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    ABSTRACT  
The history of the British Army in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars is 
generally associated with stories of British military victory and the campaigns of the Duke of 
Wellington. An intrinsic aspect of the historiography is the argument that, following British 
defeat in the Low Countries in 1795, the Army was transformed by the military reforms of 
His Royal Highness, Frederick Duke of York.  
This thesis provides a critical appraisal of the reform process with reference to the 
organisation, structure, ethos and learning capabilities of the British Army and evaluates the 
impact of the reforms upon British military performance in the Low Countries, in the period 
1793 to 1814, via a series of narrative reconstructions. This thesis directly challenges the 
transformation argument and provides a re-evaluation of British military competency in the 
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This thesis evaluates the performance of the British Army in the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars with specific reference to four of its campaigns in the 
Low Countries between 1793 and 1814. In doing so it provides a critique of the current view 
that, following the reforms of the Duke of York (1795-1809), the British Army was 
transformed into a well-led and efficient fighting force. The campaigns studied are York’s 
expedition to Flanders in 1793; the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland in 1799; the 
expedition to the island of Walcheren in 1809; and Sir Thomas Graham’s expedition to 
Bergen-Op-Zoom in 1813-14.  
During the period 1793 to 1815 the protection of the Low Countries from France was 
the overriding objective of British foreign policy. This originated from the British fear of an 
invasion being launched from the Low Countries by an aggressive foreign power – as had 
happened in 1688.1 It led the British to intervene increasingly in the affairs of the Dutch and 
to the British-inspired creation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814.2 The Low 
Countries played a dual role in British strategic thinking. On the one hand, the region was 
viewed as a staging area for a French invasion of the British Isles, whilst on the other it was 
seen as a potential springboard for British intervention in Europe.3 As J.E Cookson has 
argued, as far as the British were concerned “The most important constant in the strategic 
                                                          
1 See Steve Pincus, 1688, The First Modern Revolution (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Tim Harris, Revolution, The Great Crisis in the British Monarchy, 1685-1720 (London: Penguin, 2007); Peter 
Unwin, The Narrow Sea, Barrier, Bridge and Gateway to the World, The History of the English Channel 
(London: Headline, 2003), pp. 130-135.  
2 G.J. Renier, Great Britain and the Establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 1813-1815, A Study in 
British Foreign Policy (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930), p. 1.  
3 For an in-depth study of British society during this period see Mark Philip (ed), Resisting Napoleon, the British 
Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).  
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situation from the defeat of the First Coalition until the Dutch revolt at the end of 1813 was 
the enemy’s control of the coast north of the Channel”.4 
Throughout the eighteenth century the British had committed their military forces to 
safeguard their interests in the Low Countries and protect the region from French aggression; 
a prime example being the Duke of Marlborough’s campaigns in the Low Counties in 1705-
1708.5  During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars British strategists maintained 
this approach and instigated a number of significant British military interventions in the Low 
Countries. As Rory Muir has noted, the British government entered the war of the First 
Coalition in 1793 “For the most traditional of all reasons:  the search for security in the face 
of French aggression in the Low Countries”.6  
Naval considerations were also important and grew in strategic significance following 
the French conquest of the ports of Ostend, Flushing, Antwerp and the Helder on the Flanders 
and Dutch coasts. As Colin S. Gray has noted, in the seven wars fought between Britain and 
France in the period 1688 to 1815, “Each...was different, but virtually the same elements 
structured them all...For example, Britain was permanently sensitive to the issue of which 
state controlled the Low Countries in general and the mouth of the Scheldt...with the ports of 
Flushing and Antwerp in particular.”7 Invasion by France was the most important challenge 
to Britain during this period. If a French army had landed on the Kent or Suffolk coastline 
Britain’s very survival as an independent nation would have been under threat. At the same 
time, however, a successful British intervention in the Low Countries, with allied support, 
had the potential to threaten the foundations of French power in Northern Europe and the 
French frontier.  
                                                          
4 J.E Cookson, The British Armed Nation 1793-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 38.  
5 Richard Holmes, Marlborough, England’s Fragile Genius (London: Harper Press, 2008), pp.  324-406.  
6Rory Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815 (Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 
1996), p.1. 
7 Colin S Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power, The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War (New York: The Free 
Press, 1992), p. 165.  
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Between 1793 and 1814 six major British expeditions were sent to the Low Countries 
but, despite high expectations of military success, each ended in disaster. Moreover, despite 
the fact that historians have agreed that the Low Countries were vital to British interests, none 
has sought to undertake a comparative study of  these campaigns or to provide an explanation 
for the poor British military record during these years. This thesis sets out to redress this 
imbalance, provides a new evaluation of British strategic thinking regarding the Low 
Countries, and re-evaluates the fighting qualities of the British Army in the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with reference to its performance in the Low Countries 
between 1793 and 1814.  
Historiography  
The British Army in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has always been 
a popular topic for historians. However, as Michael Howard has pointed out, wider changes 
in the nature of military history have altered how historians have written about the British 
Army.8 Gone are the days when to write about military history was to devote one’s time 
solely to the study of battles and the creation of heroic national myths. This parochial 
approach has been largely superseded by the ‘New Military History,’ with its increasingly 
inter-disciplinary perspective on ‘War and Society’ - encompassing international relations, 
the social sciences, anthropology, gender and media studies -  as well as revising aspects of 
economic, political and constitutional history. 
Although these studies have added much needed diversity and breadth to the history 
of the British Army, exponents of this ‘New Military History’ have not sufficiently 
challenged the existing views of older generations of military historians. Furthermore, instead 
                                                          
8 Michael Howard, ‘Military history and the history of war’ in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich 
(eds), The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp.12-20; Stephen Morillo with Michael F. Pavkovic, What is Military History? 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 61. 
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of developing a unique approach of their own, advocates of the ‘New Military History’ have 
sought instead to borrow ideas and theories from other historical fields. As one historian has 
noted, “The Army”, has become, “a test subject for a variety of different theoretical 
schools”.9  This view is echoed by Joanna Bourke, who has suggested that military history 
has attracted the interests of a wide range of scholars from outside the traditional military 
history fraternity, “Much of what was identified as new military history was being written 
about outside of the historical discipline altogether. These historians drew upon approaches 
from an eclectic mix of disciplines: sociology, anthropology, economics, psychology and 
literature, to name just a few.”10 What links these approaches together is that they have 
tended to emphasise the importance of social aspects and the history of war from below.11 
Approaches which, as Jeremy Black has noted, have tended to “de-militarize” the study of 
military history.12  
Recently published examples, based on these varied approaches, about the British 
Army in the Napoleonic period include Kevin Linch & Matthew McCormack (eds), Britain's 
Soldiers: Rethinking War and Society, 1715-1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); 
Catriona Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars: Military and 
Civilian Experience in Britain and Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Mark 
Wishon, German Forces and the British Army: Interactions and Perceptions, 1742-1815 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); Catriona Kennedy and Matthew McCormack 
(eds), Soldiering in Britain and Ireland, 1750-1850: Men of Arms (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012).  
                                                          
9 William P. Tatum III, ‘Challenging the New Military History: the case of Eighteenth-Century British Army 
Studies’ History Compass 4 (2006), pp 1-13 at pp. 6-7.   
10 Joanna Bourke, ‘New Military History’ in Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott, Palgrave advances in 
modern military history (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006), p. 262. 
11 Peter Paret, ‘The New Military History’ Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, 31/3 (autumn, 
1991), pp. 13-36 at p. 16.  
12 Jeremy Black, Rethinking Military History (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), p. 6.  
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These historians owe a great deal to the work of an earlier generation of scholars who 
pioneered the study of war from social and cultural perspectives during the 1980s and 1990s. 
One of the most important studies produced in this period, which paved the way for further 
research, was John Brewer’s The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-
1783 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989). Although writing about the development of the 
fiscal-military state, Brewer placed the traditional military history of the period within its 
wider social and political context. This approach, which some have likened to the Early 
Modern Histories written by Michael Roberts and Geoffrey Parker, widened the study of war 
and encouraged historians from other fields to turn their attention to the study of eighteenth-
century military history.13  
Traditional military historians of the period, meanwhile, have been mixed in their 
response to these developments although some, such as Bruce Collins, Rory Muir and Jeremy 
Black, have incorporated social and cultural aspects into their wider histories.14 In doing so, 
these historians have provided a broader sense of perspective to the history of the British war 
effort in the period 1793 to 1815. Naval historians such as Roger Knight and David Andress 
have adopted a similar approach to John Brewer and have compared and contrasted military, 
naval, economic, social and political factors in order to evaluate the impact of the war on the 
development of the British state and its war fighting capabilities.15 Andrew Bamford and 
Carole Divall, meanwhile, have created both traditional campaign histories and social 
                                                          
13 Tatum III, ‘Challenging the New Military History,’ p.5; Jeremy Black, ‘Eighteenth-Century English Politics: 
Recent Work and Current Problems’ Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, Vol. 25 No. 3 
(Autumn, 1993), pp. 419-441 at p. 438; Jeremy Black, ‘Historiographical Essay: Britain as a Military Power, 
1688-1815’ JMHS, Vol. 64 No. 1 (Jan., 2000), pp. 159-177 at pp. 159-160.  
14 See Bruce Collins, War and Empire: The Expansion of Britain 1790-1830 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2010); 
Rory Muir, Britain and the defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815 (Yale: Yale University Press, 1996); Jeremy Black, 
Britain as a military power 1688-1815 (London: UCL Press, 1999).  
15 Roger Knight, Britain against Napoleon: The Organisation of Victory 1793-1815 (London: Allen Lane, 
2013); David Andress, The Savage Storm: Britain on the brink in the age of Napoleon (London: Little Brown, 
2012); N.A.M Rodger, ‘Review of Roger Knight and Martin Wilcox, Sustaining the Fleet, 1793–1815: War, the 
British Navy and the Contractor State & Janet MacDonald, The British Navy’s Victualling Board, 1793-1815: 
Management Competence and Incompetence’ EHR, cxxvi. 519 (April 2011), pp. 465-466.  
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studies.16 This approach has, however, not been replicated by the majority of traditional 
military historians who have otherwise been content to write about the same limited range of 
topics and have not sought to question, or revise, established arguments.  
Instead the traditional, and popular, history of the British Army in the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars has come to be dominated by a ‘heroic narrative’ based 
on the study of British victories: “Popular works on the Napoleonic era necessarily follow a 
rather set pattern. In Britain, for example, the bookshelves groan under the weight of works 
on Nelson and Trafalgar, or Wellington at Waterloo. These are the heroic narratives and the 
icons of British national identity.”17 Regimental historians of the British Army in this period 
have furthered many of these national myths. As Michael Howard has noted, the 
“Historiographical tradition” of the British Army, “is that of a regimental history writ large, a 
rather selective regimental history at that. The regimental historian…is expected to chronicle 
triumphs, not disasters. His purpose is morale building, not dispassionate analysis.”18 
The history of the British Army in this period has become synonymous with the study 
of British victories and the career path of the Duke of Wellington. For example, recently 
published material about Wellington and his campaigns includes: Nick Lipscombe, 
Wellington’s Guns, The Untold Story of Wellington and his Guns in the Peninsula and at 
Waterloo (Oxford: Osprey, 2013); Rory Muir, Wellington, The Path to Victory, 1769-1814 
(New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2013); Raymond P. Cusick, Wellington’s 
Rifles, The Origins, Development and Battles of the Rifle Regiments in the Peninsular War 
                                                          
16 Examples  include (Traditional): Andrew Bamford, A Bold and Ambitious Enterprise, The British Army in the 
Low Countries 1813-1814 (Barnsley: Frontline, 2013); Carole Divall, Burgos 1812: Wellington’s Worst Scrape 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2012) (New): Andrew Bamford, Sickness, Suffering and the Sword, The British 
Regiment on Campaign, 1808-1815 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013);Carole Divall, Napoleonic 
Lives, Researching the British Soldiers of the Napoleonic Wars (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2012); Carole Divall, 
Redcoats Against Napoleon, The 30th Regiment During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Barnsley: Pen 
& Sword, 2009).  
17 Dominic Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814 (London: Penguin, 2010, 
Orig. pub. 2009), pp. 3-4.  
18 Howard, ‘Military history and the history of war’, p.14.  
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and at Waterloo From 1758 to 1815 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2013); Huw J. Davies, 
Wellington’s Wars, The Making of a Military Genius (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2012); David Buttery, Wellington against Junot, The First Invasion of 
Portugal 1807-1808 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011); Peter Snow, To War with Wellington, 
From the Peninsula to Waterloo (London: John Murray, 2010); T.A Heathcote, Wellington’s 
Peninsular War Generals and Their Battles (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2010); Ron McGuigan, 
Howie Muir & Rory Muir, Inside Wellington’s Peninsular Army (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 
2006).  
Indeed, such is the proliferation of books on Wellington that students new to the 
subject might be forgiven for thinking that he, rather than York, was Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army and that the forces he commanded, in the Iberian Peninsula and at Waterloo, 
constituted the British Army. On the contrary, Wellington did not become Commander-in-
Chief until 1842 and neither did he command the British Army in the Iberian Peninsula or at 
Waterloo – these armies were in fact expeditionary forces which were despatched for specific 
purposes.  
Moreover, in focusing so much attention on Wellington’s Iberian victories, historians 
have largely ignored the poor record of the Army in other theatres of war over the course of 
the wider period 1793 to 1815. Unlike their victorious record in Spain and Portugal, the 
British struggled to achieve success in the Low Countries and were defeated on several 
occasions over the course of the period. Characteristic failings made by the British in the Low 
Countries in 1793 to 1814 included: lack of coherent strategic thinking regarding aims and 
means; poor military planning; over reliance on unreliable intelligence reports; lack of 
accurate maps; breakdowns in civil-military relations; disrespect on the part of the British 
Army for the actions and fighting qualities of Allied forces; and the inability of the British 
officer corps to identify, analyse and learn from past mistakes.  
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One of the problems for historians interested in the other campaigns fought by the 
British Army in the period 1793 to 1815 is that there are significantly fewer printed primary 
source materials available than for those scholars interested in the Peninsular War. Most of 
the well-known soldiers’ accounts used by historians of British Army in the Peninsular War 
were printed after the publication of Major General William Napier’s six-volume History of 
the Peninsular War between 1828 and 1840. Napier’s history greatly popularised the genre of 
military memoirs amongst the general public and helped lay the foundations for the 
development of popular history.19After years of military defeats, British triumph in the 
Iberian Peninsula captured the imagination of the general public and encouraged further 
interest in the subject. Furthermore, with the general public eager for tales of British victories 
and adventures in Spain, Portugal and at Waterloo, interest in the less successful campaigns 
fought by the army in earlier years did not attract or stimulate the same level of interest. The 
relative lack of printed sources is particularly acute for the scholar of the British Army in the 
Low Countries in the campaigns fought from 1793 to 1795 – one of the only memoirs in print 
being Corporal Brown’s Campaigns in the Low Countries, Recollections of a Coldstream 
Guard in the early campaigns against Revolutionary France 1793-1795.20  
The Transformation of the British Army 1795 to 1815? 
The steady, knowledgeable and thorough-going reform that was carried out by 
Frederick, Duke of York between 1798 and 1809 transformed the British Army and 
laid the basis for its series of victories in the Peninsular War that contributed so 
                                                          
19 Hew Strachan, ’The Idea of War’ in Catherine Mary McLoughlin (ed), The Cambridge Companion to War 
Writing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 7-13 at p. 13.  
20 Other examples include: Captain L. T. Jones, An Historical Journal of the British Campaign on the Continent 
in the Year 1794 (London, 1797); Sir Harry Verney (ed) The Journals and Correspondence of General Sir 
Harry Calvert, comprising the campaigns in Flanders and Holland in 1793-4 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 
1823); Anon, The Present State of the British Army in Flanders, with an authentic account of the British retreat 
from before Dunkirk by a British officer in that Army who was living on the 24th of September (London: H.D 
Symonds, 1793). Several memoirs have also been studied by historians in journal articles i.e Colonel H.C.B 
Cook (ed), ‘The St George Diary A junior regimental officer in the Low Countries, 1794-95’ JSAHR, V. 47 
(1969). Also located at TNA: SSR/7745/14 ‘A Junior Regimental Officer in the Low Countries 1794-1795’.  
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significantly to the downfall of the Napoleonic Empire. Rightly, may the Duke of 
York be called the Architect of Victory.21 
This view by John Peaty is based heavily on Richard Glover’s Peninsular 
Preparation, The Reform of the British Army 1795 to 1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1963).22 Glover argued that, after the British defeat in the American War of 
Independence (1776-1783) the British Army suffered a decade of neglect and decay which 
contributed to several poor British military performances in the early years of the French 
Revolutionary Wars, most notably in the Low Countries in 1793-1795. Despite this, Glover 
contended that, over the course of the following years, the Army was transformed by a series 
of reforms instigated by the new Commander-in-Chief of the Army, His Royal Highness 
Frederick, Duke of York and that these changes enabled the Army to improve its 
performance and achieve a series of decisive victories against the French during the later 
years of the Napoleonic Wars.23  
Despite the major developments in the field of military history since Peninsular 
Preparation was published, military historians have never sought to evaluate Glover’s 
arguments and have gradually woven his ‘transformation thesis’ into the fabric of the 
dominant historiography of the British Army. John Houlding, for example, has tried to place 
the York’s reforms into the wider context of British military developments in the eighteenth 
century, whilst Piers Mackesy pointed to the British victory in Egypt in 1801 as proof of the 
reforms’ transformative effects on British military performance.24 Recent academic and 
                                                          
21 Dr. John Peaty, ‘Architect of Victory: The Reforms of the Duke of York,’ Paper presented at the International 
Commission for Military History Annual Congress, Madrid, August 26, 2005, BCMH Newsletter: ‘Land & Sea 
Warfare in the Age of Nelson and Wellington,’(Autumn, 2005), pp.31-39 at p. 39 
22 The Duke of York’s reforms had already formed the subject of historical inquiry before Glover published 
Peninsular Preparation but had not been earmarked as having had a transformative effect. Two historians to 
analyse the reforms before Glover were: Sir John Fortescue in his History of the British Army and Julia H. 
Macleod, ‘The Duke of York's Plans for the Army’ HLQ, Vol. 9 No. 1 (Nov., 1945), pp. 95-100.  
23 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 12-13.  
24 John Houlding, Fit for Service, The Training of the British Army 1715-1795 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1981); Piers Mackesy, The British Victory in Egypt, The End of Napoleon’s Conquest (London: Taurus, 
2010, org. pub. 1995);Hew Strachan, ‘Review of Glover, Peninsula Preparation, Houlding, Fit for Service and 
Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt’ EHR, Vol. 112  No.446 (Apr., 1997), p.497. Other historians who have 
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popular studies have further reinforced and bolstered these existing arguments. In his major 
new study of the British regimental system, Andrew Bamford has argued that York’s reforms 
constituted “one of the great internal overhauls” in British military history, changes which 
made the British Army “a far more professional body than heretofore.”25  Roger Knight has 
presented York as “a natural bureaucrat” who had an “active appreciation of what was wrong 
with the army” and who worked alongside other government and naval reformers to improve 
the British military machine and pave the way for victory.26 Rory Muir, in his biography of 
Wellington, has contended that York’s reforms not only transformed the administration of the 
Army, but also led to a transformation in terms of British military performance:  
The Duke of York was not just the son of George III; he was also the man who had 
supervised the reform of the British Army, replacing flagrant abuses of patronage 
and promotion with a well-regulated system, and laying the foundations for the 
success that it was to achieve in the coming years.27  
 
Not only are several aspects of this argument flawed, but none of these historians has 
produced a generally accepted explanation of what is meant by the term ‘transformation’. 
Although there have been detailed descriptions of the reforms themselves, there has been 
little attempt to question to what extent these reforms actually led to transformation. 
Historians have not identified criteria by which to analyse whether, and to what extent, the 
reforms were transformative in nature. Before considering a set of criteria for transformation, 
it is necessary to define terms.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
furthered these arguments include: Corelli Barnet, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, A Military, Political and 
Social Survey (London: Allen Lane, 1970) , pp. 239-246; Peaty, ‘Architect of Victory’, pp. 31-39; David Gates, 
‘The Transformation of the British Army 1783-1815’ in David Chandler and Ian Beckett (eds)., The Oxford 
History of the British Army (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, org. pub. 1994), pp. 132-160; Mark Urban, 
Generals, The Ten British Commanders Who Shaped the World (London: Faber & Faber, 2005), pp. 95-119.  
25 Bamford, Sickness, Suffering and the Sword, pp. xx, 3.  
26 Knight, Britain against Napoleon, pp.103-104. 
27 Muir, Wellington, p.  289. 
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Definition of terms  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, transformation is defined as the process 
by which something is changed from one state of affairs to another: a “considerable change” 
or “metamorphosis” in “form, character and appearance”. For a transformation to occur in an 
organisation something more profound than incremental reform is required – its members 
should think, act and perform in a noticeably different manner from before. In order to 
evaluate the transformation thesis more critically it is necessary to place Glover’s thesis in the 
context of wider arguments about transformation and the nature of change in military affairs.  
Evaluating the significance of change in military affairs has been a constant thread in 
the work of historians. For example, Michael Roberts coined the term ‘Military Revolution’ 
to describe many of the major military changes which occurred in European warfare in the 
early modern period.28 Other historians have further refined and critically evaluated the 
validity of this concept.29 Although this may be the case for the term ‘Military Revolution,’ 
some of the other terms used by historians to describe military change are not as well defined 
or understood. Military historians have often used the term ‘transformation’ to describe the 
process of military change, but have not sought to explain the concept itself.  
 Furthermore, much of what has been written about the scope of transformation in 
military contexts has been generated by current debates between Western defence analysts 
about future war. During the 1990s American and British military thinkers developed a new 
conceptual framework in order to understand and evaluate military changes more rigorously. 
At the heart of the new framework was the idea that the post-Cold War American military 
                                                          
28 Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560-1660’ in Clifford J. Rogers (ed), The Military Revolution 
Debate, Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Westview, 1995), pp. 13-36.  
29 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution, Military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500-1800 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate; Williamson Murray 
and MacGregor Knox (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).  
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was experiencing a technology-led ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) one which would 
alter the way future wars would be fought.30 Since the idea of an RMA was postulated, the 
subject has gained in popularity amongst military analysts, historians, journalists and even 
politicians, and has been more widely applied to encompass other aspects of military change.  
One idea which developed out of the wider RMA debate was that, since the beginning 
of the twenty first century, the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain have been 
undergoing a technology-led transformation.31 Although it is not the purpose of this thesis to 
analyse in detail modern theories about transformation in current military affairs, it is 
important to demonstrate the absence of any similar analytical thinking or framework in the 
work of military historians of the Napoleonic period. Therefore, the concepts and criteria 
developed for transformation by current analysts provide a useful comparator by which to 
examine whether the changes made by York to the British Army in 1795 to 1809 were truly 
transformative.   
  In the modern debates, Paul David has pointed out that the process of 
transformation should not be confused with that of reform. According to David, 
transformation is a significant change in the way an army functions and operates, brought 
about by a series of dramatic developments. In contrast, reform is merely a gradual process of 
                                                          
30 Murray and Knox, ‘Thinking about revolutions in warfare’ in Dynamics of Military Revolution, pp. 1-14; 
Morillo with Pavkovic, What is Military History?, pp.76-77; Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History, Essays on 
Theory and Practice (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), pp. 113-119; Andrew Latham, ‘Warfare Transformed: A 
Braudelian Perspective on the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ EJIR, 8:2 (2002), pp. 231-266 at pp. 231-235.  
31 See United States Department of Defence ‘Transformation Planning Guidance” April 2003 
http://www.defense.gov/brac/docs/transformationplanningapr03.pdf, pp. 1-34;  Robert T. Foley, Stuart Griffin 
and Helen McCartney ‘‘Transformation in contact’: learning the lessons of modern war’ International Affairs 
87:2 (2011), pp. 253–270 at p. 255; Eliot A. Cohen (2004) ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs’ JSS, 
27:3, pp. 395-407 at p. 395; Theo Farrell, ‘The dynamics of British military transformation’ International 
Affairs, 84: 4 (2008), pp. 777–807. For further debates about RMAs and established military theory see David 
Lonsdale, ‘Clausewitz and Information Warfare’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds)., 
Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 231-250; Andrew N. 
Liaropoulos, ‘Revolutions in Warfare: Theoretical Paradigms and Historical Evidence: The Napoleonic and 
First World War Revolutions in Military Affairs’ JMHS, Vol. 70 No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 363-384. 
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improvement made to existing practices.32 Similarly, Leonard L. Lira has argued the need for 
a clear distinction to be made between transformative change and the process of reform. 
Influenced by the work of social scientists, such as K.K Smith, Amir Levy and Uri Merry, 
Lira has argued that military thinkers need to take a more nuanced approach to the subject of 
change and the value of social theory.  
One of the ideas borrowed by Lira from social science is that change can be split in 
two and analysed as either first or second order change.33 ‘First order change’, according to 
Lira, can be of great benefit to an organisation since it can iron out teething problems and 
lead to improved performance. Lira, however, is keen to stress that first order change can 
only go so far because it does not bring about a change of mind-set or culture. According to 
Lira, ‘Second order change’ transcends functional aspects and alters the “Founding 
assumptions, concepts, values and practices” which define how members of an organisation 
operate.34 Lira’s analysis aptly describes the distinction which should be made by historians 
between military reform and transformation.  
For transformation to occur, therefore, the personnel within an organisation must alter 
their ethos and core values and be ready to make major administrative and functional changes 
over time –administrative and organisational changes on their own are not enough to bring 
about transformative change. The changes made must transcend incremental reforms and lead 
to self-sustaining improvements in functions and performance. The changes made to the 
                                                          
32 Paul K David, ‘Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and what lies ahead?’ in Stephen J. Cimbala 
(ed), The George W. Bush Defence Program: Policy, Strategy, and War (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2010), p. 11. 
Also available online at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1413.html .  
33 Leonard L. Lira, ‘Transformation and the Evolution of the Professional Military Ethic: A current assessment’ 
A paper presented for the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Centre at 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the CGSC Foundation, Inc. Conference on Exploring the Professional Military 
Ethic 15-18 November 2010, www.leavenworthethicssymposium.org/resource/resmgr/2010.../Lira.pdf. Also 
published in Mark H. Wiggins and Chaplain (Maj.) Larry Dabeck (eds)., Symposium Report, Fort Leavenworth 
Ethics Symposium, Exploring the Professional Military Ethic (Fort Leavenworth: CGSC Foundation Press, 
2011), pp. 221-234.   
34 Lira, ‘Transformation’, p. 2.  
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British Army between 1795 and 1809 were incremental and did not alter the ethos or culture 
of the Army in the ways required for the changes to be transformative in nature. As this thesis 
will demonstrate, although York’s reforms led to some improvements, they did not lead to 
improved military performance which must surely be the test of whether an army has been 
transformed.  
Methodology and Structure  
 This thesis started as an MPhil dissertation about the disastrous British expedition to 
the Scheldt in 1809. The initial assumption was that this defeat was an atypical experience for 
the British Army. However, further research into British military campaigns in the Low 
Countries in 1793 to 1815 revealed that the British Army had suffered more than its fair share 
of defeats in this ‘Cockpit ‘of Europe. It gradually became apparent that these defeats were 
caused by errors of judgement on the part of British commanders and that these mistakes 
were repeated by the British in other theatres of war.  
This discovery demonstrated the need to question the validity of Glover’s 
transformation thesis and the impact of the reforms and to place greater emphasis on Britain’s 
military experience in the Low Countries. Instead of focusing on just one campaign, the 
scope of the research was broadened in order to study the conduct and performance of the 
British Army in four campaigns in the Low Countries over the course of 1793 to 1814. 
Additionally, it was also necessary to place British military culture, and the character of 
York’s reforms within the context of wider military developments and European military 
culture. Only then would it be possible to pronounce on the relative quality of the British 
Army and the impact of the reforms.  
 The thesis is structured as follows: the first chapter outlines the state of the Army in 
1793 and its poor performance in the Dunkirk campaign of that year. Chapter two briefly 
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analyses the British defeat in the Low Countries in 1794 and 1795 and evaluates the 
subsequent reforms made to the British Army by York. Chapters three, four and five analyse 
three further British defeats in the Low Countries, between 1799 and 1814, demonstrating the 
lack of impact of the reforms and the Army’s inability to learn. The concluding section 
summarises the main points raised in the thesis and confirms the argument that the British 
Army was not transformed by York’s reforms. Given the lack of research that has been 
undertaken into the campaigns of the British Army in the Low Countries it was essential to 
place each of the campaigns within a wider context. Thus, in addition to the focus on 
operational military history, each chapter also includes a discussion of Anglo-Dutch relations 
and wider British strategic aims and objectives. This extended line of inquiry required 
research in a range of archives and museums across the British Isles as well as a review of the 
relevant secondary literature.35  
Source materials  
Because this thesis is predominantly about British military culture and operational 
performance the primary sources materials used in its creation were those of the senior 
politicians and diplomats who framed British strategy and the military figures who were 
tasked with its execution. It is not about the conduct and experiences of the ‘ordinary soldier’. 
This approach is also reflected in the choice of secondary source material, with the emphasis 
being primarily placed upon political, strategic and military histories rather than social 
studies or the surviving letters of individual soldiers.   
Such a study would not have been possible without regular visits to read the personal 
papers and official military reports housed at The National Archives (TNA). Indeed the bulk 
of the official military documents relating to British military operations in the French 
                                                          
35 For a comprehensive list of the secondary sources used see Bibliography.  
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Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars are stored at TNA within the War Office (WO) 
collections. Other items located at the TNA that have proved useful are the maps and plans 
stored in the Map Room, the many naval intelligence reports located within the Admiralty 
Office collections (ADM) and the letters and correspondence of officials at the Foreign 
Office (FO).  
Alongside TNA, The British Library (BL) has also provided a rich source of primary 
and secondary material; particularly for the personal papers of British politicians, such as 
William Huskisson and Lord Auckland, and for more obscure journal articles, such as the 
Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. The Templer Study Centre at The National Army 
Museum (NAM) also provided a large number of important manuscript materials, such as 
those of Captain Peter Bowlby. The Caird library at The National Maritime Museum (NMM) 
also provided useful source material, especially the personal papers of Vice-Admiral Sir 
Richard Goodwin Keats.   
Due to the large number of Scottish officers in the British Army during the period in 
question, it was also necessary to visit both The National Archives of Scotland (NAS) and 
The National Library of Scotland (NLS) in Edinburgh. Both of these provided source 
materials which were not available south of the border: most notably ‘the Military Notebook 
and Papers of General Sir Thomas Graham’. Alongside trips to both London and Edinburgh, 
the secondary source materials and unpublished dissertations located at the Bodleian Library 
and at All Souls College Cambridge have also been of use. Similar research was also 
undertaken at Warwick University, the Cadbury research archive at the University of 
Birmingham and at Birmingham Central Library.   
The internet has also been an invaluable tool, especially the Internet Archive with its 
ever expanding collection of digitized books, military manuals and personal papers, such as 
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the Dropmore papers. Other useful electronic sources include the online versions of the 
Parliamentary Papers (PP), older editions of newspaper articles and the online depository for 











THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DUNKIRK CAMPAIGN, 1793 
The Ministers and the Military 
Unlike the Royal Navy, which was administered and directed in wartime by the 
Cabinet, the First Lords of the Admiralty and the officials in the Admiralty office, the Army 
did not possess a clear chain of command. The symbolic and ceremonial head of the British 
Army was His Majesty the King, George III. Despite being refused the chance to gain active 
military experience during the Seven Years’ War, the King nurtured a keen interest in 
political and military affairs and was the commanding officer of both the Foot Guards and the 
Household Cavalry. Over the course of the Napoleonic period, the King played a key role in 
the management of promotions and his powers of patronage allowed him to maintain an 
influence over appointments.1 That all major military and strategic decisions needed royal 
approval also meant that the King was always well informed about the war effort and this 
enabled him to influence wider political and military aspects.2  
Directly answerable to the King and to Parliament was the Commander-in-Chief (C-
in-C) who was chiefly responsible for the upkeep and organisation of the regular forces, both 
at home and abroad. The C-in-C was supported in these tasks at the Horse Guards by the 
Adjutant (AG) and Quartermaster Generals (QMG) – the former was tasked with the upkeep 
of the Army whilst the later was responsible for its movements and supply. The Royal 
Artillery and Engineers benefitted from being administered separately by the Ordnance 
Department, headed by the Master General who was also responsible for the procurement of 
                                                          
1 Jeremy Black, George III, America’s Last King (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2008, org. pub 
2006), pp. 117-119. 
2 Jeremy Black, ‘British Strategy and the Struggle with France 1793–1815’ JSS, Vol. 31 No. 4 (August 2008), 
pp. 553-569 at pp. 560-562.  
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military equipment and ammunition. 3 The C-in-C also relied on a number of other 
administrative officials and organisations, such as the medical officials of the Army Medical 
Board and the military representatives at the Treasury. But, although influential in military 
administrative affairs, the C-in-C had relatively little influence over British strategy and the 
planning of military expeditions. Instead, the key persons who were responsible for the 
direction of British strategy and the deployment of the Army were the senior politicians based 
at Whitehall, in particular the Prime Minister and the Secretaries of State for War and Foreign 
Affairs. 4 
 During the early years of the French wars the incumbents of these key positions were 
William Pitt the Younger, Sir Henry Dundas (later Lord Melville), and Sir William Grenville. 
Pitt had risen to power in 1783, thanks largely to the support of the King, who deeply disliked 
the opposition Whigs and their leader Charles Fox. From 1783 to 1801 Pitt, Dundas and 
Grenville formed the key triumvirate in British political and strategic circles alongside the 
King.5 The King continued to play a formative role in British politics and the conduct of the 
war during the period 1793 to 1810, a period which witnessed a range of governmental 
changes as British military fortunes went from bad to worse in Europe. Despite the political 
turmoil, however, the key British government posts largely remained in the hands of a small 
group of ministers, many of whom were Pitt’s friends and protégées.6 Indeed, as Jennifer 
Mori has suggested, during the 1790s Dundas and Grenville were more akin to being Pitt’s 
political ‘creatures’ than his friends.7 Over the course of the following decades, the King’s 
grip over British politics gradually waned, due to a combination of the deterioration of the 
                                                          
3 Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 36.  
4 Rory Muir and Charles Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government: the Wars against 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 1793-1815’ in C.M Woolgar (ed), Wellington Studies I (Hartley Institute: 
University of Southampton, 1996), pp. 1-91 at pp. 6-9.  
5 Michael J. Turner, Pitt the Younger: A life (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2003), p. 121.  
6 J. Holland Rose, William Pitt and the Great War (London: Bell & Sons, 1912), pp. 454-482, esp. pp. 466-467.  
7 Jennifer Mori, William Pitt and the French Revolution 1785-1795 (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), 
p. 270.  
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King’s mental health and an increase in the power of the executive, with its growing 
emphasis on cabinet politics.8 Thus the British war effort in the years 1793 to 1815 was 
managed and maintained by a small number of people. It must be remembered that the 
creation of a dedicated civil service and the development of professionally trained 
government officials was still some way in the future.9 In the political realm, it was not 
unusual for a senior minister to hold a number of different and complex governmental posts 
at the same time. For example, Henry Dundas, Britain’s first Secretary for War in the period 
1793 to 1801, was also Home Secretary and the President of the Board of Control.10  
The British Army on the eve of War 
Our army was lax in its discipline, entirely without system, and very weak in 
numbers. Each Colonel of a regiment managed it according to his own notions, or 
neglected it altogether. There was no uniformity of drill or movement; professional 
pride was rare; professional knowledge still more so. 11 
This statement, written by Henry Bunbury, highlights some of the British Army’s 
significant weaknesses at the start of the French Revolutionary Wars. Dejected after its defeat 
in America, the Army had returned to Britain with little to show for its endeavours. Despite 
some battlefield success, particularly in the early years of the war, the increased scope and 
scale of the conflict after 1778 had stretched British military and naval resources to breaking 
point.12  Although other factors played a part in British defeat in 1783, poor strategic and 
                                                          
8 Peter Jupp, The Governing of Britain 1688-1848, The Executive, Parliament and the People (London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 118-121; Knight, Britain against Napoleon, pp. 96-121, 213-250; Muir, Britain and the 
Defeat of Napoleon, pp. 9-13; Muir and Esdaile, ‘Strategic Planning in a Time of Small Government’, pp. 16-
19.  
9 There was no such thing as a professionally-minded ‘Civil Service’ in Britain until after the publication of the 
Northcote-Trevelyan Report in 1855. For more on the origins of the Civil Service see: Rodney Lowe, The 
Official History of the British Civil Service, Reforming the Civil Service, Volume 1: The Fulton Years, 1966-81 
(London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 17-40.   
10 Holden Fuber, Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742-1811, Political Manager of Scotland, Statesmen, 
Administrator of India  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931),  p. 75.   
11 Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Bunbury, Narratives of the some passages in the great war with France, from 
1799 to 1810 (London: Richard Bentley, 1854), p. 1; G.A Steppler, ‘The British Army on the Eve of War’ in 
A.J Guy (ed)., The Road to Waterloo, The British Army and the struggle against Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
France 1793-1815 (London: National Army Museum Publications, 1990), pp. 4-15 at p. 4.  
12 Stephan Conway, ‘Britain and the Revolutionary Crisis’ in P.J Marshall (ed), The Eighteenth-Century, 
Volume II, The Oxford History of the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, org. pub.1998), 
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military planning were major factors, particularly in the humiliating defeats suffered by the 
British at Saratoga in 1777 and Yorktown in 1781.13 Furthermore the lack of popular support 
for the war in Britain hindered recruitment levels and necessitated the use of German 
mercenaries in British service. Naval recruitment had also proved difficult during the early 
years of the American War and only gained in popularity after the French declared war on 
Great Britain in 1778. 14  
The crushing military and naval defeat of British forces by the combined American 
and French armies at Yorktown in 1781 was a strategic hammer blow for the British war 
effort and hastened calls for an armistice, which was negotiated at Paris in 1783.15 The 
reputation of the British Army, which had been high since the Seven Years’ War (1756-
1763), had been turned upside down and the force which returned from America needed 
drastic reform. War weary and financially exhausted, however, the British government was in 
no position to undertake costly reform and the politicians eschewed the need for change and 
demobilised the bulk of the Army.16   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pp. 325-346 at pp. 340-341. The catalyst for the enlargement of the conflict had been the British defeat at 
Saratoga in 1777 and the French intervention on the side of the Colonists. For details of the immediate British 
response to these events and the origins of British strategic overstretch see: Gerald S. Brown, ‘The Anglo-
French Naval Crisis, 1778: A Study of Conflict in the North Cabinet’ WMQ, Third Series, Vol. 13 No. 1 (Jan., 
1956), pp. 3-25.  
13 William B. Willcox, ‘Too Many Cooks: British Planning before Saratoga’ JBS, Vol. 2 No. 1 (Nov., 1962), pp. 
56-90; William B. Willcox, ‘The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command’ AHR, Vol. 52 No. 1 
(Oct., 1946), pp. 1-35.  
14For details of the recruitment of the British armed services in these years see: Stephen Conway, ‘The Politics 
of British Military and Naval Mobilization, 1775-83’ EHR, Vol. 112 No. 449 (Nov., 1997), pp. 1179-1201; 
Stephen Conway, ‘British Army Officers and the American War for Independence’ WMQ, Third Series, Vol. 41 
No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 265-276; Stephen Conway, ‘To Subdue America: British Army Officers and the 
Conduct of the Revolutionary War’ WMQ, Third Series, Vol. 43 No. 3 (Jul., 1986), pp. 381-407; Stephen 
Conway, The British Army, “Military Europe,” and the American War of Independence WMQ, Vol. 67 No. 1 
(January 2010), pp. 69-100; Brendan Simms, Three Victories and a Defeat, The Rise and Fall of the First 
British Empire, 1714-1783 (London:. Penguin. 2008), pp. 596-597, 618.   
15 For a recent study of the Yorktown campaign and the siege see: Jerome A Greene, The Guns of Independence, 
The Siege of Yorktown, 1781 (New York: Savas Beatie, 2005).  
16 H.C.B Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth-Century (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 27.  
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Demobilisation was rapid, the Army shrank in size from its wartime strength of over 
90,000 officers and men to well below 50,000 in a year.17 The remaining regiments were 
redeployed across the globe to guard what remained of the British Empire, leaving a skeleton 
force in the British Isles. The British Army at home continued to be reduced, save for a brief 
period around the time of the Nootka Sound crisis in 1790 and by 1792 there were barely 
13,092 officers and men fit for service out of a total garrison of 15,919. The British Army as 
a whole, including the garrisons in the Caribbean, Canada, Australia, India, Gibraltar and the 
Bahamas, officially numbered 43,717, of whom 36, 557 were listed as “effectives”.18 These 
numbers were in keeping with the strength of the British Army in the period 1775 to 1777.19  
The meagre size of the Army in Great Britain was necessitated by both cultural and 
financial factors. The British public had long been averse to the existence of a large standing 
Army because of the perceived threat that this would pose to British liberty; sentiments which 
could be traced back to the English Civil Wars and to the aftermath of the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688.20 The general public was also opposed to the creation of barracks, 
fearing that these would enable the government to gather troops together in order to impose 
their will on the populace. This latter concern had little merit since in the absence of purpose-
                                                          
17 Figures taken from: ‘Return of the number of effective men in the British army, from the 1st January 1775 to 
the 1st January 1783; distinguishing each year:--as far as can be made up from the documents in the War-
Office’ by Richard Fitzpatrick, 22nd May 1806:  House of Commons, Parliamentary Papers Online (Proquest, 
2006), Table 172, p. 393; Kevin Barry Linch, ‘The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815’ Ph.D Thesis, 
University of Leeds (October, 2001), p. 21.   
18 Knight, Britain against Napoleon, p. 51; PP: An account of the effective numbers and established strength of 
regiments of cavalry, guards, and infantry, borne on the British establishment; and the general distribution of the 
said forces; in the years 1791 and 1792’ by Lord Palmerston, 22 February 1816: House of Commons, 
Parliamentary Papers Online (Proquest, 2006), Table. 40, p. 391. See also: J.W Fortescue, A History of the 
British Army, Vol. III 1763-1793 (London: Macmillan, 1911), p. 526. For analysis of the Nootka Sound crisis 
see: Howard V. Evans, ‘The Nootka Sound Controversy in Anglo-French Diplomacy—1790’ JMH, Vol. 46 No. 
4 (Dec., 1974), pp. 609-640.  
19PP: ‘Return of the number of effective men in the British Army, from the 1st January 1775 to the 1st January 
1783; distinguishing each year:--as far as can be made up from the documents in the War-Office’ by Richard 
Fitzpatrick, 22nd May 1806: (Proquest, 2006), Table 172, p. 393.  
20 Colin Kidd, British Identities before Nationalism, Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World 1600-1800  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, repr. 2004), p. 266, Hannah Smith, ‘Politics, Patriotism, and 
Gender: The Standing Army Debate on the English Stage, circa 1689—1720’ JBS, Vol. 50 No. 1 (JANUARY 
2011), pp. 48-75; Jack P. Greene, ‘Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American 
Revolution’ in Marshall (ed), The Eighteenth-Century, Volume II, pp. 208-230.  
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built accommodation and an official police force, soldiers were both billeted with civilians 
and employed to maintain order, factors which increased existing tensions.21  
The lack of a nationwide system of barracks, combined with the need for British 
troops to be dispersed across the country in small groups to keep the peace, greatly hindered 
the effective training of the troops. Unlike the French and Prussians, who regularly staged 
large peacetime training camps, it was usually only in times of war that the British were able 
to gather large numbers in camps.22 The multiplicity of roles which the Army was expected 
to perform, combined with the need to spread the forces across the globe, militated against 
the development of standard drills and training methods for the infantry and cavalry.  
The lack of training opportunities not only hindered the drilling of the troops, but also 
hampered the development of higher command skills amongst the officer corps. With few 
opportunities to train in camp, veteran officers had to rely on what they had previously 
experienced, which generally meant the skills cultivated in America during the War of 
Independence.  A major problem with this approach, however, was that the skills that had 
proved useful in American conditions were not necessarily good preparation for European 
war.23 Few British officers had experience of European warfare or indeed knew what it was 
like to command large forces on a European battlefield.  
The forces involved in the War of Independence were pitifully small by European 
standards. For example, Cornwallis’s army in the campaigns in the Carolinas and Virginia in 
                                                          
21 Brewer, The Sinews of Power, p. 43.  
22 Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, 1740-1813 From Frederick the Great to Napoleon (London: 
Frank Cass, 2005), p. 20; Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (London: David & Charles, 
1974), p.37.Several maps of British training camps are located at the National Archives and include: TNA WO 
78/ 5825: – ‘Plan of Encampments of Swindley Camp – (under Duke of York and David Dundas) – 29 June 
1800’, TNA WO 78/ 5824: ‘Plan of Encampments of Bagshot Heath – 1 –Jan. 1799, 31 Dec. 1799, TNA WO 
78/ 5823: ‘Plan of Encampments of Windsor Forest’ 24 June 1799, TNA WO 78/ 5822: ‘Plan of Encampments 
of Windsor Forest 23 July 1798’,  TNA WO 78/5824: Plan of Encampments at Bagshot Heath, on 1 January and 
31 December 1799. For camps example of a camp at Winkfield see TNA WO 78/ 5821, Colchester see TNA 
WO 78/ 5820, and Windsor Park in 1805 see TNA WO 78/ 5826.  
23 Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. III, pp. 535-539.  
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1780-81 was no bigger than around 8,000 men at the peak of the fighting. On many occasions 
such as the Battle of Green Spring Farm, during the Yorktown campaign in 1781, the number 
of British troops involved did not exceed 2,500.24 In contrast, York was expected to 
command around 35,000 troops in 1793, five thousand more than the entire British military 
presence in the American Colonies in 1776.25  
The small-scale nature of the armies in America meant that the majority of the officer 
corps of the British Army, save those of Dundas’s generation, went to war in 1793 with as 
J.A Houlding notes “Little or no experience of manoeuvring in brigade, let alone in the lines 
and columns adopted on campaign” and the majority were forced to “learn their business on 
the spot.”26 Lack of training in large formations, combined with the small-scale character of 
the war in America, meant that the British officer corps in 1793 was largely bereft of generals 
who had the necessary skills to command large formations on campaign. This continued to 
hinder the improvement of the British Army throughout the conflict and, as Wellington later 
noted of his colleagues, “I have often said that if there were eight to ten thousand men in 
Hyde Park, it is not every general that would know how to get them out again…’.27  
The continued rotation of battalions to and from different parts of the British Isles and 
the globe was also disruptive, with different types of drill favoured in different climes. The 
movement of officers also hindered training techniques, especially if a regiment received a 
change of commanding officer. It was customary for colonels to train their men according to 
their own methods. The result was chaotic with regiments being drilled in a variety of 
                                                          
24 Brendan Morrissey, Yorktown 1781, The World Turned Upside Down, Osprey Campaign Series, No.  47 
(Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1997), pp. 28-29; Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 116.  
25 Various historians cite that the British had around 30,000 men in the Colonies in 1776: numbers calculated 
from Barnet Schechter, The Battle for New York, The City at the Heart of the American Revolution (London: 
Jonathan Cape, 2003), pp.112-114; Daniel Marston, The American revolution 1774-1783, Osprey Essential 
Histories No. 45 (Osprey: Oxford, 2002), p. 41; Robert Harvey, A Few Bloody Noses, The American War of 
Independence (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 199; Mark Urban, Fusiliers, How the British Army lost America 
but learned to fight (London: faber & faber, 2007), p. 75.  
26 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 348.  
27 Elizabeth Longford, Wellington, The Years of the Sword (London: World Books, 1969), p. 113.  
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different ways.28 Although there was some form of official guidance, in the form of the 
King’s Regulations of 1728, 1764 and 1778, these had not been made compulsory.29 It took 
until 1792 for a standardised drill manual for the infantry to be introduced, in the form of 
Colonel Sir David Dundas’s Principles of Militarily Movements, Chiefly Applied to 
Infantry.30 Although York has been accredited as a keen supporter of Colonel Dundas’s 
drills, Dundas’ Principles had first been published in 1788 when he was QMG in Ireland. 
Dundas’ drills were known at the Horse Guards before York assumed office and had caught 
the attention of Lord Jeffrey Amherst when he was C-in-C and it was Amherst who had made 
Principles the basis of the 1792 regulations.   
The adoption of a standard system of drill in the British Army was long overdue, 
especially given that the Europeans had experimented with standard drills for many years. 
The Army of the Dutch Republic, for example, had created a set of standard drills during the 
Eighty Years’ War [1568-1648]. In Prussia the first official regulations for the training of the 
infantry emerged as early as 1714. These were updated at regular intervals during the years 
that followed.31  The French also experimented with a variety of drills during these years and 
gradually standardised them.  Even the Americans, during the War of Independence, showed 
a desire to create greater uniformity of drill than their British opponents. George Washington 
famously enlisted a Prussian drill master, Baron von Steuben, to train the Continental Army 
in European methods.32   
                                                          
28 J.W Fortescue, The British Army 1783-1802, Four Lectures Delivered at the Staff College and Cavalry School 
(London: Macmillan, 1905), p. 12.  
29 Houlding, Fit For Service, p. 229.  
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26 
 
Although the adoption of a standardised system of drill was a necessary step for the 
British Army, Principles was far from innovative because Dundas’s tactical ideas were 
chiefly based on the dated training methods of Frederick the Great.33 Unlike some of his 
contemporaries, who had made names for themselves fighting colonial wars in North 
America and the West Indies, Dundas was a European soldier who had served under the 
Duke of Cumberland in the Low Countries and Germany during the Seven Years’ War.  It 
was during this conflict that Dundas had developed a keen appreciation of the rigorous and 
methodical drills used by the Prussians.  
Crucially, Dundas was not interested in assessing the recent tactical developments 
which had been undertaken by the Army in North America, such as the greater use of light 
infantry. His aim was to prepare the troops for the type of linear warfare that he had 
experienced in Europe during the Seven Years’ War.34 By adopting Dundas’ Principles, both 
Amherst and then York remodelled the British Army on a military system which had changed 
little in fifty years; the Prussians did not perform well in the early campaigns of the 
Revolutionary Wars and the weaknesses of Frederick’s system were to be cruelly exposed by 
Napoleon in 1806.35 Neither did Amherst or York heed calls from those who suggested that 
the Army needed greater numbers of light troops.36  
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The British cavalry were also deficient in a number of aspects, not least in terms of 
recent military experience having played only a very limited role in the American War.37 
Although the British raised a number of provincial loyalist cavalry units for service in 
America, only two regular regiments were dispatched from Great Britain. The regiments that 
did serve, namely the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons, also suffered greatly from the loss of 
mounts on the long voyage to the colonies.38 Such was the lack of combat experience 
amongst the British cavalry in the period 1776 to 1793 that when a considerable number were 
deployed to Flanders in 1793 they could not perform even the most basic task of placing 
mounted sentries.39  
Since 1715, Britain’s artillery had been maintained on a permanent footing. Before 
this point the only permanent force of artillerymen had been the gunners of the Tower of 
London who had trained at the grandly-titled ‘Artillery Garden’ in Spitafields since the 
sixteenth century.40 Over the course of the 1700s the administration of the artillery had 
become more sophisticated. In 1716 the Ordnance had started manufacturing its own artillery 
pieces and in 1741 had opened its very own training centre for junior officers – the Royal 
Military Academy based at Woolwich.41 This emphasis on education marked artillery and 
engineer officers out from the rest of the British officer corps whose members, unlike their 
European counterparts, generally entered the military without the benefit of formal military 
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education or any encouragement to develop a cognitive approach to their profession.42 
Learning in the military was not a British forte.  
Another area of the British military machinery which was deficient during this period 
and which continued to be so throughout the French wars was British intelligence. Lack of 
reliable intelligence about the Low Countries and the state of the French Army was a 
recurrent problem for the British. Whilst the French employed a number of experienced staff 
tasked with intelligence gathering, the British had no such organisation at their disposal.43 A 
further impediment to the gathering of reliable intelligence was the fact that British 
diplomats, the main source of British intelligence during the French Revolutionary Wars, 
were evicted from the continent after the French conquest of the Low Countries in 1795, 
which closed off a vital avenue of intelligence for the British.44 Shorn of diplomatic 
intelligence gathering and lacking in trained staff officers the British were forced to rely on 
untrustworthy sources, such as smugglers and deserters.  
Lack of adequate maps was another problem, with the Horse Guards possessing scant 
topographical knowledge of the coast and hinterland of the Low Countries. Throughout the 
period, British generals often found themselves operating in alien conditions without any 
clear understanding of what they faced or where they were supposed to advance. Official 
guidance was not of a high order – indeed, it was not until 1805 that a ‘Depository of Military 
Knowledge’ was created by York at the Tower of London to store the various maps and 
reports gathered over the years.45 However, despite its grand title, the Depository was little 
more than a glorified storeroom and lacked many items. Additionally, there was no process 
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by which lessons from past campaigns could be identified and until 1857 there was no 
official journal for the development of military thinking.46  
To sum up - on the eve of war the British Army was reduced in number, poorly 
trained and deficient in light infantry and experienced cavalrymen. The majority of its officer 
corps lacked recent European military experience and, ordnance officers aside, had not had 
the benefit of formal military education. For both the rank and file, the Flanders campaign of 
1793 was to be a true baptism of fire.  
‘A sort of hurricane of politics’47: Reasons for British intervention in the Low Countries  
The English…only make up their minds to fight when their interests seem 
absolutely threatened…Their history is full of alterations between indifference 
which makes people think them decadent, and a rage which baffles their foes. They 
are seen, in turn, abandoning and dominating Europe, neglecting the greatest 
continental matters and claiming to control even the smallest, turning from peace at 
any price to war to the death.48  
 
These words, by Albert Sorel, perfectly describe the oscillations in the British 
approach to continental affairs in the period from 1783 to 1793. For much of this decade, the 
government of Pitt the Younger pursued a policy of isolation from European affairs following 
the British defeat in the American War of Independence.49 Ousted from America and 
unpopular in Europe, isolation from European affairs had been a popular and prudent choice, 
the prime minister seeking to use the peace to rebuild the British economy and the Royal 
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Navy.50 However, events in the Low Countries during the 1780s gradually drew the British 
towards intervention once again. The cornerstone of Britain’s strategy in North-West Europe, 
as envisaged by Pitt and his colleagues, was the existence of strong ties between the British 
and Dutch governments and the maintenance of Austrian rule over the Southern Netherlands. 
Before analysing the British position regarding the Habsburgs, it is necessary to outline the 
formative influence that Anglo-Dutch relations had upon British strategic thinking in Europe.    
Above all other considerations in Europe, Pitt aimed to secure good Anglo-Dutch 
relations and cultivated a close relationship with the House of Orange. There was nothing 
new about this strategic vision. Since the middle of the sixteenth century, the English had 
sought to secure close relations with the Dutch in the face of Spanish expansionism in 
Northern Europe.51 The close proximity of London to Amsterdam also provided the English 
with a readymade market for goods on the continent. The Dutch, in this period, used their 
powerful fleets to carve out a great trading empire overseas, which at its height incorporated 
trading stations in New Guinea, China, Ceylon, the Cape and North America and enjoyed a 
golden period of population growth.52  
Anglo-Dutch relations turned sour during the 1650s due to the development of an 
intense trade rivalry between the two states. Fierce Anglo-Dutch economic competition 
eventually gave rise to three ‘Trade Wars’ between the two states in 1652-1654, 1661-1667 
and 1672-1674 respectively.53 Although ultimately more destructive for the Dutch economy 
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in the long-term, the English suffered several major defeats at the hands of the Dutch fleet 
during these years. None was more humiliating than that suffered by the English in June 1667 
when, with the English preoccupied in dealing with the aftermath of the Plague and the Fire 
of London, the Dutch Fleet under Admiral de Ruyter successfully forced the River Medway 
and severely damaged the anchored English fleet.54  
Frictions between the two states continued and in 1688 Stadtholder William I of 
Orange, with the aid of English Protestant rebels, successfully invaded the British Isles in the 
event known as the ‘Glorious Revolution’.55  William cemented his victory when he defeated 
James II at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. William’s successful invasion ushered in a period 
of stability and renewed goodwill between the British and the Dutch and, although this 
proved short-lived, the rule of the House of Orange contributed to the development of the 
belief in British political circles that the future strength of the United Provinces required the 
Dutch state to be governed by a member of the House of Orange. The British also hoped that 
a rejuvenated Dutch state, under a stable government, would be able to act as a bulwark 
against the gradual growth of French power in Northern Europe.  
These hopes proved short-lived, however, when William died childless in 1702, 
leaving the Dutch without a leader. Although Queen Anne ruled over the British Isles for a 
brief period, her death twelve years later further distanced the British from the Dutch and, 
with the accession of the Hanoverian George I, ushered in the Georgian period. For the next 
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forty years the British sought to maintain friendly relations with the Dutch amid fears of the 
growth of French power in North West Europe.56 
During the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the British and Dutch fought 
alongside the Austrians against the French. However, the British grew increasingly alarmed 
during these years at the lack of strong Dutch leadership. British fears regarding the strength 
of their Dutch ally peaked in 1747 when, faced with the prospect of a French invasion of the 
United Provinces, the British actively advocated the need for the Dutch to restore the 
Orangeist party to its former position of strength at The Hague and that a member of the 
House of Orange be elected to the post of Stadtholder.57 The British even went as far as to 
deploy a naval force to the River Scheldt in order to show their support for the Orangeist 
cause. A successful Orangeist coup quickly followed, the news of which was greeted with 
scenes of great joy amongst the ministers in London.58 
Over the course of the following decades a growing number of Dutchmen and women 
came to detest the level of influence exercised by the British over Dutch affairs. By the 1770s 
the most vocal opposition to the House of Orange came from the self-styled Dutch ‘Patriot’ 
party, whose members resented the close ties which had developed between the British and 
the House of Orange.59 Eager for change, especially the reform of the armed forces, the 
Patriots were also heavily influenced by the ideas of the American Revolution.60 The 
American War of Independence, meanwhile, had also heightened existing Anglo-Dutch 
tensions, especially over mercantile interests.61 Matters eventually came to a head in 1780 
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when the Patriots forced William V to support the American colonists in the war with Great 
Britain.62  Over the course of the following years the Patriot movement gained greater 
strength throughout the United Provinces.63   
 Considerable frictions also existed between the Dutch and the Austrians over the 
subject of trade access to the North Sea via the River Scheldt. The Austrians wanted to see 
the Scheldt opened to trade, so that Antwerp could reap the benefits of increased access to the 
North Sea, whilst the Dutch sought to keep the river closed, a right which they had been 
given in 1648.64 A mini-crisis ensued in 1784 when the Austrian Emperor Joseph II claimed 
Maastricht as an indemnity for the closure of the Scheldt.65 All-out war was averted but 
British influence over Dutch affairs was further weakened when the French mediated 
between the Dutch and Austrians at the subsequent political negotiations at Fontainebleau in 
November 1785.66   
The Dutch continued to argue amongst themselves and the internal divisions in Dutch 
politics finally came to a head in September 1786 when the Patriots forced the Stadtholder to 
relinquish command of the armed forces.67 Over the course of the winter months and into the 
New Year the Orangeists lost control of Holland, along with several other provinces, as the 
paramilitary forces of the Patriots seized power.68 Panic-stricken by these events, Pitt’s newly 
appointed government had flirted with the idea of British military intervention, but instead 
negotiated for a Prussian force, under the Duke of Brunswick, to invade the Dutch Republic 
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and restore the House of Orange.69 Challenged by disciplined Prussian troops, the Patriot 
forces were defeated and scattered. Subsequently, the British reclaimed the strategic initiative 
and negotiated for the Dutch and Prussians to join them in forming a new Triple Alliance.70 
Despite this victory for British diplomacy the Patriot cause did not die out in 1787 and neither 
did the House of Orange gain in strength. Pleased with the Prussian invasion and subsequent 
negotiations the British allowed themselves to slip back into their former policy of isolation.  
During the same period the British were also concerned about the political instability 
of the Southern Netherlands, particularly in the years immediately before the outbreak of the 
French Revolution. At the same time as the Dutch Patriot movement had been growing in 
strength in opposition to the dynastic rule of the House of Orange, the people of the Austrian 
Netherlands had begun to demonstrate their increasing dissatisfaction with Habsburg rule 
and, more specifically, the sweeping reforms of Emperor Joseph II. These changes, according 
to historian Adrien de Meeüs, turned the Belgian people against their new emperor and 
Austrian rule “Joseph II…alienated the clergy, the peasantry, the small burghers in the 
corporations, and the nobility, who had just been deprived by decree of their feudal rights.”71 
Like the Dutch Stadtholder the Austrian Emperor came to be viewed as an enemy of the 
people and was targeted politically by groups, such as the radical Vonckists, who sought to 
establish an independent Belgium.72 Following the fall of the Bastille, the people of Brabant 
revolted against the Austrians and a Belgian ‘Patriotic Army’, which had been readied across 
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the border in the United Provinces, invaded the Southern Netherlands and seized Brussels.73 
These events precipitated a general revolt which culminated in the formation of a short-lived 
independent Belgium in 1790.74 During the same period the Belgians also cultivated closer 
links with the French, much to the concern of the British government, who feared for the 
future security of the Low Countries.75 Although these fears were allayed in July, when the 
Austrians reconquered the Southern Netherlands, the outbreak of the French Revolution 
temporarily drew British attention to the events in France.  
Unlike the Germanic powers, the British initially did not see the need to intervene in 
the French Revolution, nor did they involve themselves in the diplomatic disagreements 
which eventually brought about the outbreak of another European War in 1792. Indeed, 
throughout the opening years of the new decade, Pitt remained optimistic that Britain was on 
the verge of an extended period of peace.76 Pitt’s dreams of peace in his time proved short-
lived and the British were eventually forced to intervene in the Low Countries following the 
French invasion of the Southern Netherlands in 1792.  
The situation in the Low Countries in 1792 greatly concerned the British. Not only 
did the Belgians welcome the French with open arms, but the Dutch also showed signs of 
renewed discontent with the Orangeist government.77 For example, the British ambassador at 
The Hague, Sir William Eden, Lord Auckland, wrote to Grenville in June to state that Patriot 
‘cabals’ were rumoured to be forming in towns and cities throughout the Republic.78 The 
political situation worsened over the course of the following months and Auckland wrote 
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again to Grenville in late November to say that the political situation in Amsterdam was 
“critical” and that the Patriots had “become noisy and impudent” there being scarcely “a 
village, or an ale house…in which the language is not seditious.”79 Auckland even suggested 
that a small squadron of British naval vessels should be readied for operations in the Scheldt, 
in case of a sudden French invasion.80 Auckland’s advice was not heeded, however, and 
although the events in the Low Countries made war between Great Britain and France 
increasingly likely, the diplomats of each nation continued to work towards the continuation 
of peaceful relations. Grenville, in particular, held out a hope that hostilities could be 
avoided.81 However, after months of negotiations, it was the French who finally decided to 
act and on 1 February 1793 the French government declared war on Great Britain and the 
United Provinces. The British responded in kind two weeks later.82  
The situation at The Hague was chaotic. The Dutch government showed little sign of 
urgency while a resurgent Patriot party welcomed the French as liberators. Flooded with 
messages, and fearful of the French advance, Auckland feverishly asked Grenville for British 
military and financial support for the Dutch. Auckland demanded, “Men, Commanders, Ships 
and Money,” and, more specifically, that “The Duke of York” and “some English battalions” 
be dispatched to Holland.83  The British had already hired some 13,000 Hanoverian troops to 
be used in Holland against a potential French invasion, but it would be several months before 
this force was ready.84  Auckland also echoed the comments of Edmund Burke, made over 
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two years previously, by stating that the beleaguered Dutch state should be viewed by the 
British government as being of similar importance as one of its own counties.85  
Auckland’s request clearly made an impression upon Grenville and, in just over a 
week, a small convoy of British troop-transports carrying three battalions of His Majesty’s 
brigade of Foot Guards, under the Duke of York, sailed for the Dutch coast.86 The British 
force landed on Dutch soil at Hellevoetsluis on 4 March. York proceeded to The Hague to 
meet with the Dutch government and Lord Auckland. In the meantime, the Guards, under a 
future hero of the British Army in India Major-General Gerard Lake, were divided and 
positioned along the coastline. 
On 18 March 1793 the Austrians decisively defeated the French under Dumouriez at 
the Battle of Neerwinden. Battered and bruised, Dumouriez’s army was sent into a headlong 
retreat through the Austrian Netherlands to the French border fortresses. The Low Countries 
were saved. Shortly before Neerwinden, ministers in London and the senior figures in the 
Low Countries had started to consider how best to proceed in the war against France. 
Foreseeing a French defeat and eager to see the United Provinces secured for the future, 
Auckland had suggested to Grenville that the British should consider commencing an 
offensive to secure the United Provinces and the Austrian Netherlands.87 News of 
Neerwinden convinced Auckland of the benefits of such a campaign:  
 
The interests of Holland, as well as of the allies cannot be better served than by now 
sending towards the frontiers of France all the troops that are able...the Duke of 
York is strongly of this opinion, and left The Hague tonight, in order to proceed 
with the brigade of Guards to Bergen-op-Zoom…If the campaign can be 
successfully maintained, possibly it should be wished to use every effort to gain 
possession of the principal places on the French frontier, such as Lille, 
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Valenciennes, Conde (and even Dunkirk and Calais) with the intention either to 
keep them or to demolish them.88  
 
 That Auckland mentioned York is significant because historians of the period 
have generally argued that the subsequent British operations in Flanders were devised solely 
by the politicians.89 Over the course of the following weeks, the King and Grenville also 
warmed to the idea of swift military action.90 Aside from aiding the Dutch there were other 
reasons why the British welcomed the idea of an advance into the Southern Netherlands. For 
instance, the British were keen to restore Austrian rule to the Southern Netherlands and 
rebuild the old barrier fortresses which had previously protected the Low Countries against 
French expansionism. The problem facing the British was that over the course of the late 
eighteenth century the Habsburgs had gradually lost interest in the Low Countries and longed 
instead to exchange their lands in North-West Europe for Bavaria.91 This so called ‘Bavarian 
exchange’ naturally concerned British strategists, but the apparent weakness of France in the 
spring of 1793 and the belief that the war in Europe would be short-lived made them think 
that the time was right for them to find a solution. The British, like the other European 
powers, were eager to secure indemnities of their own.  
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Strategic planning process 
 Uneasy about the war aims of the Austrians, York was ordered by Henry Dundas to 
dispatch one of his aides-de-camp (ADCs), Captain Crauford, to the Austrian headquarters to 
ascertain Austrian strategy.92 Crauford’s report stated that the Austrians were keen to work 
with the British and that the Austrian commander, Prince Frederick Josias of Saxe-Coburg-
Saalfeld, proposed a conference of the Allied commanders, including York, the Stadtholder, 
Count Starhenburg, the Prince of Orange, Brunswick and General Knoblesdorf, the Prussian 
commander in the Low Countries, to be held at Antwerp on 7 April.93 Crauford was also able 
to confirm that after a series of secret dealings the French commander of the Armée du Nord, 
General Dumouriez, sought to defect and “was ready to turn his arms against the Convention 
and lend his aid to the re-establishment of the monarchy in France”.94 With the French 
seemingly in disarray, the British were further emboldened to take action in order to secure 
their own primary strategic objectives on the Flanders coast before the end of hostilities.  
The conference was the first time that the main military representatives of Great 
Britain, Austria, Prussia and the United Provinces had met since the decision to dispatch 
British troops to support the Dutch. The result was to prove significant and in a little over a 
week Dundas instructed the York to suspend purely defensive operations and to advance in 
support of the Austrians before striking out to the north to seize Dunkirk. Dundas, like 
Auckland before him, hoped that the subsequent Allied offensive would ensure “The Security 
of the Netherlands as a barrier to the ambitions of France, and a frontier to the United 
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Provinces”.95 Pitt and Dundas also reasoned that by committing to the offensive they would 
be in a position to dictate Allied strategy and ensure British interests were secured before the 
French were defeated.96 The ministers also believed that conquests on the seacoast would 
provide them with a valuable bargaining chip, which could then be offered to the Austrians, 
in the hope that the Habsburgs would retain the Southern Netherlands after the end of 
hostilities.97 Operating with the Austrians also made military sense until British 
reinforcements were available.  
The decision to commit the British Army to the offensive changed the nature of the 
British commitment to the war in Europe. Until this point the British intervention in the Low 
Countries had been strictly limited to support of the House of Orange and the Dutch 
government with a small contingent of British soldiers. Following the Antwerp conference 
the role of the British army was widened to include not only participation in a major Allied 
offensive but one which required greater British military presence on the ground. York’s 
force was to be increased from just over a thousand British regulars to include several 
thousand British, Hanoverian, Hessian, Austrian and Prussian troops. It was to be a truly 
multi-national force which, although fighting for Allied objectives, was forged to secure 
British interests.  
What is particularly striking about the British decision to increase their involvement   
in Europe was that the ministers and the generals involved made up their minds in just a 
matter of a few days without fully considering the potential consequences of their decision. 
Important questions were not raised. For example, nobody recognised the need to ask 
whether the Army was capable of fighting a major European war.  Perhaps the reason why 
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the ministers did not spend time considering the finer details of their decision was because 
they were already thinking about where they would strike next.  
As the Antwerp conference was taking place, Pitt, Dundas and Grenville were 
thinking about other expeditions and were not short of ideas. Pitt was eager to attack the 
French coast, believing that the French would be unable to protect their vast coastline from 
British amphibious raiding.98 In suggesting such a strategy Pitt, whether consciously or not, 
advocated a return to the type of military enterprises employed by his father, William Pitt the 
Elder, during the Seven Years’ War.99 This approach had many admirers. Several military 
and political figures believed that British interests were best served by the deployment of 
Britain’s limited military resources in raiding the French coast, rather than in support of 
untrustworthy continental powers. The Master-General of the Ordnance, Charles Lennox, 
Duke of Richmond, was a known supporter of this approach.100  
There was also a small group of politicians, outside Pitt’s inner circle, who wanted the 
government to support French Royalists and opposition groups by way of sending arms and 
equipment to the French coast, the chief advocate of this policy was William Wyndam.101 
Although initially unwilling to give in to these suggestions, the growing zeal and radicalism 
inherent in French politics and foreign policy would later convince Pitt of the benefits of this 
stratagem. The government sanctioned the dispatch of troops to support a Federalist rising at 
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Toulon in August- September 1793 and launched an émigré Royalist expedition to Quiberon 
in 1795 to support French Royalists in Brittany and the Vendée. 102 
Alongside Pitt, Dundas played a key role in major policy decisions and was entrusted 
with the task of acting as unofficial war minister, a role he performed while also Home 
Secretary, President of the Board of Control and Treasurer of the Navy. These wider 
responsibilities no doubt influenced Dundas’s outlook regarding the war effort, Dundas 
placed increased emphasis on the need for regular military and naval activity to protect 
Britain’s trading empire. Like Pitt, Dundas also firmly believed that France was on the verge 
of defeat and that the war would be short-lived, a belief which contributed to his desire to 
dispatch a sizeable British expedition to secure the West Indies and capture as many French-
controlled Caribbean islands as possible before the end of hostilities.103 The ministers’ 
assumption that the war in Europe would be short-lived would come to undermine British 
strategy and contribute greatly to British defeat in 1793.  
The 1793 campaign and the road to Dunkirk  
Following the Antwerp conference, the British agreed to advance south to Tournai in 
order to link up with Coburg’s army.104 This decision appears to have been taken without 
much thought as to whether the British forces in the Low Countries were up to the task. Apart 
from the weaknesses inherent in the British military establishment at the time, the British 
forces in the Low Countries were so few in number that they could hardly be referred to as an 
army. For instance, before the arrival of the first contingent of Hanoverians in late April, 
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York’s ‘army’ was made up of barely six infantry battalions comprising the three 
strengthened Guards battalions under Lake and a further three battalions of line infantry 
under the newly arrived Major-General Ralph Abercomby.105 Excluding the Guards, the 
quality of York’s force was not of a high order. Abercromby’s brigade, which was composed 
of the 14th, 37th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, was barely fit for service having absorbed 
several hundred new recruits from a series of independent companies before it had embarked 
for the continent.106  Of the three newly arrived regiments, the 53rd was in the worst condition 
and, although York received an apology from the Horse Guards for the condition of 
Abercromby’s force, he was forced to leave the 53rd at Bruges where it was to be made ready 
for action.107  
Due to the limited number of British troops the Austrians had generously given York 
control over a force of Austrian cavalry, whilst the Prussians had also provided two battalions 
of infantry; these troops were to stay with the British until the arrival of Marshal Freytag’s 
Hanoverian forces.108 With the British likely to be involved in siege work, York’s unofficial 
chief of staff, Colonel Sir James Murray asked for a “Train of battering cannon and other 
requisites for a siege.”109 Murray failed to list any specifics at this stage, the British 
concentrating instead upon making arrangements for the arrival of the Hanoverians.  
 As Hanoverian reinforcements began to arrive, the British generals spent much of late 
April and early May discussing the advance with the Austrians.110 Coburg’s plan was not a 
bold one, the Austrian commander favouring a limited offensive in order to seize a number of 
fortresses instead of a bold advance to destroy the French forces. Coburg was not alone in 
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advocating such an approach and, as Gunther E. Rothenberg has noted Coburg’s plan 
“epitomized the Austrian preoccupation with cordon deployment and fortress warfare.”111 
This limited form of warfare was not unique to the Austrians and had been developed by the 
Ancien Regime states during the previous century, as a means to protect their professionally 
trained and expensive armies. Expectations of what could be achieved by battle were also low 
and many thinkers believed that the risks involved in fighting a major battle were too high for 
it to be actively sought. Furthermore, the fact that most armies generally did not live off the 
land during the period before the Napoleonic wars, meant that it was imperative for generals 
to secure enemy cities in order to feed and reequip their troops. Thus, as R.R Palmer has 
argued, prior to the French Revolution several important considerations encouraged military 
leaders to advocate a guarded approach to war and warfare:  
 
Wars were long, but not intense; battles were destructive (for the battalion volleys 
were deadly), but for that reason not eagerly sought. Operations turned by 
preference against fortresses, magazines, supply lines, and key positions…war of 
positions prevailed over war of movement, and a strategy of small successive 
advantages over a strategy of annihilation. 112 
 
Although Lille was initially earmarked as the next objective for the Anglo-Austrian 
armies, alongside Condé, the Allies quickly changed their minds when it was discovered that 
a sizeable French army had taken up a defensive position to the south of the city of 
Valenciennes.113 Eager to retain the services of the British for as long as possible, the 
Austrians managed to convince York that the French forces on the coast were  too strong to 
be attacked until after the French army at Valenciennes had been dealt with. Once 
Valenciennes was captured, Coburg promised York that he would not object to the Anglo-
Hanoverians marching to besiege Dunkirk.  
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York was happy with these changes, Murray exclaimed to Dundas that “Every 
professional man acquainted with the fortress in question is decidedly of the opinion that 
Valenciennes will be a much easier conquest than Lille,” and that until Valenciennes fell and 
French troops were drawn away from the coast “There was an evident impossibility in any 
separate enterprise whatever being undertaken by His Royal Highness.”114 As York and 
Coburg marched to Valenciennes another Austrian army, under the command of General 
Clerfaiyt, was to besiege Condé. With the campaign decided upon, the British generals were 
happy to forget temporarily about Dunkirk and placed the thought of a coastal campaign to 
one side. Their failure to plan for the advance to the coast at this stage would later prove 
significant.  
Over the course of May the Anglo-Hanoverian forces participated in a series of 
engagements in support of the Austrians at the minor battles of Vicogne, St Armand and also 
in the Allied attack on the entrenched camp at Famars on 23 May. In each instance, the 
Anglo-Hanoverians performed well, although the Coldstream Guards suffered heavy 
losses.115 At Famars, York’s forces were largely spectators when the cautious Austrians 
forced the French to abandon their positions outside Valenciennes. 116 With the French secure 
inside the city, the Allies readied itself for a long siege. 
Remarkably, given the number of times British troops had served in Flanders over the 
course of the eighteenth century, the siege of Valenciennes was the first occasion since the 
War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) that the British Army participated in besieging a 
major European fortress.117 However, British inexperience in European siege warfare, 
                                                          
114 TNA WO 1/166: Murray to H.Dundas, 5 May 1793, p.201. TNA WO 1/166: ‘“Considerations der Armeé 
combines” – Frontier der France aux Pays Bas, 1793.’ 
115 Brown, Campaigns in the Low Countries, p. 31.  
116 Verney, Journals and Correspondence of Sir Harry Calvert, pp. 76-77; Burne, The Noble Duke of York, pp. 
52-53.  
117 For example although York’s chief engineer, Colonel James Moncrief, had developed his siege craft during 
the American War of Independence he had no active knowledge of European siege warfare before 
Valenciennes. For more on Moncrief see: The James Moncrief papers 1710-1894, William L. Clements Library, 
46 
 
combined with the small scale of British forces, meant that York’s troops played only a minor 
role in the siege. With little to do save oversee the digging of trenches and the construction of 
earthworks, the British high command turned their thoughts to Dunkirk.  
Planning and preparation 
 Alongside the desire to retain the strategic initiative over the French and secure their 
own aims at the expense of the Austrians, the British were eager to secure Dunkirk for a 
number of other reasons. Chief amongst these was the fact that the French had long used the 
port as a staging area for an invasion of the British Isles and in 1744 Marshal de Saxe had 
gathered over 70,000 men in the environs of Dunkirk for this very reason and had only been 
unable to put his plans into effect because of poor weather in the English Channel.118 Whilst 
in 1773 a plan had been mooted to close the port of Dunkirk to French vessels in the event of 
the outbreak of another war with France.119 Dundas and York also believed that a victory on 
the coast would provide them with the means to restore some pride to the Army and enable 
them to destroy one of the last known safe havens of privateers in Western Europe.120 
However, what is striking about the correspondence between the generals and the 
ministers in these weeks is the overconfidence displayed by York and Murray regarding the 
siege of Dunkirk. Despite the British Army’s lack of experience in European siege warfare 
Murray made it clear to Dundas that the weak state of the French Army practically made it 
inevitable that the British would be able to achieve a swift victory on the coast and stated 
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that“40,000 effective men were, in the present situation of the French Army, a force fully 
adequate to the reduction of Dunkirk.” 121  
This belief in the weakness of the French Army was central to the British mind set, 
for the generals, like the politicians before them, believed that France was on the brink of 
defeat and would not be able to reinforce the Flanders coast. Murray wrote to Dundas that, 
“in the present distracted state of France,” there was no reason to believe that the French 
would be able to make “any great augmentation of force” upon the coast.122 Once the Anglo-
Hanoverian forces reached Dunkirk the 20,000-strong British contingent, under York, would 
besiege Dunkirk whilst the Hanoverians acted as an ‘Army of Observation.’123 Murray also 
suggested to Dundas that York aimed to follow-up the siege of Dunkirk with operations 
against Bergues and St Venant.124   
Although seemingly well-thought out, Murray’s plan did little more than set out how 
the British were to march to the coast and that the British and Hanoverian forces would 
operate separately when they reached Dunkirk. Nothing was done to secure accurate 
intelligence about Dunkirk’s defences or the condition of the French forces in the region, 
whilst nobody sought to gather information about the character of the roads or the layout of 
the Flanders canal network. At no point did York, or Murray, see the need to conduct a 
thorough reconnaissance of the area in question. Instead, Murray had the audacity to ask 
Dundas if the minister could make enquiries about the logistical situation on the coast, 
specifically whether vessels could transport the siege train via the canal network from 
Nieuport to Dunkirk.125 Asking Dundas to perform such a basic military task was perverse, 
given the close proximity of the British forces to the Flanders coast. The generals also 
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ignored the need for naval support. This was bizarre given that one of the main reasons for 
the coastal campaign was that the British could nullify the threat posed by French privateers 
based at Dunkirk. The port needed to be sealed off from both land and sea if the British 
wanted to invest the town and conduct a swift siege. That such a fact went unnoticed by the 
British generals as they planned the siege illustrated their incompetence.   
The one aspect which the British spent time trying to organise was the procurement of 
a siege train. Murray finally forwarded an extensive list of requirements for the siege to 
Dundas and Pitt. This had been drawn up by York’s senior ordnance officers Major William 
Congreve and Colonel Moncrief.126 The requirements were disproportionate to the task; for 
instance, Congreve wanted over 130 pieces of artillery, thousands of round shot, mortar shells 
and the all necessary waggons, horses and drivers. Moncrief also demanded several hundred 
tons of oak planks for the construction of the siege works plus thousands of spades, pickaxes 
and sand-bags.127 The scale of the list no doubt shocked Dundas, but instead of questioning 
the York’s judgement he placed the task of procuring the necessary materials in the hands of 
Richmond. Murray also informed Dundas that it was York’s intention to reach the coast by 
about the beginning of September which gave the government, and the Ordnance, roughly 
two months to ready and ship the siege equipment.128  
This was a mammoth task and one which angered Richmond, who had little sympathy 
for Pitt and Dundas’s Flanders strategy.129  Despite these reservations, Pitt managed to 
convince the Master General of the need to keep up to date with York’s expected arrival time 
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on the Flanders coast.130 From this moment onwards every arrangement, contract and 
preparation was made with September in mind. Time was of the essence. The generals’ 
failure to gather up to date information about the situation on the coast was further 
compounded by the failure to use existing sources of information. On several occasions in the 
1700s the British were given responsibility for dismantling Dunkirk’s defences and in 1773 
an Ensign based at Dunkirk made a series of observations regarding the ports defences and 
layout.131 By the early 1790s these reports, alongside several maps, were stored by the 
Ordnance Office. As will become apparent later in the thesis, however, the British Army’s 
lack of a culture of knowledge sharing meant that these documents were forgotten by the time 
of the Flanders campaign and thus were not presented to York for the Dunkirk campaign.  
Valenciennes surrendered to the Anglo-Austrian besieging forces on 28 July 1793. 
The sudden fall of Valenciennes was greeted with jubilation by the British. Murray wrote 
excitedly to Dundas that York’s army would now be able to reach the Flanders coast by the 
end of August.132 Murray did not ask Dundas whether this change would affect the 
movement of the siege train. Instead he carried on with readying the Anglo-Hanoverian 
forces for the march north. At the same time, the British commanders in the Low Countries 
were made an offer by the Austrians which promised to alter the course of the campaign. 
Keen to capitalise on French defeats, and no doubt eager to prevent the British from moving 
to the coast, Coburg suggested that the Allied forces advance to destroy the French forces in 
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central Flanders, followed by an aggressive final offensive to crush the revolutionaries in 
Paris.133  
The response of the British high command to Coburg’s suggestion was highly 
questionable and bordered on unprofessional. Instead of thinking through the positives of the 
Austrian plan, York and Murray dismissed Coburg’s plans out of hand. Murray even wrote to 
Dundas to state that he did not think it necessary to “Trouble you [Dundas] with the 
particulars of this plan.”134 Nor did they alter the expected arrival date of the army on the 
coast. By not informing Dundas and Pitt of the ‘particulars’ of the new Austrian proposals 
both York and Murray acted far beyond their authority and, may have let slip a golden 
opportunity to end the war.  
Over the course of the next few days York met with Coburg to decide when the 
British could be released to march to the coast. After much discussion, York informed the 
politicians that his Anglo-Hanoverians would reach the coast by 22 August.135 As the British 
rushed to prepare their forces further planning errors ensued. The most significant related to 
Murray’s request to Dundas for information about the Flanders canal network.  Dundas was a 
busy man and was greatly preoccupied with overseeing preparations for the siege of Dunkirk 
and was also monitoring the situation at Toulon.136 Weighed down by an increasingly 
unhealthy workload and lacking detailed knowledge of the Flanders Coast, Dundas instructed 
General George Ainslie, the British commander at Ostend, to assess whether it was possible 
for a siege train to be transported by canal from Nieuport to Dunkirk.  
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Seeking to keep matters as secretive as possible, Ainslie organised a night-time 
spying mission. The conditions did not suit the task in hand and in the darkness each of the 
canals must have looked identical to Ainslie’s agent, something which made the correct 
identification of the right canal impossible. The presence of French patrols also hindered the 
spy’s task resulting in his having to hide in a marsh to avoid capture.137 Cold, soaked and 
tired from the experience, the spy reported to Ainslie the following morning, but owing to the 
general lack of knowledge about the area in question and the difficulty inherent in working at 
night in hostile terrain, the spy had in fact reconnoitred the wrong canal. The mission having 
failed, York and Dundas chose not to sanction any further missions, a decision which left 
Ainslie embarrassed and the British none the wiser.138 Despite the many questions left 
unanswered by this fiasco, York and Murray seem to have been unperturbed by the events in 
question and focused instead on readying the troops for the march north.   
  On 21 August, the Anglo-Hanoverians reached the Flanders coast. The journey from 
Valenciennes had not been without incident. Having set off on 15 August in several columns, 
the Anglo-Hanoverians parted company with Coburg after defeating a French force at the 
battle of Caesar’s Camp on 7-8 August. This victory was quickly followed by another, this 
time for York, at the minor Battle of Lincelles on 18 August. This action was a rare victory 
for the British against the French. Having arrived on the field after a force of Dutch had been 
pushed off a hill near the village of Lincelles, Lake and his Guardsmen proceeded to advance, 
in parade ground fashion, up the hill and into the fire of over 6,000 French infantry and their 
supporting artillery. Bayonets fixed, the Guardsmen drove all before them and cleared the 
road to the coast in the process.139  
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Lake’s charge at Lincelles deserves to be remembered as one of the finest military 
exploits of the French Revolutionary Wars and remained the greatest single victory for a 
force of British infantry over their French counterparts until the Egyptian campaign in 1801. 
The conduct of the Guards at Lincelles epitomised all that was good about how British troops 
were prepared for small scale tactical operations, ones in which the regimental values of the 
British army could come to the fore. It was fortunate, therefore, that the task of attacking the 
French forces at Lincelles fell to Lake’s troops, the Guardsmen being the finest British troops 
under the York’s command.  The victory at Lincelles generated overconfidence on the part of 
the British high command. For example, Murray boasted to Dundas shortly afterwards that he 
believed that Dunkirk would surrender the moment that the British siege train arrived.140 
On reaching the coast, the Anglo-Hanoverian forces pushed back French outposts and 
prepared the ground for the siege train. To the south of Dunkirk, Freytag’s ‘Army of 
Observation’ screened the British positions, the Hanoverian forces forming a defensive arc 
ten miles to the south-east of Dunkirk between the French held town of Bergues and the 
village of Poperinghe.141 British intelligence regarding the strength of the French on the 
Flanders coast was sketchy at best. The British were aware that a sizeable French garrison 
protected Cassel and that Dunkirk and Bergues were garrisoned but, other than this 
information, little was known about French troop movements behind the lines.  
No sooner did the British arrive outside Dunkirk than things started to go wrong. The 
first issue was the appearance off Dunkirk of French gunboats.  Fast moving and agile in 
shallow coastal waters, the gun boats immediately began to bombard the British troops that 
were stationed in the sand dunes and in the main camp.142 The British had not thought to 
organise a naval force of their own before marching to the coast and, in the end, it was 
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Dundas who took it upon himself to organise a force of naval vessels to support the army. On 
31 August Dundas instructed Rear-Admiral John MacBride to prepare a squadron to support 
York’s operations.143 This was a sound decision because a naval force would not only 
provide the British with a means to combat the French gun boats, but would also enable them 
to blockade the port. Disdainful of what he believed to be ministerial meddling, Murray’s 
response to Dundas’s decision was short-sighted, “Upon the subject of naval 
cooperation…tho’ it is no doubt proper upon many accounts to send the squadron you have 
announced, I do not look upon it to be very material towards the siege”.144  
 
Why Murray did not recognise the ‘material’ value to be gained by having a naval 
force stationed off Dunkirk is unclear given that Murray was no stranger to amphibious 
operations, having participated in a number of combined operations earlier in his military 
career, in both North America and the West Indies.145  Furthermore, although he disregarded 
the merits of having a naval squadron stationed just off the Flanders coast, Murray had 
previously asked Dundas for sailors to transport the siege train from Nieuport to Dunkirk.146 
Why Murray had only wanted sailors and no other naval force to support the army was 
strange and highlights the peculiar nature of Murray’s thinking at this point in the campaign. 
The fact that York placed great trust in Murray’s military thought is indicative his limited 
military knowledge at this time.  
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The character of the coastal terrain was also something of a surprise for the British. 
York and Murray only realised the importance of the canal system as a means of defence 
when they arrived on the coast. The canals and dykes provided ideal defensive lines for the 
French whilst the broken country between the dykes suited the fleet-footed tactics of the 
French light infantry and hampered the movement of the large British baggage train. It was 
also not until the British arrived that they realised that by cutting the sea dykes and opening 
sluice gates the French could inundate the area between Dunkirk and Bergues and flood the 
fields to the east of Dunkirk. The British did not recognise the danger until it was too late. 
The French commander at Dunkirk, General Jacques Ferrand, had instantly cut the sea dykes 
when it was clear a British force was intent on attacking the port.147 The wet summer weather 
did not help the situation either, the summer rains having already flooded some of the fields 
before the sea water began to rise. Despite these problems, York and Murray remained 
confident of a quick victory and Murray told Dundas that, “The inundations will have no 
effect in preventing the siege”.148 As will become clear, the British would come to rue the 
French decision to cut the dykes.  
In the meantime, other problems needed to be overcome if the siege was to be a 
success. A more important problem for the British at this stage was logistics. Since arriving 
on the coast, the British had expected the siege train to arrive promptly, but there was little 
sign of the convoy. Ten days after York’s troops had reached the coast the first convoy of 
vessels carrying part of the siege train finally arrived at Ostend and Nieuport, aboard were 
twenty-four mortars and thirty-six 24-pounders.149 Further delays ensued however due to the 
fact that the British port authorities had packed vital engineering equipment, which was 
needed by York before the guns could be placed in position, underneath the siege guns. This 
                                                          
147 TNA WO 1/166: Murray to H.Dundas, 24 August 1793, Camp near Dunkirk, pp. 782-783.  
148 TNA WO 1/166: Murray to H.Dundas, 24 August 1793, Camp near Dunkirk, p. 783 
149 TNA WO 1/166: Murray to H.Dundas, 31 August 1793, Liefkenshoek, p. 823.   
55 
 
dilemma forced the seamen at Ostend and Nieuport to unload all of the cargo before they 
could transport the guns to Dunkirk. 150 The arrival of the first batch of artillery was greeted 
with relief by the British high command, but concerns remained, notably that not all of the 
requested ordnance had arrived. Nevertheless, the British worked quickly over the course of 
the first week of September to prepare the batteries to bombard Dunkirk. British enthusiasm 
would prove short lived, however, thanks the efforts of a rejuvenated French Army and the 
over-confidence of Marshal Freytag and York.  
Before analysing the French preparations for a counter attack, it is necessary to 
outline the nature of the Hanoverian forces and their dispositions. Freytag’s ‘Army of 
Observation’ was located ten miles to the south of York’s camp at Dunkirk, the Hanoverian 
forces deployed in a defensive cordon twenty miles long and several miles deep. The first 
outpost line covered the villages of Wormdhout, Herzeele, Houtkerque, and Poperinghe; a 
stronger second line guarded the villages of Bambecque, Rousbrugge and Quaedypre. If the 
distances involved were problematic enough, the existence of a large area of marshland, 
immediately east of the French held town of Bergues between the British camp and the 
Hanoverian outposts, was a serious impediment to swift communication between the Anglo-
Hanoverian forces.151  
The French inundations and limited number of dyke roads also made communication 
between the British and the Hanoverians difficult. The broken nature of the Flanders 
countryside did not suit the Prussian-style tactics of the Hanoverians. The French, by 
contrast, were much better equipped to fighting on the coast, the canals and dyke roads 
providing them with a series of ready-made earthworks, a perfect setting for French light 
troops to operate. French control of the canal networks also gave their troops an advantage 
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and enabled them to maintain speedy communications and an efficient supply system. The 
British and the Hanoverians struggled to drag supplies to the front from Ostend and found it 
problematic to source adequate forage and drinking water in their flooded positions.  
The actual strength of the Anglo-Hanoverian force was also an issue, with Freytag 
having barely 12,000 troops at his disposal, whilst the majority York’s force at Dunkirk was 
tied down. Freytag’s contingent consisted of four regiments of line infantry, one of light 
infantry, a Guards battalion, three divisions of Artillery, eight cavalry regiments and a force 
Horse Guards.152 The quality of the Hanoverian contingent was good; Freytag’s cavalry and 
artillery were highly rated by the British.153 Despite the quality of the Hanoverians, the large 
area of ground which York had expected Freytag to cover meant that the Hanoverians were 
too widely dispersed to resist a major French attack without British aid. The French Armée 
du Nord, in contrast, was concentrated and ready to strike.  
By the spring of 1793, French defeats coupled with the outbreak of insurrection in the 
Vendeé had resulted in the creation of a new government organisation, which was tasked 
with the direction of the war effort and the maintenance of public order: the Committee of 
Public Safety (CPS).154 Driven by a determination to regain the strategic initiative and save 
France from invasion, the CPS orchestrated the mass conscription of French citizens into the 
armed forces. The first of these major levees in 1793 was known as the February Leveé des 
300,000; followed in August by the more famous Leveé en Masse.155  
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Further measures were also taken to try to improve the fighting quality of the French 
armies and the Republic’s officer corps such as the reorganisation of the French infantry into 
demi-brigades and, with reference to new ideas and older French military theorists, combat 
divisions.156 As the new formations integrated, the CPS also took the decision to dispatch 
government representatives to each of the French armies, with orders to inform the 
government of the quality and conduct of the various French commanders in the field.157  
Further actions taken by the CPS included the cultivation of a greater revolutionary 
zeal amongst French troops in order to attain new heights of bravery and aggression in the 
defence of France. The hostile European powers such as Austria, Prussia and Great Britain, 
and the internal opponents of the revolution were to be terrified into submission. With this 
vision in mind, the CPS had sought to reclaim the initiative against the coalition powers with 
the French being especially eager to strike against the allied forces in the Low Countries. 
 Even before the French had been aware of the Anglo-Hanoverian advance to the 
coast, Carnot himself had decided that the French forces in Flanders needed to strike at the 
weak allied positions on the coast and Ostend was singled out as a prime target. The raiding 
force assembled for this task, under Generals Jean-Baptiste Jourdan and Antoine de Béru, had 
moved north from Douai and Lille in mid-August. But they were surprised and defeated by 
Lake’s Guardsmen at Lincelles.158  
The presence of York’s Anglo-Hanoverians on the Flanders coast had forced Jourdan 
to retreat to the relative safety of Cassel and Dunkirk. Carnot had responded by rapidly 
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readying Dunkirk for a siege and reinforcing the French forces at Cassel. Throughout August 
and early September 28, 250 men were sent from the French Armies of the ‘Moselle’ and 
‘Rhin’ whilst a further 2, 750 men were sent northwards from the ‘Ardennes.’159 The French 
forces on the coast were then reorganised into several different interdependent commands. 
The ‘Groupe du Nord,’ comprising 23,500 men, under General Nicolas Barthel, was stationed 
at Cassel. To the east, was the ‘Mauberge’ with a fighting strength of 18,000 officers and 
men. Finally, in the centre, was the 58,900 strong ‘Corps Principal’ under Houchard, making 
for a total of 100,400 effective men. Once assimilated into the various garrisons across 
French-held Flanders, including Dunkirk, the operational combat strength of the ‘Nord’ 
amounted to around 50,000 officers and men.160   
Changes were also made to the French chain of command. Jourdan, who was already 
a divisional commander, was chosen to command the garrisons at Dunkirk and Cassel in 
place of Barthel. General Joseph Souham was also replaced by Jacques Ferrand, whilst 
further down the chain of command some future heroes of Napoleon’s Grande Armée were 
given their first chance to shine, most notably a young Captain Édouard Mortier who found 
himself promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel Adjutant-General, based at Dunkirk.161 
Mortier would prove to be a wise choice. Other future Napoleonic officers who would 
distinguish themselves in the Dunkirk campaign included Lieutenant Michel Ney, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Victor Moreau, who commanded a volunteer battalion, Captain 
Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, General of Brigade Jacques MacDonald and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Dominique Vandamme.162  
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Despite possessing the element of surprise and having the benefit of numerical 
superiority, Houchard was not the most aggressive of French generals and his plan erred on 
the side of caution. The Nord was to advance in six columns, five of which were to push back 
the Hanoverians, whilst another was to force York to abandon the siege of Dunkirk. 
Houchard did not desire a decisive battle, but simply wanted to protect French Flanders, 
before planning a new offensive to strike back at the Austrians.  
The French dispositions prior to their advance on 6 September were as follows: three 
columns, with a combined strength of 20,800, under the command of Pierre Dumesny and 
Vandamme, were stationed to the west of Cassel and had instructions to advance to the north 
against the enemy outposts stationed in the villages of Poperinghe, Proven, Rousbrugge and 
Oost-Cappel.  In the French centre, Jourdan, with 13,000 troops, was to strike Wormdhout 
and Herzeele, which, unbeknown to the French, was the centre of Freytag’s outer line of 
outposts. To Jourdan’s left were a further 12,000 French troops, formed in a two columns; the 
closest to Jourdan, under General Jean Noel Landrin, was positioned on high ground just to 
the north of Cassel. Landrin was ordered to strike at Wormdhout. The other column, under 
Theodore Leclaire at Bergues, was to advance eastwards against the British forces to the 
south of the swampy ground. Finally, Ferrand was to attack York’s siege works with 6,000 
men.163   
Despite being aware of the movement of sizeable French reinforcements to the coast, 
York and Freytag were not aware of the full scale of the French force marshalled before 
them. The accuracy of reports regarding French troop movements was sketchy at best. 
Murray knew that French reinforcements were gathering at Cassel and near St Omer, but he 
did not know how many troops were involved nor what the French intended.164 Yet, despite 
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the French troop movements, York apparently did not think it necessary to send out further 
scouts or send reinforcements to Freytag.  
The key battle for the fate of Dunkirk was fought to the south-east of the port as 
Houchard’s attacking columns made several deep indentations into Freytag’s defensive 
cordon between 6 to 7 September; Vandamme’s column seized Poperinghe, Landrin halted at 
Wormdhout, whilst Jourdan pushed through the centre, only to be halted by several counter 
attacks.165 Ferrand’s garrison also conducted a spirited sortie against the British trenches on 
the evening of 6 September which, though bravely conducted, made little headway.166 
However, with the cordon punctured and no sign of reinforcements from York, Freytag 
ordered his troops to withdraw. The retreat was not without incident and at Rexpoede, York’s 
brother, Prince Adolphus Duke of Cambridge and Freytag were wounded.167 The two 
commanders were eventually saved by the arrival of Count Walmoden who led the battle-
ready Hanoverians to the village of Hondschoote.  
On 8 September Houchard threw caution to the wind and attacked Walmoden’s 
14,600 Hanoverians with around 22,000 French troops.168 A bloody battle of attrition ensued 
and despite brave Hanoverian resistance the French were victorious.169 Informed of 
Walmoden’s defeat and fearful of being encircled, York abandoned the siege of Dunkirk and 
retired in the evening of 9 September. Such was the speed of the British retreat that two 
battalions of infantry were almost left behind at the village of Tetteghem.170 In the rush to 
escape York decided not to save the siege guns and also abandoned the army’s stores, 
equipment and baggage; just as the British would do again at Dunkirk in June 1940.  
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 Murray was quick to inform Dundas of the unfortunate events and stated “With 
extreme sorrow” that following the defeat of the Hanoverians at Hondschoote, York was 
“reduced to the necessity of collecting his whole force by abandoning the position he had 
taken near Dunkirk.” Murray was also sad to point out that in the process the British had been 
forced to leave “Thirty-two of the heavy guns and part of the stores provided for the 
siege.”171  
The sudden retreat was not a pleasant experience for the British troops due to the wet 
summer weather which had churned up the already muddy roads. The Royal Artillery and the 
cavalry also found it tough going, with gun carriages and horses often getting stuck in the 
mud, whilst both services also lacked the quantities of forage necessary to feed their horses 
adequately. In scenes not dissimilar to those which British soldiers would later experience on 
the Western Front in the late summer of 1917, York’s troops slogged their way through the 
mud to safety. Perhaps the most harrowing example of the suffering experienced by the 
British in the retreat occurred on the beach at Nieuport when, in the rush to escape the 
French, almost an entire waggon-load of sick and wounded soldiers was drowned by the 
incoming tide.172  
The lack of a dedicated military transport service in the British Army was also a cause 
of considerable frustration. The British had hired civilian carts and drivers earlier in the 
campaign and found that, under pressure, the drivers were not suited to the task in hand and 
neither were the carts. The few carts that the British brought back from the siege were so 
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overloaded that many simply fell to pieces as they were dragged through the many quagmires 
which covered the roads. Dead and exhausted horses also littered the route of the British 
retreat. Furthermore, with much of the baggage left behind, many of the British troops were 
also without their tents and blankets. As one officer recalled:  
The army, it may be supposed, is not well satisfied: but in the anguish of their 
disappointment and distress they know not who to blame, the difficulties under 
which they labour are truly pitiable. Scarcely can even the officers obtain the 
necessities of life; and many of them are without a change of linen. What then must 
be the situation of the poor soldiers? In the brigade of guards, which we may 
conclude to be as well provided at least as the others, there is only one tent to every 
ten men; and they have not a single truss of straw to save from entering contact with 
the cold, damp ground. Add to this the present heavy rains, and then conceive what 
sickness and mortality may close the miseries of the present campaign!173 
 
The conditions accelerated the onset of disease amongst the cold and hungry soldiers. 
The troops had started to fall ill in the swampy conditions before Dunkirk and many more 
cases emerged as the Allied forces retreated. The worsening state of the Anglo-Hanoverians 
was of great concern to Murray whom, in a letter to Henry Dundas, expressed the fears of the 
British high command at what might happen if the weakened allied forces were attacked by 
the French:   
The state of this army is very distressing. The troops being too much dispersed…I 
cannot give you an exact account of the numbers either of sick or of the fit for duty, 
which I am sorry to find vary considerably from what they were…I understand that 
we have in all, Austrians included 8 or 9,000 sick and wounded. Garrison men be 
left and posts maintained, so that after the departure of the four regiments, there will 
not be above 12,000…men in camp, so that if the enemy should direct their 
principal effort against us…I fear it will be necessary to give up Ostend.174 
 
Murray and York were also concerned about the withdrawal of four infantry 
regiments, the British government having requested earlier in the campaign for York to spare 
a brigade of infantry for service elsewhere. With the Anglo-Hanoverian forces close to 
breaking point, it was fortunate that the other Allied forces were still relatively fresh and the 
French were eventually checked by the determined Austrians at the two-day battle of 
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Wattignies fought on 15-16 October.175  The campaigning season ended with both sides 
poised to make a bid for a decisive action the following year.  
In late November 1793, the Anglo-Hanoverian army entered winter quarters. At long 
last the York and his subordinates had an opportunity to rest, take stock and prepare for the 
next campaign. The British officer corps and the senior generals in British service certainly 
had much to learn about how to operate in European conditions, whilst a period of rest and 
recuperation was also exactly what the British and Hanoverian soldiers needed.  
In spite of the poor showing in Flanders, neither York nor any of his subordinate 
officers sought to undertake a thorough review of the campaign in order to try to highlight 
errors of judgement and identify potential lessons to be learnt. As far as York was concerned 
the failure at Dunkirk and the Anglo-Hanoverian defeat in the wider campaign in Flanders 
were not of his or his soldiers making. Although he opted to keep silent in public, in private 
York was all too eager to lay the blame for the defeat upon the British politicians, the 
Hanoverians and the Austrians. Indeed, no sooner had the British been forced to retreat from 
Dunkirk than York wrote to his father, the King, to exonerate himself and blame others for 
the defeat.176  
Despite having every right to be frustrated with the conduct of the politicians, York’s 
letter to his father was riddled with fabrications designed to shift the blame. York argued that 
“Sir James Murray applied in My name to Your Majesty’s ministers for… a sufficient naval 
force to co-operate with me, and to protect me against the enemy’s vessels.” York also 
argued that Freytag had repeatedly disobeyed his instructions.177 York clearly did not request 
naval support when he claimed to have done so, nor is there evidence to suggest that Freytag 
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acted in any less a professional manner than any other officer might have done in the 
circumstances. Freytag’s instructions were vague at best and York expected Freytag to 
defend a very wide area, with barely enough troops for the purpose. Although Freytag 
underestimated the strength of the French forces in the area, it is unlikely that any of the 
British generals would have acted differently, since both the British and the Hanoverians 
believed the French to be poor soldiers in the wake of Lincelles.178 
 It was also highly misleading for York to suggest that he was aware of the French 
troop build-up before Freytag was since it was from the Hanoverians that York received 
much of his information. Indeed, Freytag’s outposts stretched almost to Cassel itself, this 
town was known by the British to be one of the main staging area for French forces in 
northern Flanders.179 Although Freytag was certainly foolhardy in disregarding many of the 
reports that indicated that sizeable French reinforcements were nearby, it must be 
remembered that it was York who had the final say when it came to the deployment of the 
Allied troops on the coast. If York had feared for his left flank and wanted Freytag to keep in 
close contact with the British camp at Dunkirk, he could have ordered Freytag to concentrate 
closer to Dunkirk or sent a force of British troops to support the Hanoverians. By not doing 
so, York isolated Freytag just at the moment when he most needed to concentrate his forces.  
The main reasons for the British defeat at Dunkirk, namely poor planning on the part 
of York and his senior commanders and lack of accurate intelligence information thus went 
unrecognized. The British habit of blaming their Allies did little to aid faltering coalition 
relations. Freytag, for all his experience, lost control of his Hanoverian forces in the retreat 
and was somewhat foolhardy prior to the French attack. Nevertheless, Freytag and Walmoden 
                                                          
178 Duffy, ‘A Particular Service’, p. 549.  
179 York to the King, Menin, 18 September 1793 in A. Aspinall (ed), The Later Correspondence of George III, 
Published by Authority of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, Volume II February 1793 to December 1797 




put up a sound defence during the initial French offensives on 6 to 7 September. York and 
Freytag were lucky to have a general of Walmoden’s quality on whom they could rely. 
Walmoden acted with great courage and skill in both the retreat to Hondschoote and during 
the battle. Indeed, if York had acted with greater calm during the initial French attacks, he 
could have sent reinforcements to support Walmoden, since the British troops at Dunkirk 
were hardly engaged until Ferrand’s sortie.  
 If York had sent reinforcements to Walmoden at Hondschoote, the outcome of the 
battle might have been different given the fact that, despite possessing a numerical superiority 
over the Allies in the wider theatre of operations, Houchard’s troops had suffered greatly 
during the earlier battles and were dispersed over a wide area. Although the terrain made the 
use of Walmoden’s cavalry almost impossible, reducing the Hanoverians’ effective strength 
to 9,000 infantry, Walmoden’s soldiers were better trained and equipped than their more 
numerous French opponents and the Hanoverians were also in possession of a strong 
defensive position.  
Thus, despite the French numerical superiority, Walmoden’s troops provided stubborn 
resistance. If York had opted to rush to Walmoden’s aid, the Anglo-Hanoverians might have 
been able to achieve a much needed victory. Eager to save the British troops under his 
command, however, York left the Hanoverians to keep the French at bay whilst the British 
extricated themselves from Dunkirk. By the end of the battle Walmoden’s force was spent 
and, in the words of one Hanoverian officer, the Hanoverians could “no longer to be 
depended upon”.180 In leaving the Hanoverians to fight the French alone at Hondschoote, the 
York sacrificed his German allies in order to save his British troops. That the Hanoverians 
                                                          
180 Fortescue, British Campaigns in Flanders, p. 239.  
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performed this thankless task exemplified their fighting spirit and professional pride whilst, 
in contrast, the British retreat was uncoordinated and confused. 181  
Fundamentally, poor planning on the part of the British high command led to the 
failure of the coastal campaign in 1793, but as the following chapter demonstrates the British 
learnt nothing from this defeat and repeated many of the same mistakes during the following 
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BRITISH DEFEAT IN THE NETHERLANDS 1794-1795 AND THE DUKE OF 
YORK’S REFORMS  
Following their defeat at both Dunkirk and Hondschoote York’s forces had continued 
to retreat until the onset of extreme cold forced a halt to active operations and the British 
entered winter quarters. Not only did this offer the British a golden period of rest, but it also 
presented them with an opportunity to review what had gone wrong in 1793 so that they 
could fight more effectively the following year. However, although the British busied 
themselves with administrative tasks, nobody recognised the need to evaluate the past 
campaign or to analyse why things had gone so badly wrong at Dunkirk. The situation was 
further compounded by the fact that many senior officers, including York, spent the winter on 
leave in London and command of the army in Flanders was temporarily handed to the newly-
promoted Lieutenant-General Sir William Harcourt.1 With few senior officers on hand to 
help him in his new role, Harcourt was content to merely work on administrative issues and 
thus the lessons of 1793 were not identified.  
On his return to the Low Countries in January 1794, York also eschewed the need for 
any kind of review and focused instead on preparing the army for active operations.2 There 
was one notable personnel change with Murray being appointed to take command of a 
brigade of infantry in order to make way for Colonel James Craig to act as York’s senior 
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ADC.3 Administrative aspects apart, the Duke also made contact with the Austrians and the 
Dutch in order to ascertain what they sought to achieve in the new campaign. During these 
discussions, the British were aided by a former French officer, Major-General François Jarry 
de Vrigny de la Villette, whose knowledge of the French Army and local topography were 
highly regarded.4 After several meetings with the ambitious Austrian chief of staff, Colonel 
Karl Mack von Leiberich, York accepted the new Austrian strategy, which again called for an 
Allied offensive in Flanders to drive the revolutionaries back to the frontiers of France.5 As 
with the previous campaign, the Austrians did not desire a decisive engagement with the 
French, but favoured a new thrust to seize a series of apparently vital strategic positions. 
Indeed, as Gunther E. Rothenberg has observed, Mack’s approach to warfare was just as rigid 
as Coburg’s “Mack too espoused the fashionable system of strategy in which the main 
objective was not the destruction of the enemy but control of certain topographical points. He 
designed intricate offensive movements by divergent columns, though he often underrated the 
opponent’s reaction”. 6 
After being reviewed by the Austrian Emperor at Le Cateau on 16 April the Anglo-
Hanoverians and their Austrian counterparts launched their new offensive.7 As in the early 
stages of the previous campaign the Allies achieved some early successes and were quick to 
                                                          
3 TNA WO 1/168: Major James Craig to Evan Nepean, 14 January 1794, Ghent, p.113, Burne, Noble Duke of 
York, p. 115. Burne incorrectly refers to Craig as John.  
4 Hughes Marquis, ‘Le Général François Jarry au service de l’Angleterre (1793-1806)’ Annales historiques de la 
Révolution française, No. 356 (Avril/Juin 2009), pp. 93-118 at p.96-97; François Jarry de Vrigny de la Villette, 
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1793. A keen military theorist and an expert on both light infantry and officer education, Jarry’s contribution to 
the reform of the British Army will be studied in greater detail later in the thesis.  
5 TNA WO 1/168: York to H. Dundas, 9 March 1794, Courtrai, pp. 397-398; TNA WO 1/168: Prince of Coburg, 
‘Considerations sur l’ouverture et les Operations de la Campagne prochaine de la Armée 1794’ Bruxelles le 4 
Fevrier 1794’, pp. 259-282; Mack is best known as the General who surrendered the city of Ulm to Napoleon in 
the early stages of the 1805: F.N Maude, The Ulm Campaign 1805: Napoleon and the Defeat of the Austrian 
Army During the 'War of the Third Coalition’ (London: Leonaur, 2008).  
6 Rothenberg, Napoleon’s Great Adversaries, p. 36.  
7 Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. IV, pp.230-231.  
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encircle the French-held fortress of Landrecies.8 Over the course of the rest of April a French 
relief force, under Souham, tried repeatedly to break through the Allied advanced position in 
order to lift the siege. Despite Souham’s best efforts, the French were defeated at the battles 
of Vaux, Villers-en-Cauchies, Beaumont and Willems.9 The Anglo-Hanoverian army played 
a prominent role in each of these engagements and the infantry were well supported by the 
British and Austrian cavalry.  
Following the capture of Landrecies, which fell to the Austrians on 30 April, the 
Allies advanced to the north-west and took up a series of positions between Courtrai and 
Menin.10 The French, under Pichegru, were concentrated in the vicinity of Lille, but French 
troops also held positions as far north as Dunkirk and to south-west of Landrecies. 
Meanwhile, following the failed attempt to break the siege of Landrecies, Souham had tried 
to retire to Lille, but had been partially overtaken by Clerfaiyt’s advance guard and had taken 
up a defensive position several miles to the east of Lille on the right bank of the River Lys.11 
Although the Lys provided some protection from Clerfaiyt, the presence of the main Allied 
army to the south of this position greatly concerned Souham and Pichegru.  
With the French forces divided, Coburg and York decided to attack the French before 
their forces could reunite. Under the supervision of Mack the Allied forces were divided into 
six attacking columns and ordered to converge to the west of Tourcoing in order to keep 
Souham away from Lille. Once this was achieved the Allies would then attack Pichegru and 
                                                          
8 Fortescue, British Campaigns in Flanders, pp. 298-300.  
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Haythornthwaite, Die Hard!, Dramatic Actions from the Napoleonic Wars (London: Arms & Armour Press, 
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10 Lynn, Bayonets of the Republic, p. 17.  
11 See Appendix Map 3: Battle of Tourcoing; Clerfaiyt’s column marked as VI.  
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force Souham to surrender.12 The success of the plan depended on the ability of the Allied 
commanders to cooperate effectively and coordinate the timing and speed of each of their 
respective attacks so that they reached their objectives in good order and with enough strike 
power to make a decisive blow. What Mack and his colleagues had not bargained for, 
however, was that the French had also planned to make a general attack and had positioned 
the bulk of their finest troops in close proximity to the planned Allied line of advance.13 
 Thus when the Allied columns began their narrow advance towards Tourcoing on 17 
May they met with little resistance.14 However, unbeknown to the Allied high command, the 
French had started their own advance and had made several major gains at the expense of the 
Allied troops on either flank. By the time Coburg was fully aware of the danger the Allied 
columns were already fully engaged and could not easily be coordinated.  Over the course of 
the following day the main Allied attacks lost their impetus and the battle gradually 
degenerated into a number of confused engagements before Coburg and York were forced to 
order a general withdrawal.15  
Although the Allies were able to make an orderly withdrawal after defeat at 
Tourcoing, the British ministers were alarmed by the defeat and feared a sudden French 
advance to threaten Ostend. With York unable to reach the coast, Henry Dundas dispatched 
another expeditionary force of around 10,000 men, under the command of the highly 
experienced Major-General Francis Rawdon, Earl of Moira, to safeguard the Flanders coast.16 
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13 Blanning, The French Revolutionary Wars, pp. 112-113.  
14 For a map of the Battle of Tourcoing see Appendix: Map 2.  
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Moira’s force had spent much of December aboard ship in the English Channel, having failed 
to support the Royalist cause in Normandy and Brittany, and were thus on hand to be 
deployed to protect Ostend.17 After having made a successful landing at Ostend, Moira was 
forced to move inland following news that the Austrians had been forced to withdraw 
towards Maastricht after the decisive French success at the Battle of Fleurus on 26 June 
1794.18 With the Austrians in full retreat, and the Dutch offering scant resistance, York and 
Moira retired from Flanders; the French secured Brussels and the great Belgic port of 
Antwerp in the process. The loss of Antwerp was a major blow for the British war effort, but 
with the survival of York’s army at stake, the Prince had no choice but to abandon the city 
and its dockyards to the French.  
 During the late summer of 1794, the Anglo-Hanoverian army snaked its way through 
the United Provinces in search of a new defensive position.19 This retreat was similar to the 
one which the British had conducted after Dunkirk and, yet again, it was far from well 
managed. “O dear, O dear” wrote the commander of the newly arrived 85th Regiment of Foot, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Paget, brother of Lord Paget, “We lost a waggon full of baggage 
in the last march”. The villains of the piece, according to Paget, were the inefficient and 
unprofessional commissary services: “the Commissary Department want a great deal of 
scouring” and wrote further that his men were “cheated” of their food and pay in the 
process.20 Tired and hungry, Paget and the rest of the army were forced to keep on the run, 
the wet roads making progress slow. As a lieutenant in Paget’s regiment noted, the veterans 
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in the ranks also found it tough going: “even old campaigners of America declared they never 
underwent a march of such exertion and fatigue.”21   
Having crossed the frontier between the Southern Netherlands and the Dutch 
provinces in early September York decided to defend the River Maas.22 The Duke’s hopes 
were scuppered on 14 September when the French outflanked the Anglo-Hanoverian 
positions and captured the important village of Boxtel.23 Although Abercomby reclaimed the 
village, by way of a bold counter-attack the following morning, York’s faith in the river 
defences had been greatly shaken and he ordered the army to take up a new defensive 
position beyond the River Waal at Nijmegen.24 The British reached the Waal several days 
later and spent the following two months creating what York hoped would be an unassailable 
defensive position behind the strong-flowing waters of the Waal and the River Lek. 
Despite high hopes of being able hold the French until the winter forced a halt to 
operations, the French continued to make offensive preparations and surprised the British by 
launching a number of attacks across the frozen Waal during the last days in December and 
into early January.25 The British again made attempts to push the French back but, with 
French advancing in ever greater numbers, the British decided to fall back upon the River 
Lek and to the River Yssel. By this point the British forces were under the command of 
Harcourt, York having been recalled in December, due to political pressure.26  
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Over the course of the spring the Anglo-Hanoverian army made its sorry way across 
the heart of the United Provinces. Freezing in the winter cold and ravaged by sickness, 
hundreds of British and Hanoverian troops fell in droves by the roadside.27 Ensign St George, 
a junior officer in the 80th Regiment of Foot, noted the harrowing account of the retreat:  
The cold was so intense on the march…(that) our breath was freezing as soon as 
emitted…The wind was so excessive high it drifted the snow and together so strong 
that we could hardly wrestle against it…Some so exhausted with fatigue were 
obliged to lie down… but when they woke they found their blood almost instantly 
congealed in their veins and so frost bitten as not to be able to stir... In one place 7 
men, 1 woman and a child were found dead…A few men were found alive, but their 
hands and feet were frozen to such a degree as to be dropping off at the wrists and 
ankles.28 
 
 The hospital conditions that awaited those who were rescued from the roadside often 
proved to be as deadly as the frozen ground, as frostbitten men were laid side by side with 
those suffering from fever. The men of the 85th Regiment of Foot were also plagued by 
Caribbean fever, having sailed to the Low Countries in a transport which had previously been 
used to carry infected troops to Great Britain from the West Indies.29 As Corporal Robert 
Brown noted, the hospital staff showed wanton disregard for the welfare of the sick and 
wounded:  
Removing the sick in waggons, without clothing sufficient to keep them warm in 
this rigorous season, has sent hundreds to their eternal home; and the shameful 
neglect that prevails through all that department, makes our hospitals mere 
slaughter-houses; without covering, without attendance and even without clean 
straw and sufficient shelter from the weather, they are thrown together in heaps, 
unpitied, and unprotected, to perish by contagion.30  
 
As conditions deteriorated so too did British discipline and the troops pillaged and 
raped their way across the Dutch landscape.31 The increasingly despicable behaviour of the 
British towards the local population accentuated anti-British sentiment amongst the Dutch 
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peasantry, who welcomed the French as liberators.32 With little reason to remain in the 
United Provinces, the British hastened to the neutral city of Bremen, where they were finally 
evacuated by the Royal Navy.  
Scratching the surface: York’s reforms and the British Army  
At the beginning of 1795 it became obvious that the war could be carried on in no 
satisfactory way by the system of temporary expedients and makeshifts which had 
hitherto been the only resource of the government. A step was therefore taken 
towards the re-establishment of the Army’s discipline and efficiency by the 
appointment of the Duke of York to be Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief.33 
 
 The promotion York to the post of C-in-C was not greeted with any great fanfare and 
neither was it thought that much good would follow his appointment. As Lord Cornwallis 
noted, “Whether we shall get any good by this, God only knows, but I think that things 
cannot change for the worse in that department”.34 Furthermore, York was only appointed to 
the post in order to save face and placate the King’s desire for his son to play a prominent 
role in the military establishment.35 York’s rise to the top of the command pyramid was not 
due to his skill as a commander or to any plan he had for the future of the Army but was 
simply a case of the ministers seeking to safeguard the reputation of the Crown. Although 
some historians have suggested that the York possessed “an active appreciation of what was 
wrong with the Army”36 his knowledge of the key weaknesses was limited. York did not 
have a reform ‘blueprint’ outlining the changes that needed to be made. Nor were the reforms 
motivated by any great desire on the part of the York, or his colleagues, to alter the status 
quo.   
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The reform process was triggered because the British Army was clearly unready to 
meet the threat of French invasion. The Duke thus found himself in a position of authority 
when changes were needed and the government was clearly concerned at the weak state of 
the nation’s defences. York, therefore, set about his reforms because the situation of the 
nation’s armed forces necessitated change at a time of crisis. The reforms were merely a 
reaction to the prevailing circumstances, rather than a product of constructive thinking based 
on lessons learnt from the campaigns in the Low Countries. Although some improvements 
were made, notably in the form of administrative changes, the reformers did not seek radical 
reform and neither did they transform the British Army.  
The main reforms and their impact  
The main reforms made York occurred in stages and targeted three main areas: 
administration, training and the officer corps.  
Administration 
York’s first act was his creation of a new post of Military Secretary, the inaugural 
appointee being Colonel Robert Brownrigg.37 Until this point, all of the correspondence 
relating to the Office of the C-in-C at Horse Guards had passed through the hands of a 
civilian official in the form of the Secretary at War.38 This change was greatly welcomed 
because the previous Secretary at War, Sir George Yonge, had damaged the quality of the 
officer corps through the unregulated sale of commissions.39 Despite the benefits of this 
reform, a less positive result of the creation of a new Military Secretary was that it distanced 
the office of the C-in-C from the rest of the political administration.  
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Over the course of his first five years in office, York stamped his authority upon the 
administration of the Army by making a series of personnel changes, designed to place like-
minded officers in key positions. Alongside Brownrigg, York appointed Major-General 
Henry Fox to act as the first Inspector General of Recruiting, a position which was eventually 
subsumed into the AG’s department. The latter position was held by Lieutenant-General Sir 
William Fawcett, until 1799, when another acolyte of York’s, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry 
Calvert, assumed the role. Calvert, like Brownrigg and Fox, had come to the Duke’s attention 
in the Low Countries in 1793 to 1795 and remained in post until long after the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars.40  
Others to hold positions of authority at the Horse Guards included: Colonel George 
Morrison; Colonel William Clinton; Lieutenant-General Sir David Dundas; Major-Generals 
George Hewett; John Whitelocke; John Willoughby Gordon and Sir Harry Torrens. The last 
two officers are perhaps the best known, as it was they who had most dealings with 
Wellington, during the latter years of the Peninsular War. The most controversial of the group 
was Whitelocke, whose career was cut short following his mishandling of the British 
expedition to Rio de Plata in 1807.41  
Although some of these officers remained in their initial posts for the entirety of the 
period, there was some notable overlap in terms of responsibility. Brownrigg, for instance, 
vacated the post of Military Secretary in 1803, only to be appointed QMG. Willoughby 
Gordon shared the same career path as Brownrigg, the former replacing the latter as QMG in 
1809, having first served in Brownrigg’s old post of Military Secretary after taking over from 
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Clinton in 1804.42 These key individuals apart, the bulk of the administrative work was done 
by a small number of clerks. 
At the War Office, the number of clerks rose steadily as the wars with France 
developed. In 1797 the Secretary at War, William Windham, could call on the services of 58 
clerks, a number which swiftly grew to 208 by 1815. York never had more than 29 clerks at 
his disposal at any one time. Of all the military departments, the best staffed in numerical 
terms was the Ordnance, the Master-General being able to call upon the services of 353 
clerks in 1797 and up to 886 by 1815. By way of contrast, the Foreign Office was never 
served by more than 34 clerks, a number which although far smaller than the Ordnance, was 
still superior to the number available to York. Although the small number of staff at the 
Horse Guards meant that close working relationships developed, the reform process was not 
subject to the scrutiny of others and neither was there much scope for civilian input.  
Although military historians tend to suggest that civilian influence upon military 
matters is not beneficial, recent research into the subject of military change has suggested 
otherwise. Instead of hindering the process of military change, those without close ties to the 
military, or those in positions of authority, are often better placed to provide an impartial 
perspective upon the need for political and military change and are more likely to pursue 
transformative developments than those with a vested interest in the existing system.43  In 
1810, for instance, the prominent Whig statesman and future Prime Minister, Sir Charles 
Grey, proposed a series of sweeping changes to the military establishment to improve the 
workings of the British military bureaucracy and to provide greater unity and purpose to 
British strategy.   
Grey’s plan was to amalgamate the various departments, such as the Ordnance and 
Horse Guards, into a single ‘Board of War.’ Grey envisaged that the new board would be 
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modelled on the system used by the Admiralty and would be controlled by a First Lord who 
would be aided by a panel of four military commissioners. These senior figures would 
preside over the smooth running of seven administrative departments, organised according to 
their specific functions, such as the Medical Board and the Office of the Adjutant-General.44 
Despite the potential merits of these proposals Grey did not greatly publicise his ideas and it 
is also highly questionable whether they would have been accepted by the conservative-
minded Portland administration.45 What is significant about all of this is that York did not 
make anything like the changes proposed by Grey during the period, changes which might 
have had a transformative effect on the British Army. As it was those in power were content 
to maintain the status quo, an approach which was repeated by Wellington when he was C-in-
C in 1827-1828 and 1842-1852.46 
Much has also been made of the importance of York’s decision to establish a Depot of 
Military Knowledge in 1803.47 Despite its grand title the depot was little more than a 
cluttered store room, into which a series of miscellaneous maps and plans were placed. Nor 
was the depot a new idea, something similar had existed for several years in the form of the 
Tower of London Drawing Room which had been created by the Ordnance Office in 1717.48 
The Drawing Room had also a larger number of personnel working at the Tower in the years 
before it was replaced.49 The depot was not as effective as it could have been and, on several 
occasions during the war years, commanders suffered from a lack of adequate maps. The lack 
of improvement in this area was due to the fact that, instead of changing the way the existing 
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Drawing Office operated, York simply gave the office a new name and did not impose a new 
rationale or set of procedures for improvement. The Depot of Military Knowledge was 
simply a place where dusty maps were stored, rather than a centre for the development of 
military knowledge.  
The training of the infantry  
 Although some historians have credited York with the decision to adopt David 
Dundas’s drills throughout the line regiments of the Army, it has already been noted that 
Amherst was first to recognise the potential of Dundas’s training methods; Dundas’s drills 
were used by every regiment in Flanders in 1793-5.50 The reform of the training of the line 
infantry, therefore, was a gradual process and one in which York played only a minor role.51 
Of greater significance for the tactical flexibility of the British Army in the period was the 
development of light infantry.  
Some historians, such as Mark Urban, have suggested the reforms made to light 
infantry by officers such as Sir John Moore and Calvert stemmed from the many ‘lessons 
learned’ in North America.52 Although there is evidence to suggest that the British did adopt 
looser tactics in America, due to the terrain, and the general lack of heavy cavalry and massed 
artillery on American battlefields, it is highly questionable whether the British ‘learnt’ 
anything of any great use from this conflict.53  Not only was there no official review of the 
war in the months after the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, but few senior British 
officers’ documented their experiences.54 Furthermore, no official government inquiries were 
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established to evaluate the tactical developments of the American War and, over the course of 
the following years, British officers largely forgot what they had experienced.55  
The situation was not helped by the fact that York did not see the need for a large 
body of light infantry until Britain was faced with invasion in 1803. There were also only a 
few officers who had detailed knowledge of light infantry tactics: these being Moore, Coote 
Manningham, William Stewart and Kenneth Mackenzie.56 However, although these officers 
had some knowledge of light infantry, the lack of emphasis on the development of light 
infantry over the course of the previous years had left the British far behind their European 
rivals. With no official history or collective memory of the American War to rely on, Moore 
and his acolytes relied heavily on the technical knowledge of several foreign experts.57 The 
creation of the famous 95th Rifles was also guided by foreign expertise, in the form of the 
Baron de Rottenburg, who had made a name for himself in the 60th Royal American Rifles 
and was the author of an influential English-language light infantry manual.58 Without men 
like Rottenburg, the British Army would not have been able to field light infantry of the 
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The reforms and the officer corps 
 
One of the first steps taken by York was to impose stricter controls over promotions.59 
The motivation for this decision stemmed from the fact that during the campaigns in the Low 
Countries in 1793 to 1795 the quality of many of the regimental officers in the British Army 
had been below par. As far as York and his colleagues at the Horse Guards were concerned, 
the main reason for the shortfall in quality of regimental officers stemmed from the 
dysfunctional nature of the system by which budding officers could gain a commission and 
progress up the command structure. During these years, aspiring officers and those already in 
the system had a choice when it came to how to gain a promotion. On the one hand, the 
individual could seek to gain promotion through many years of hard service and the approval 
of senior officers, whilst on the other those with the financial means and a powerful and 
wealthy patron could simply purchase promotion.60  
Although the purchase system did enable some good officers to rise to higher levels in 
the officer corps, the system had been much abused by Yonge, who in the years before 1793 
had made a fortune via the sale of commissions. York’s former ADC, Craig, was particularly 
scathing in his criticism of Yonge’s conduct and its effects upon the quality of the officer 
corps:  
 
There is not a young man in the Army that cares one farthing whether his 
commanding officer, the brigadier of the commander-in-chief approves his conduct 
or not. His promotion depends not on their smiles or frowns. His friends can give 
him a thousand pounds with which to go to the auction rooms…and in a fortnight 
he becomes a captain. Out of the fifteen regiments of cavalry and twenty-six of 
infantry which we have here, twenty-one are commanded literally by boys or 
idiots.61 
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York therefore set about tightening the rules governing how the purchase system 
operated. Regimental colonels were instructed to draw up detailed lists, naming the officers 
under their command and outlining their record and years of service. A new set of rules was 
also introduced to govern how and when officers could apply for promotion. For example, a 
subaltern who wished to be a captain had to have served for at least a year before he could 
seek to gain a captaincy, whilst anyone wishing to rise to the rank of major had to have 
served at least six years in order to be eligible.62  Further regulations were also introduced 
over the course of the period but the premise remained the same: all officers had to have 
served for a specified period of time before they could seek higher appointments.  
Although the changes instigated by York removed some of the problems inherent in 
the way in which officers gained promotion, the system of purchase remained until 1871 
when it was finally abolished, after much debate, by the then Secretary for War, Edward 
Cardwell.63 York’s reforms certainly made it harder for junior officers to rise swiftly through 
the officer corps, but they did not prevent the wealthy from continuing to purchase their way 
to the higher levels after they had served the minimum years required of them. The pressures 
of war also had an impact on the new system and on campaign it mattered less if a junior 
officer had served the full five years if a place needed to be filled. 
 
Officer education  
One of the harshest critics of the British officer corps of the age was Sir Henry 
Dundas, who spoke of his concern regarding the lack of training for younger officers to 
Grenville, in a letter dated 21 July 1798: 
The education of our young military men is an object calling loudly for 
attention…It is impossible they can know the duties of subalterns, or of course, of 
their profession, for they are hurried through inferior situations into the rank of field 
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officer before they have either studied or practically exercised the elements of their 
profession. 64 
 
The first official school for the training of junior regular officers in the British Army 
opened in the back room of the Antelope pub in High Wycombe in 1799.65 The brain behind 
the idea was not York, but an enterprising young cavalryman, Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Gaspard Le Marchant. 66 The initial success of the project convinced York of the value of the 
project and, after having moved to new premises and divided into junior and senior 
departments it was granted the title of Royal Military College (RMC) in 1801.67  
The supporters of the transformation thesis claim this development was a major 
improvement to the British military system. However, the creation of the RMC was not as 
radical a change as has been suggested. Firstly, although several graduates of the school 
eventually found themselves in administrative posts in Wellington’s headquarters in the 
Iberian Peninsula, the fact that the school could only cater for around thirty cadets at any one 
time meant that it took many years for the benefits to be felt.68 Secondly, despite creating a 
college to educate a small group of junior officers, neither York nor Le Marchant sought to 
make the course compulsory, whilst the high entrance fees also served to limit rather than 
encourage potential entrants. Thirdly, beyond this small beginning nothing was done by the 
reformers to encourage a widespread awareness throughout the Army of the value of learning 
as a gateway to improving strategic and operational planning and military thought.  As a 
result, for many years only a handful of serving officers recognised the value of studying 
military theory.  
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The British approach to military education in a European context  
 
One of the problems with the transformation thesis is that its proponents have tended 
to analyse York’s reforms in isolation. This is particularly true of the way in which military 
historians have assessed the reforms made by York and Le Marchant to military education in 
the British Army. Richard Glover, for example, devoted an entire chapter to the study of 
York’s reforms to military education in the British Army, but made only a passing reference 
to the more extensive changes that had already been made to military education in Europe.69 
The same Anglo-centric approach can be found in the work of those who have subsequently 
built upon Glover’s thesis.70  
When placed within the wider context of European military developments over the 
course of the previous centuries, the changes made to education in the British Army by York 
and Le Marchant in the period 1799 to 1803 appear limited and long overdue. Also, far from 
being on the cutting edge of military thought, the British lagged far behind their European 
rivals. Essentially, unlike the Europeans, the British had not yet developed a cognitive 
approach to war.  
‘They do things differently there’: The European military world and the 
British Army  
 
  Long before York set his reforms in motion, the French had recognised the need to 
train junior army officers. In 1679, for instance, the French had established a cadet school for 
the training of junior engineer officers at Douai and, over the course of the following decade, 
experimented with the training of young infantry officers in a series of new cadet 
companies.71 By way of contrast, the British equivalent of the school at Douai, the Royal 
Military Academy at Woolwich, would not be built for another 80 years. The French 
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continued to experiment over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a 
process which culminated in the creation of the prestigious Ecole Militaire in Paris in 1750. 
By this point, however, the French were not the only ones to have recognised the need to 
develop a cognitive approach to war.  
The Prussians, under Frederick the Great, had gradually sought to develop cadres of 
educated junior officers, whilst the Austrians and Russians had also sought to create a series 
of military schools of their own.72 The Russians, in particular, had made a major effort to 
keep abreast of developments in Europe and in 1698 Peter the Great had established a 
rudimentary military school for aspiring officers of the Guards and Artillery as part of a 
wider series of military reforms.73 An Artillery school was added in 1701, an Engineer 
School in 1712, whilst many garrison schools were also constructed. In 1758, a Russian 
‘Ecole Militaire’ was formed entitled ‘The Artillery and Engineer Noble Cadet Corps’. This 
institution quickly became famed throughout Europe and by the Napoleonic era had been 
responsible for the education of many thousands of Russian generals, including Mikhail 
Kutuzov, Fedor Büxhowden and Aleksey Korsakov.74 Thus, by the end of the Seven Years’ 
War, each of the continental European powers had recognised the value of military education 
for the young entrants to their respective officer corps.75  
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With their initial advantage lost, one of the last great military changes made by the 
Bourbons was to update the system of military education in France, with the aim of placing 
the French army at the forefront of European military development once again. The French 
system of military education in the period before the French Revolution was the most 
advanced in Europe. After passing a testing examination officer cadets were expected to 
attend civilian school to hone their reading and writing skills. These ‘Finishing Schools’ 
fostered an appreciation for intellectualism amongst new entrants to the officer corps. 
Graduates of this system included a young Napoleon Bonaparte, who attended the school at 
Brienne.76 
The idea behind this scheme was that the new entrants would learn both intellectual 
and practical skills before being sent to their respective regiments.77 Graduates of this system 
could then study at the Ecole Militaire and, when officially commissioned into the French 
Army, might also seek further instruction by attending a more specific military academy. 
Napoleon, for instance, went from the Ecole Militaire to a specific gunnery school at 
Valence, whilst Lazare Carnot, attended a Finishing School before he went on to the engineer 
school at Mézières.78 Other specific schools included the geographical school for engineers in 
Paris, the cavalry schools at Bescançon, Metz, Douai and Angers, and those for gunnery at 
Bescançon, Metz, Douai, La Fère, Auxonne and Grenoble.79  
Not all of the entrants to this new system were French and a few British officers 
attended French schools during these years. Indeed, it is interesting to point out that arguably 
Britain’s best generals of the Napoleonic Wars in Wellington, Rowland Hill and William 
Carr Beresford, attended one of the French schools in question. Although it is difficult to 
establish what they learned from their experiences in France, save for a better grasp of 
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French, it is possible to say that, unlike their contemporaries, Wellington, Hill and Beresford 
would have been made aware of the existence of the wider European military world, one in 
which military thought was as highly prized as regimental responsibilities and values.  
In the short term, the elaborate system of military education in France suffered greatly 
during the early years of the French Revolutionary Wars but nevertheless the French were 
able to reap the benefits of the previous reforms. During the Revolutionary Wars the French 
Army fielded no less than 255 generals and admirals who had had the benefit of military 
schooling.80 Many of those who had received a military education went on to distinguish 
themselves on the battlefields of Europe. Of Napoleon’s Marshals eight had attended a 
military academy including: Davout, Grouchy, Kellermann, Marmont, Macdonald, Perignon, 
Poniatowski and Serurier.81 Napoleon also took a keen interest in military education and in 
1802 created the Ecole Speciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr which, over the course of the 
Napoleonic Wars, educated over 4,000 junior officers.82  
The British Army also lagged behind the Royal Navy in the development of education 
for its officer corps. Since 1677, junior naval officers had been ordered to attend training 
sessions in navigation and tactics, followed by an examination aboard ship.83 Despite these 
developments, the French were more advanced in their educational thinking and had opened 
two naval academies at Rochefort and Toulon in 1670.84  Soon the other European naval 
powers followed suite and created naval academies of their own: the Danish ‘Sea Cadet 
Academy ‘opened in 1709, whilst the Russians established a Naval Academy at St Petersburg 
in 1715. In 1699, a British civilian schoolmaster, Lewis Maidwell, had called on the 
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Admiralty to create a similar institution and in 1705 also argued the need for a Naval 
Mathematical School.85 Although the Admiralty warmed to Maidwell’s proposals, the plan 
was later shelved, and the British remained without a Naval Academy until 1733.86  
Though the British had been slow to emulate the Europeans, the Naval Academy at 
Portsmouth was a jewel in the British naval crown and offered its entrants a first-rate 
education as part of a broad-based curriculum. As F.B Sullivan has noted, “The scholars were 
to be instructed in writing, arithmetic, drawing, navigation, gunnery, fortification, other 
useful parts of mathematics, French, dancing, fencing and the exercise of the firelock” and, 
after a year of hard academic work, the young cadets were then instructed in practical and 
technical skills aboard a training vessel.87 Although not all aspiring naval officers opted to 
attend the new academy, the foundations had already been laid for the benefit of future 
generations of naval officers, many of whom appreciated from an early age the value of study 
and learning from past experiences.  
Running in parallel to, and underpinning, the new military developments in France 
and Europe during the 1750s to 1780s was a pan-European military intellectual ferment.  
During this time many of the great enlightenment thinkers had turned their attention to 
military thought. Scholars such as Jean Jacques Rousseau devoted a great deal of effort to the 
study of war and its social implications.88 Other military specialists from across Europe 
included the Frenchman Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert and the German 
intellectual duo of Gebhard von Scharnhorst and Fredrick von Bülow.89 The major theories 
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about the art of war written by these individuals shaped the approaches taken by many of the 
European armies and existed side by side with the many thousands of military pamphlets, 
drill manuals and tactical treatises which were also produced during these years. Many of 
these publications also crossed the Atlantic and found a ready audience with the officers of 
the American Continental Army during the American War of Independence.90  
A German in British pay later recalled that, during operations in America, his troops 
routinely seized a large number of military books from captured American soldiers. The 
officer in question, Captain Johann von Ewald, recorded that he was often “Astonished when 
American baggage fell in our hands” largely because a great many of the American soldiers’ 
knapsacks were “filled with military books”. This fact prompted Ewald to claim that the 
Americans “studied the art of war while in camp,” a habit which contrasted sharply with the 
works of fiction chiefly read by their British opponents.91 British officers were expected to 
lead from the front and uphold the paternal ethos of the regiment; book-learning and 
intellectualism were simply not on the agenda.92 The British aversion to the development of 
new military thinking, as opposed to the educated, free-thinking attitude in the armies of 
Europe is best illustrated by the overwhelming disparity in the number of works of military 
theory produced by Europeans, as opposed to the limited number of works written by British 
military thinkers.  
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The types of books available by British authors included titles about the general 
responsibilities expected of officers such as: Charles James’s The Regimental Companion: 
containing the relative duties of every soldier in the British Army (London: 1800); Robert 
Donkin’s Military Collections (New York, 1777); Thomas Simes’s Military Medley (1768). 
Several officers also carried with them memoirs of past campaigns. These works of history 
tended, however, to be less about the study of past conflicts and more about the personal 
exploits and arguments of the author, a prime example being Colonel Banastre Tarleton’s 
History of the Southern Campaigns of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North 
America (1787). Others used the opportunity to publish works that called for the reform of 
the tactics of the infantry. The majority of these works tended to be written by advocates of 
light infantry tactics, a good example being Brigadier-General William Stewart’s, Outlines of 
a Plan for the general Reform of the British Land Forces (Second edition, 1806). Although a 
couple of officers did argue that a focus on military education was necessary, the vast 
majority were more concerned with drill and fostering the regimental ethos.93 This mentality 
has been well described by Corelli Barnet, who noted that “In Great Britain the preference for 
character over intellect, for brawn over brain, has always taken the form of denigration of the 
staff-college graduate and apotheosis of that splendid chap, the regimental officer”.94  
 
The authors of drill manuals aside, the only famous British military theorist of the 
period who had a European readership was Henry Lloyd, whose main intellectual work was 
his history of the Seven Years’ War, entitled The history of the late war in Germany between 
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the king of Prussia and the empress of Germany and her allies (1766). Lloyd, however, was 
relatively unknown in Britain and spent his formative years in the service of both the French 
and Austrian armies; he also saw active service against the Dutch in the Low Countries at the 
siege of Bergen-Op-Zoom in 1747.95 That the British themselves had little knowledge of 
Lloyd’s work highlights the general ignorance of the British officer corps in relation to the 
study of war and military education in this period.  
Perhaps the most important theorist of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
was Scharnhorst. An inspiring theorist, Scharnhorst devoted his career to the study of war. He 
entered a military academy at an early age and went on to teach in a regimental school, before 
being appointed head of a military school in Berlin which sought to teach junior officers core 
skills in the art of staff work. One of Scharnhorst’s protégés was the future military theorist 
and philosopher Carl Von Clausewitz.96 Scharnhorst was also a senior member of the Berlin 
‘Military Society’, an organisation in which Prussian Army officers and government officials 
met to discuss new developments in the context of military history.97 The existence of this 
discussion group is evidence of the development of a more analytical approach to the conduct 
of war in mainland Europe. The absence of such a discussion group in Britain is 
demonstrative of the gulf which separated the learned and increasingly professional European 
military community and the generally unintellectual and amateurish approach of the British 
officer corps.  
The French, like the Prussians before them, were also keen to put theory into practice. 
On numerous occasions they created various camps in order to put their new theories to the 
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test. At the camp at Vassiuex in 1778, for example, the senior commanders of the French 
Army tested the tactical ideas of a number of different theorists, including Guibert and other 
French writers, such as Mensil-Durand, so as to assess their practicality and see which was 
more suited to the abilities of the troops in conditions similar to those they would likely 
encounter on a European battlefield.98 That Guibert’s ideas were proved sound and Durand’s 
heavily criticized was important at the time, but what is historically significant is the fact that 
the French had decided to undertake the experiments in the first place.  
Placed in this European context, York’s creation of the RMC was far from 
progressive. Although several graduates of the RMC performed well on Wellington’s staff 
during the Peninsular War, the slowness of the British to create a school, combined with the 
young age of the entrants, meant it was not until late in the Peninsular War that the British 
were able to employ more of its graduates.  Furthermore, in the period after the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars, both the Royal Military Academy and the RMC suffered from reduced 
funding and a shortfall in both quality teaching and thus talented graduates.99  
Hew Strachan has noted that the RMC produced few senior officers in the years after 
the end of the Napoleonic Wars, the period 1832 to 1851 was particularly poor for the RMC; 
during these years only three graduates, out of a total number of 420, made it to the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel.100 Although the college created a means by which the British could 
develop young staff officers, something which the British had not had before, the return of 
only three senior regimental commanders for the number of entrants to the RMC was not an 
impressive return. The situation in the post-Napoleonic years was not helped by the fact the 
majority of senior officers and politicians, including Wellington, did not see the need for 
further reforms to education and viewed the graduates of the RMC with disdain. The Iron 
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Duke later referred to the studious types in the Army as, “coxcombs and pedants.”101 
Although some officers did advocate the need for a more European approach during these 
years, such as the lieutenant-governor of Portsmouth in the 1840s, Lieutenant-General Lord 
Frederick Fitzclarence, the senior figures at the Horse Guards did not respond favourably to 
such calls for change and nothing was altered.102   
Ultimately the creation of the RMC was far from transformative. Until the British 
created the means to emulate the French and Prussians and place an emphasis on institutional 
learning, they would continue to operate in much the same way as before. Even as late as 
1870 the British Army did not fully acknowledge the need for effective military education 
and training for officers. As Captain James Walter wrote in 1883:  
Before the year 1870 it seems to have been, with few exceptions, an article of 
English faith that the trade of soldiering was one which required no 
apprenticeship…and that when he donned a red coat he at once 
became…impregnated with those qualities and that knowledge of which in other 
professions had to be learned by hard work and study.103     
 
York’s reforms to administration, training methods and light infantry and the officer 
corps were limited in scope and conception. Missing from the reforms, but crucial if the 
changes were to have a transformative impact, was an attempt to cultivate in the officer corps 
a more intellectual mind set, one which recognised the value of learning from past 
experiences and the benefit of regular discussions between both Army and Navy personnel in 
order to improve performance. As the following campaign case studies demonstrate, the 
changes made did not greatly improve British military performance and nor did they bring 
about a transformation in the British Army.  
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THE EXPEDITION TO THE HELDER, 1799 
The Anglo-Russian expedition to the Helder in 1799, which sought to liberate the 
Dutch and oust the French from the Low Countries, was Britain’s main military effort of the 
War of the Second Coalition. Despite high hopes, British strategic and military planning 
blunders ultimately undermined the Anglo-Russian expedition and led to the near destruction 
of the British and Russian expeditionary forces. As in 1793-95, the main British failings were 
their inability to undertake effective operational planning and their over-reliance on 
unreliable intelligence reports. The British also greatly overestimated the willingness of the 
Dutch to support their operations and blamed the Russians for the defeat, much as they had 
the Austrians in 1795.  Dejected by the outcome of the expedition and concerned for the 
safety of their colonial possessions, the British reverted to a policy of strategic isolation. In 
doing so the British abandoned the Austrians who were eventually defeated the following 
year by a young Napoleon Bonaparte at the Battle of Marengo.1  
The architect of the Anglo-Russian intervention in the Low Countries, and the wider 
alliance, known as the Second Coalition, was Grenville. An ardent opponent of French 
expansionism, Grenville sought the overthrow of the French directory in order to forge a new 
European balance of power.2 Grenville’s plans for the future of Europe, however, did not 
immediately endear him to the more pragmatic Prussians and Austrians. The German powers 
had viewed the British with suspicion ever since the breakdown of Allied relations at the end 
of the War of the First Coalition in 1795. Neither was Grenville’s plan welcomed by all in the 
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British cabinet - its most vocal opponent was Sir Henry Dundas who believed that British 
interests would be better served if British military, naval and financial resources were used to 
seize French colonial possessions.3 Although Dundas would eventually have his way his 
arguments were overruled in 1798 by the weight of support for Grenville’s proposal for a 
renewed British commitment in Europe.  
Despite Grenville’s high hopes, the fact remained that in the spring of 1798 a feeling 
of mutual distrust lingered over European politics. The British, for instance, had felt betrayed 
by the Austrians who had failed to repay two substantial loans that had been granted to them 
by the British during the previous conflict.4 Instead of seeking to better Anglo-Austrian 
relations, Grenville looked to Berlin for support. However, the Prussians were far from eager 
to engage in a new offensive war with France and wanted instead to rebuild their armed 
forces in order to keep both France and Austria in check.5  Frustrated, Grenville looked to the 
Russians for support. As John Ehrman has noted Tsar Paul I was an unknown quantity on the 
diplomatic stage “The new Emperor Paul was known to hate the Revolution as his mother 
had done. But there resemblances ended. Morose and capricious, obsessed with military 
discipline, and now emerging from physical exclusion, he was an unknown and unpromising 
factor. 6 
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However, Paul was greatly impressed by Grenville’s idea for a new coalition and 
shared the foreign secretary’s desire to punish the French for their aggressive polices.7 The 
Tsar also sought to defend the smaller states of central Europe from French aggression and 
was particularly concerned about the future of Malta since this was home to the Order of the 
Knights of St John of whom he was Grand Master.8 Russia’s stance greatly pleased the 
British who had come to view the Russians as natural allies. However, before the British 
could make any further negotiations, news reached Grenville that several Swiss cantons had 
revolted against the French.9 Although the Swiss insurgents were defeated, the events in the 
Swiss cantons furthered Grenville’s desire for a new European alliance. Simultaneously, the 
British were also surprised by a series of fresh Austrian proposals. The Habsburgs had 
warmed to the idea of a new alliance with the British, and suggested that the British 
government furnish a new loan in return for renewed Austrian military commitment. The 
Austrians also wanted the British to send a fleet into the Mediterranean to support Austria’s 
Neapolitan Allies against the French.10 They also suggested that they would support the 
Swiss in the event of a future Swiss revolt in return for further British funds and supplies. 
Although this suggestion was later accepted by the British, Grenville did not agree to this 
proposal until July.11 
The British dedicated a great deal of thought to the new Austrian requests and, 
although Grenville refused the idea of a new loan agreement, the British agreed to commit a 
large Fleet to the coast of Naples under Nelson.12 This was a major strategic decision and one 
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which was motivated by the British government’s desire to both destroy the French 
Mediterranean Fleet and safeguard British interests in the Mediterranean and across the 
globe.  
The British were also wary of invasion and the French had come close to doing so on 
two occasions prior to 1798: in 1796 the French had almost succeeded in landing an army in 
Southern Ireland only for their fleet to be destroyed by a storm off Bantry Bay, whilst in 1797 
another French naval force managed to evade the clutches of the Royal Navy and landed a 
small army on the Pembrokeshire coast, near Fishguard.13 Although the latter invasion 
attempt was quickly defeated by the local yeomanry both invasion scares demonstrated that 
the British Isles were vulnerable and that the Royal Navy could not always be trusted to 
defend the approaches to the British coast. Swift action was clearly needed and Henry 
Dundas suggested a policy of coastal raiding in order to destroy French naval stations in 
Flanders and along the Dutch and French coasts. In 1798 the British launched a daring raid to 
destroy the lock gates at Ostend in order to prevent the French from using the Flanders canals 
to prepare an invasion.14 Although the raiding force of 1,400 British troops, under Major-
General Sir Eyre Coote, destroyed the lock-gates and blocked the canal to the enemy in an 
operation similar to the Zeebrugge Raid in 1918, bad weather prevented the navy from being 
able to evacuate the British troops and Coote was forced to surrender.15 The debacle at 
Ostend put Dundas’s raiding on hold and persuaded the cabinet of the merits inherent in 
Grenville’s continental strategy. Thus, as Nelson’s fleet moved into the Mediterranean in 
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mid-August, Pitt and the cabinet promised the Foreign Secretary that major funds would be 
provided in order to secure a Russian alliance.16  
It was to this end that Grenville instructed the British minister at St Petersburg, Sir 
Charles Whitworth, to enter into negotiations with the Tsar. This Whitworth did and, after 
much deliberation, the Tsar agreed to provide the British with an army of 45,000 Russian 
troops in exchange for a series of monthly payments of around £50,000.17 With relations 
developing Grenville dispatched his elder brother, Thomas, to Berlin in January 1799 to 
oversee diplomacy on the continent, renew negotiations with the Prussians and to open 
discussions with the Dutch-Orangeist émigrés based in Berlin.18 In going to Berlin Thomas 
was following a similar course to his brother, Grenville having been sent to The Hague and 
Versailles in the aftermath of the Dutch political crisis in 1787.19 
After a period of complex negotiations between the Tsar and the Habsburgs both 
parties agreed to form a new coalition against the French and readied their forces.20 What 
made matters confusing was that no treaty existed to link Britain to Austria, the British had 
only sought to agree matters with the Russians and still did not fully trust the Habsburgs. The 
Second Coalition was thus a fragile entity and its fate rested on the willingness of the 
Russians to support both the British and the Austrians and carry the fight to the French in 
Europe.  
With the new coalition formed, Grenville met with Thugut and various Russian 
representatives in order to set out Allied aims and objectives. Initial Allied strategy for the 
new campaign was as follows: the bulk of the Russian Army, and perhaps the Austrians, 
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under the Archduke Charles, would take to the offensive in Switzerland and support a 
planned revolt.21 Concurrently another force, preferably under Russian command, was to 
clear Northern Italy and advance to the French border. Finally a third Russian force, drawn 
from the main army, was to advance into the Netherlands to support the Dutch Orangeists. 
Grenville also firmly believed that victory in Holland would be all that was required to 
persuade the Prussians join the coalition and the following year would witness the final 
invasion of France.  
Although this strategy seemed promising on paper, strategic, political and logistical 
problems soon forced the Allied leaders to deviate from this strategy. For instance, Thugut 
disliked the idea of the Archduke Charles fighting for ‘British’ objectives in Switzerland, 
when his forces could so easily be deployed in Italy or on the Rhine; the Austrians eventually 
found a way to pursue this aim as the war progressed.22 Furthermore, it would take many 
weeks for the Russians to reach Switzerland, let alone the Dutch border, and after considering 
various options, Grenville decided against the deployment of Russian troops from the main 
army to Holland and that a new deal needed to be struck with the Tsar, so that more troops 
could be made available for an amphibious assault against the Dutch coast. Given the time it 
would take for the Russians to be shipped to the Dutch coast, Grenville also came to the 
conclusion that a British army would need to be deployed to the Low Countries in order to 
spearhead the Allied campaign.23  
Rationale for intervention  
“The object of England is…what is has been for a century. To see in that country a 
rational, free, and efficient government, capable of providing for its domestic happiness and 
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of maintaining a real independence with respect to all its neighbours”.24 This statement, 
written by Grenville to the American ambassador in London in November 1798, encapsulated 
the official aim of the British government regarding the future of the Dutch state. In order to 
forge “a solid and efficient government in that country” and “consolidate the tranquillity of 
Europe” Grenville sought to restore the House of Orange and the office of Stadtholder.25 The 
stage was thus set for a frenetic period of diplomacy, as Grenville attempted to piece together 
this strategic vision for the future of the Low Countries and continued negotiations with the 
European powers.  
Before Grenville dispatched his brother to Berlin, the Foreign Secretary had received 
an unexpected communication from William Murray, an American dignitary at The Hague, 
who claimed that the Dutch- Batavian Government was willing to support a British invasion 
if the British promised to abandon their support for the exiled Orangeists.26 Despite this offer, 
Grenville refused to negotiate and dismissed the idea as “Wholly inadmissible.”27 In refusing 
the Batavian overtures for cooperation, Grenville placed his faith in the views of his brother 
regarding the willingness of Dutch Orangeists to support a British intervention.  
During the spring months of 1799, Grenville sought to piece together plans of his own 
and sought the views of the exiled Stadtholder, William III, who had taken residence at 
Hampton Court. The picture painted of the Batavian Republic by the Berlin Orangeists and 
agents in British pay was favourable to British plans. These various sources suggested that 
the Dutch were disaffected with the Batavian government and that the Batavian Army and 
Navy were mutinous. Most encouragingly of all, however, the French army was said to be in 
a poor state, with thousands of troops having been sent to combat the Allies in central 
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Europe. Everything seemed to point to the need for military plans and Grenville accelerated 
negotiations with the Russians.  
The British had been in discussion with the Russians regarding an Anglo-Russian 
expedition since mid-May and the British secured the services of a further 17,000 Russians 
on 22 June.28 Grenville also dispatched the experienced General Stamford and Captain Sir 
Home Riggs Popham to St Petersburg in order to discuss the finer details of the Anglo-
Russian expedition with the Tsar.29 Stamford was to piece together the military aspects whilst 
Popham was tasked with organising the means by which the Russians were to be transported 
to the Low Countries.30  
 Popham reached St Petersburg first and set about outlining the shipping timetable 
with the Tsar.31 With Prussia resolutely neutral, the British could not simply rely on the 
Russian force marching across north-west Germany and into the Batavian Republic. A 
maritime solution had to be found. Time was of the essence, in that the season for 
expeditionary warfare in late spring and mid-summer was already passing. Popham was 
chosen for this task due to his nautical and logistical skills; he was also a keen administrator, 
having worked as a transport agent at Hamburg in 1795.32 It was hoped that his knowledge of 
the transport system would help to speed up the process of procuring shipping. At Popham’s 
                                                          
28 John M. Sherwig, Guineas and Gunpowder, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1793-1815 
(Cambridge: Mass. 1969), p. 120; Anon, British Minor Expeditions, 1746 to 1814, Compiled in the Intelligence 
Branch of the Quartermaster-General’s Department (London, 1884), p. 32; John A Lukas, ‘Russian Armies in 
Western Europe: 1799, 1814, 1917’American Slavic and East European Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 (Oct., 1954), p. 
332; Piechowiak, ‘The Anglo-Russian Expedition to Holland in 1799’, p. 184. 
29 J. Holland Rose review of M.H Weil, Le Général de Stamford, d'après sa Correspondance Inédite, 1793-1806 
EHR, Vol. 39 No. 154 (Apr., 1924), pp. 297-298.  
30 Mackesy, Statesmen at War, p. 106.  
31 Mackesy, Statesmen at War, p. 109; Hugh Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow - The Eventful Life of Rear- 
Admiral Sir Home Popham, K.C.B., K.C.H., K.M., F.R.S., 1762-1820. (Tywardreath: The Old Ferry, 1991) pp. 
256. 
32 Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower, the British expeditions to the West Indies and the war against 
revolutionary France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p.185.  
102 
 
request Grenville also instructed the Transport Board to secure adequate shipping for as many 
of the Russian troops as possible.33  
Boats, however, were not immediately available to the British and Popham chose to 
secure auxiliary shipping from the Russians themselves, leaving the British to organise their 
own transport methods. Popham relied on the use of the Russian Navy’s Baltic galley fleet to 
transport the Russian contingent to Holland. This plan was soon scuppered, however, when 
Popham discovered that the Russian galleys were no longer available.34 With time running 
short and the campaigning season fast approaching, Popham chose instead to reconfigure 
several aged Russian warships for use as transports. Furthermore, in order to furnish enough 
shipping for the initial landing force of 12,000 British troops, the British Transport Board, 
which had been created in 1794, was forced to negotiate with several prominent North-
Eastern British coal merchants for the use of their seaworthy vessels, known as colliers.35 The 
use of British merchant vessels also enabled the Royal Navy to free up the necessary military 
transports for the Russians and the second British force. The British were also short of flat 
bottomed boats, which were used as landing craft, but had little choice but to make do with 
what they had at their disposal.36 
As the British finalised their negotiations, the French were readying themselves for 
the Allied onslaught. Although suffering from the effects of wear and tear, the troops that 
remained in the ranks were mostly battle-hardened veterans whilst the French commanders 
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were ambitious and aggressively minded.37 What concerned the Directory was not the 
fighting spirit of the troops, or indeed the quality of the generalship, but the fact that the 
French military was overstretched; the French Army was expected to protect a much-enlarged 
empire which stretched from the coasts of the Batavian Republic to the shores of the 
Mediterranean and the Pyramids of Egypt. The fact that over 30,000 troops, under Napoleon 
Bonaparte, were stranded in Egypt did not help matters and in each campaign theatre the 
French were outnumbered by the Allies. In the Rhine valley, for instance, Jourdan 
commanded 25,000 men, but was opposed by a force of over 70,000 Austrians, under the 
Archduke Charles. Meanwhile in Switzerland, General André Massena’s 26,000 men were 
outnumbered by more than two to one by another Austrian army. Even in Italy, where the 
French had 70,000 men under Macdonald and Barthélemy Schérer, they were outnumbered 
and faced over 100,000 Austrian and Russian troops under Marshal Suvorov.38 Thousands of 
French troops were also stationed in the rear of the main battle areas in order to maintain 
supply lines and keep order; whilst in France itself thousands of troops were tied up policing 
the Royalist stronghold of the Vendeé and other volatile regions, such as the Dordogne and 
the Basque Country.39  
With typical revolutionary zeal, however, the French Directory wanted a decisive 
victory and in mid-March 1799 all of the French armies were ordered onto the offensive. 40 
French confidence was quickly rocked by a series of defeats. Particularly crushing was the 
Archduke Charles’s victory over Jourdan’s ‘Army of the Danube’ at Stockach on 25 March.41 
The Allies also made a series of quick gains in Northern Italy and on 27 April the Russian 
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Field-Marshal Alexander Suvorov defeated a French army at the battle of Cassano d'Adda.42 
Suvorov’s forces used this victory to their advantage and, over the following weeks, made 
themselves masters of Milan, Turin and Alessandria.43 By the end of July 1799 the French 
had been forced back to the Swiss frontier and the stage was to be set for the next Allied 
attack. Whilst the Austrians and Russians readied their forces, the British turned their 
attention to the Low Countries. Before analysing the British planning process it is necessary 
to outline the readiness of the British Army in 1799.  
The British Army: fit for service? 
As the Allied war machine pushed into the French occupied zones in central Europe 
and Northern Italy, the British began to make military preparations of their own.  Dundas had 
been informed of Grenville’s scheme for the Dutch expedition in early June, giving him 
barely two months to ready one of the largest expeditionary forces ever raised in Britain. 
Decimated by yellow fever whilst campaigning in the West Indies in the mid-1790s, the 
British Army was a mere skeleton of its former self. As Michael Duffy has noted, out of the 
89,000 British regular officers and men who served in the West Indies between 1793 and 
1801, 43,750 died during this period of campaigning.44  These dreadful losses had forced the 
British to reduce the army at home.45 Recruitment had also slumped during this period, a fall 
which was tied to the widespread fear of service in the West Indies amongst potential 
recruits. Thus, in October 1798, the combined strength of the regular Army and Militia forces 
in Britain totaled 67,000 officers and men. Only 12,700 of these troops were regular infantry, 
however, and this figure also included the 5,700 officers and men of the Foot Guards.46 More 
troops were needed quickly given that Grenville had promised Tsar Paul the support of a 
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British expeditionary force of 25,000 men.47 The lack of vessels for the shipment of the 
troops also meant that the British forces would need to be transported to the Low Countries in 
two batches. Finding troops for the initial British landing was relatively easy, with Dundas 
able to dispatch some 12,000 officers and men from the regulars for this task.48 Dundas’s 
main problem was what to do in order to find enough men for the second wave of British 
troops, a force which was supposed to number around 10,000. 
There were only a couple of options open to Dundas. He could seek to incorporate 
émigré regiments into the British contingent. This was difficult given the fact that several 
thousand émigré troops had been lost to British service following the defeat of the French 
Royalist expedition to Quiberon Bay in 1795.49 Dundas therefore resorted to increasing the 
size of the Army. What made Dundas’s task particularly difficult was the fact that the British 
recruiting system for the regular Army was based on volunteerism, rather than the French 
practice of conscription.50 This led to an uneven pattern of recruitment. In 1797, for instance, 
the British Army was 30,000 men short of the number Dundas thought necessary for the 
defence of the British Isles.51 Men were desperately needed for offensive operations, but the 
British recruitment system was not up to the task. A dramatic overhaul of this system was not 
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a viable option, however, because conscription was perceived as the arch-enemy of British 
values and “unpalatable” to British cultural sensibilities.52  
 Consequently, Dundas was forced to turn his attention to the Militia. Based on 
conscription by ballot, recruits to the Militia served for five years, but could only serve in the 
British Isles.53 Another characteristic of the recruitment process for the Militia was that there 
existed a loophole in the balloting process which allowed men to avoid service by paying for 
a substitute.54 This process was rife in a number of Militia regiments in 1798 and most 
notably in the Buckinghamshire Militia, with 90% of its new draft of 129 men being made up 
of substitutes.55 
Facing a manpower crisis Dundas persuaded the government to make an alteration to 
the Militia Act on 12 July which made it possible for militiamen to transfer into several 
existing regular infantry regiments.56 In order to attract as many militiamen as possible 
Dundas was wise to ensure that those who volunteered could only be deployed in Europe and 
not to the dreaded West Indies.57 By enabling militiamen to transfer to the regulars, Dundas 
had found a feasible solution to the manpower crisis and, by the end of the year, he was able 
to persuade over 26,000 militiamen to join the regulars.58 Dundas’s system would continue to 
provide soldiers throughout the Napoleonic wars.59 In the meantime some 10,000 militiamen 
                                                          
52 Catriona Kennedy, Narratives of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Military and Civilian Experience in 
Britain and Ireland (Basingstoke: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2013), p. 35.  
53 Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol. IV, pp. 639-642.  
54 Conway, ‘The Politics of British Military and Naval Mobilization’, p. 1182.  
55 Lois G. Schwoerer, ‘The Grenville Militia List for Buckinghamshire, 1798–1799’HLQ ,Vol. 68 No. 4 
(December 2005), pp. 667-676 at p. 673.  
56 Fortescue, A History of the British Army Vol. IV,pp. 641-642.  
57 Glover, Peninsular Preparation,, p 25, p. 227; Phillip. J Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington, 
(London: Brockhampton, 1998), p. 51.  
58 Ian. F. W Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1991), p. 79.  
59 Linch, ‘The Recruitment of the British Army 1807-1815’, p. 140.  
107 
 
were drafted into ten existing but understrength infantry regiments and ordered to Barham 
Downs in preparation for active operations.60 
With the Militia Act passed, the British expeditionary force was finally able to take 
full shape. Over the course of early August the commandant of the southern district, General 
Sir Charles Grey, oversaw the process of rebuilding the understrength regiments.61 On 14 
August, the total strength of the ten regiments numbered 8,927 officers and men.62 On 18 
August, the force peaked at 12,734 officers and men and was organized into five infantry 
brigades.63 The man tasked by Dundas with preparing the initial British assault force was 
Abercromby. An experienced senior officer, Abercromby had served with distinction in both 
Ireland and the West Indies during the 1780s and 90s but had not seen active service in 
America due to his political support for the Colonists.64  Abercromby had little experience of 
amphibious operations in Europe. Although a skilled administrator, he had a somewhat 
alarming tendency in battle to place himself in the thick of the action at the expense of 
maintaining order. He would lead the initial assault force with success in 1799, but his failure 
to plan effectively would hinder the expedition’s long term chances of success.  
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 The other commanding officers of the initial landing force were some of the most 
experienced in the British Army and included future divisional and army commanders such 
as Sir Harry Burrard, Moore and Coote, whilst at the lower levels battalion and company 
commanders included many future Peninsular War generals, notably Sir Andrew Barnard, Sir 
Robert Craufurd, Sir John Hope, Sir Alexander Howard, Sir George Murray, Sir Brent 
Spencer and George Ramsey Ninth Earl of Dalhousie.65. 
Dundas’s initial instructions to Abercromby emphasised the need for, “the greatest 
promptitude and vigour” owing to “the advance season of the year”.66 Abercromby’s first 
task was to lead the initial landing force and seize a beachhead on the Dutch coast. Once this 
force had established itself, the Duke of York would land with the second wave of British 
troops, made up of the five British infantry brigades encamped on Barham Downs, under the 
command of Generals John Pitt Second Earl of Chatham, Prince William Duke of Gloucester, 
Robert Manners, Sir George Don and Sir Richard Earl of Cavan.67 The Russian contingent 
was also scheduled to arrive at this time. York’s appointment as the overall commander of the 
expedition, although liked by the cabinet, was not considered a good appointment by all. The 
Tsar, in particular, had serious reservations about York’s military skills due to the Duke’s 
poor handling of the Anglo-Hanoverian army in 1793-95.68  
Planning and preparation  
Piers Mackesy has argued that “the strategic intention to seize the United Provinces 
was settled without seeking the advice of a British soldier: so was the operational plan which 
the Tsar had accepted”.69Contrary to Macksey’s assessment of the planning process, no 
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operational plan was ever created to guide the Anglo-Russian forces in the initial stages of 
the expedition. No fine-tuned landing plan was made and neither did the politicians or 
generals make it clear how the army was to operate once ashore. All the British did was to 
consider a vague series of locations for a landing. Planning how the Anglo-Russian forces 
were to cooperate was equally vague, with the only discussion between the two states on 
military matters having taken place several months earlier and, even then, the only things 
discussed were Popham’s shipping arrangements. Little else had been done. Thus, on the eve 
of the largest British military expedition since 1793, all that the British and Russians had 
agreed upon was that their combined forces would land somewhere between the rivers Emms 
and Scheldt.  
Although the ministers were to blame for many aspects of the poor planning process, 
York, who was placed in command of the whole expedition, also did nothing. The only 
officer who thought it necessary to consider the difficulties involved in the enterprise was 
Abercromby, who also consulted the expeditions QMG Colonel Sir John Hope. Despite 
writing a brief memorandum, which Hope forwarded to Grenville, the Foreign Secretary 
ignored the officer’s comments.70 Desperate for the expedition to set sail, Grenville was 
supremely confident in the expedition’s chances of success and had complete faith in 
intelligence which he had received from his brother in Berlin, which suggested that the 
French forces in Holland were very weak. Grenville informed Abercomby that the French 
were weak in number and oblivious to the impending threat: 
You know that we have, down to this very hour, accurate intelligence of the amount 
of French force in Holland. You are aware that it does not amount to 6,000 men, 
and those too, dispersed…from Delfzijl to Antwerp…the accurate intelligence 
received last night of the state of Walcheren and of the Eastern Provinces affords a 
strong confirmation of the former accounts as to the weakness of the enemy and 
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appears also in a very satisfactory manner that they have not yet turned their 
attention to our intended point of attack.71  
 
Other reports meanwhile, notably from the Orangeist agent, Robert Fagel, convinced 
Grenville that the Dutch-Batavian army would disintegrate, once the Anglo-Russian forces 
stormed ashore.72 It was on the strength of these intelligence reports that Grenville told 
Dundas that, “Were all the Generals on earth assembled…nothing they could say would 
weigh a feather in my mind”.73 Satisfied with this response Abercromby and York did not 
question the ministers any further.  
Unbeknown to the British much of the Orangeist intelligence was wildly inaccurate, 
most notably regarding the strength of the French garrison which actually numbered some 
16,000 men under the gifted General Guillaume-Maria-Anne Brune.74 The Batavian Army 
was also much stronger and amounted to 20,000 men under the able Dutch Lieutenant-
General Herman Willem Daendels.75 Reasons for the inaccuracy of British intelligence 
varied. Perhaps the most prominent factor was the willingness of Berlin Orangeists to bend 
the truth in order to convince the British to support their cause. This was not the first time 
that British intelligence had been found wanting. Nonetheless, bad intelligence or not, it was 
Grenville and his brother Thomas who were chiefly at fault for not scrutinizing the quality of 
the reports.  
Hope’s memorandum may not have resulted in an operational plan, but it did raise a 
couple of important points. One of the most significant was that Hope did not think that the 
landing sites outlined by Popham would be suitable. Whilst the lack of Prussian aid also 
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meant that a landing further south, closer to Amsterdam and the heartland of Orangeist 
sentiment, would be more promising.76 Confronted with these new doubts, Henry Dundas 
belatedly convened a meeting on 6 August and invited Abercomby, a naval officer named 
Captain Flynn, and a Dutch officer called Sontag, to discuss potential landing sites.77 
Although lacking much in the way of detailed information, Flynn managed to persuade 
Dundas that landing on the islands of Voorne and Goeree would be time consuming and 
difficult and that the Helder peninsula would be a better location. 78 With little known about 
the nature of the Dutch defences at the Helder or the size of French forces in the area in 
question Dundas changed Abercromby’s instructions and told him to decide where to land 
when his fleet reached the Dutch coast. Abercomby would be aided in this task by the naval 
commanders chosen for the expedition, these men being Admiral Viscount Adam Duncan 
and Vice-Admiral Andrew Mitchell.79   
 The haphazard manner in which Dundas and Abercromby went about 
finalising the landing plans for the expedition encapsulates the ad hoc nature of British 
military planning during this period and portrays both politicians and generals in a bad light. 
Instead of making every effort to plan carefully as soon as Dundas and Abercromby were 
informed of the expedition, the British high command allowed itself to become so distracted 
by the task of readying the new force at Barham Downs that it neglected the most important 
task of all, the creation of a detailed operational plan. Contrary to Macksey’s portrayal of the 
situation, in which Grenville is singled out for criticism, Abercromby, Dundas and York were 
also at fault in failing to plan effectively.  Despite having reservations regarding the 
expedition, Abercromby’s failure to create an operational plan outlining how the British were 
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to operate once ashore would prove to be a major error and would return to haunt the British. 
As A.B Rodger has noted, the ensuing campaign was “An ill-conceived, ill-planned, muddle-
headed fiasco...an abject lesson in how not to carry on combined operations”.80  
Execution 
The British fleet carrying Abercromby’s assault force finally sailed on 13 August, 
with Abercromby having decided that it would sail for the Helder, a sand-dune backed 
peninsula to the immediate south of the Zuyder Zee at the mouth of the River Texel.81  No 
sooner had the British put to sea than the weather took a turn for the worse. Gale-force winds 
and a heavy swell made the crossing particularly uncomfortable and threatened the cohesion 
of the fleet. 82 Thankfully the British were able to keep the transports in line and arrived off 
the Dutch coast after a few hours sailing from England. Hopes of a quick landing were 
dashed as the poor weather continued for a further thirteen days. Poor visibility also meant 
that Duncan and Mitchell were unable to assess the movements of the Batavian-Dutch fleet 
under Rear Admiral Samuel Storij.83   
These delays thus enabled Daendels to ready his division to meet the British. 
Daendels concentrated 5,400 Dutch infantry and 597 Dutch cavalry behind the sand dunes of 
the Helder peninsula. Of this force, two battalions of Chasseurs were to act as a forward 
screen between the coastal hamlets of Groote Ketten, Callanstoog and Petten to disrupt the 
initial British advance and shield the main force of the Batavian Army. Behind this line and 
east of Callanstoog Daendels positioned the 1,756 officers and men of the 5th Batavian Demi-
Brigade at the village of Oudesluis. Five miles to the south-west, straddling the villages of 
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Warmenhuizen, Bergen and Schoorl, Daendels posted the 2,072 officers and men of 1st Bn/ 
4th Demi-Brigade, 3rd Bn/ 6th Demi-Brigade and 1st Bn/ 3rd Demi-Brigade. Two squadrons of 
light cavalry were then placed in the rear, whilst the 1st Batavian Dragoons were positioned in 
the rear of the Dutch defensive position. A further force, the 1st Demi-Brigade, numbering 
2,032 officers and men, was positioned just over ten miles away in Alkmaar. Daendels 
positioned his headquarters just behind the front line at the village of Schagenbrug, whilst a 
further force, comprising the 7th Demi Brigade and numbering some 1,715 troops under 
General van Guericke, garrisoned the town and arsenal at the Den Helder. 84 
 The wind and rain eased on the night of 26 August and the British readied themselves 
to land the following day. At five o’clock in the morning, following the collection of the 
rowing boats of the ships of the line, the assault formations rowed ashore in flat-bottomed 
boats.85 The initial assault wave totalled 3,000 men and comprised the brigades of Coote and 
Moore, whilst a detachment of Colonel Macdonald’s brigade under the command of Major-
General Sir James Murray-Pulteney was also present.86 Coote and Murray-Pulteney’s forces 
were landed to the right of Moore’s brigade, with orders to secure the beachhead and clear 
the sand hills of enemy troops. Moore, meanwhile, was ordered to land closer to the Den 
Helder and to besiege this position once the beachhead was won.  
The lack of Army-Navy cooperation in thinking through the finer details of the 
landing quickly became apparent when, in the rush to get the troops off the boats, neither 
Abercromby nor Mitchell made sure that the British battalions were correctly organised into 
their respective brigades. Instead, companies and battalions were jumbled together and the 
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landing quickly degenerated into a chaotic mess.87 The rough surf also forced several 
battalions off course and many troops were crowded into a small space of ground opposite 
the hamlet of Petten.88  
 Gradually the British went about reorganising themselves and, luckily, were not faced 
with an immediate attack by the Dutch. Unwilling to linger too long in such a cramped 
position, Murray-Pulteney ordered his two battalions to advance and clear the dunes.89 The 
British infantry duly advanced into the warren of sand dunes, only to be halted by the 
aggressive fire of the Dutch chasseurs, whose fleetness of foot and use of cover contrasted 
sharply with the stolid tactics of the British line infantry. The battle in the dunes was a 
confused affair with the British gradually pushing the Dutch forces back only for their 
advance to be halted on meeting Daendels’s troops on the edge of the dunes.90 Dutch counter-
attacks forced the British back into the dunes but, with reinforcements arriving, in the form of 
the crack Guards brigade, the beachhead was made secure by three o’clock in the afternoon.91  
Although the British losses had been slight, Abercromby’s penchant for leading from 
the front had resulted in the wounding of his primary staff officers, Sir John Hope and 
George Murray, whilst Murray-Pulteney was also wounded. The biggest loss of the day, 
however, was Colonel Hay, Abercromby’s chief engineer, who was killed in the initial 
assault.92 Despite not making a landing plan, the bravery of the British infantry had again 
saved the day, although it remained to be seen how they would fare against the French 
regulars, rather than inexperienced Batavians.    
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Events now moved quickly. Moore moved against Den Helder, expecting a difficult 
fight, but was amazed to discover that the Dutch garrison had abandoned its positions and he 
quickly captured the guns covering the mouth of the Texel.93 The loss of the Helder was a 
major blow for the Dutch, especially the Batavian Fleet, which was now stationed in the 
exposed inner waters of the Zuyder Zee and at the mercy of Mitchell. Several Dutch ships, 
including a couple of warships, had already been seized by the British, a situation which 
persuaded Storij to retreat into the dangerous coastal waters of the Vlieter, between the 
Helder and the Dutch naval base at Marsdiep. Mitchell sailed into the Vlieter in the early 
hours of 30 August and blockaded the Dutch fleet. Storij refused to surrender but, on the 
raising of an Orangeist flag aboard the British flagship, Storij was unable to prevent the crews 
of two of his vessels from mutinying. In the ensuing panic, Storij chose to surrender rather 
than be branded an Orangeist traitor.94 In the space of barely a few hours, the British had 
destroyed the last vestige of Dutch naval power; the greatest individual prize was the Dutch 
flagship Washington (74).95  
As Grenville had hoped, the initial operation had been a resounding success. Not only 
had the British secured a vital foothold on the Dutch coast, but the mutiny of the Dutch fleet 
greatly pleased the naval officers. Jubilant, Grenville and Dundas firmly expected a swift 
British offensive, with both Alkmaar and Amsterdam apparently within reach of 
Abercromby’s men. Lacking maps to assess the ground, cavalrymen to scout ahead and, most 
importantly, a detailed plan to execute, Abercromby was less sanguine and opted instead to 
wait for the York and the Russians and established a defensive position on the nearby Zype 
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canal.96 Abercomby was also concerned by the strength of the French and Dutch forces, with 
the French clearly not as weak as Grenville had suggested. The terrain beyond the sand dunes 
was also rough and did not suit the rapid movement of formed infantry. All this was 
explained by Abercromby to Dundas on 4 September: 
The enemy occupies Alkmaar and its vicinity, the Dutch troops are on the 
right…and the French in Alkmaar, Bergen and Egmont. The French may be 
estimated at six thousand men and the Dutch at nine or ten thousand. On the 27 of 
Aug they had 7,000 men in the field and at the Helder and they have since drawn 
from Friesland, Groningen, Overjissel and Gelderland, everything they could 
collect. The country between us and the enemy is entirely intersected with ditches 
and canals, except on the right opposite Petten, where the sand hills of the 
Camperdown begin. In this situation I have judged it better not to risk an action, 
until the arrival of reinforcements.97 
 
Inter-service relations were also strained. Abercromby had not had any word from 
Mitchell, who appears to have concerned himself solely with the acquisition of the Dutch 
fleet following the initial landings. Devoid of naval support to his flanks and rear and lacking 
up-to-date naval intelligence of the Dutch coast, Abercromby was unsure of the strength of 
the enemy and whether the Dutch Orangeists had risen in the coastal towns around the 
Zuyder Zee. Blind to the situation facing him to his front, rear and along the Dutch coast, 
Abercromby complained to Dundas at the poor conduct of the navy and of the need for 
Mitchell to strike at Amsterdam “Since the 1st I have had no communication with Admiral 
Mitchell. I have repeatedly urged him, in the strongest terms…to threaten Amsterdam”.98  
 
Despite the surrender of the Dutch fleet, the situation was not particularly favourable 
for the British. Poor weather was also a hindrance, causing delays to the transport of York’s 
forces and the Russians. As Captain William Young, a transport agent at Ramsgate, noted 
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that “The weather…continues so very unfavourable it will be impossible to embark the troops 
intended for reinforcement so early as was yesterday expected.99 
On 3 September Abercromby was reinforced by the arrival of two brigades of infantry 
from Barham Downs, under Don and the Earl of Cavan and by the first Russian 
contingent.100 With the Russians tired from their long voyage and the ex-militiamen having 
had no active military experience, Abercromby decided to remain on the defensive until York 
and the rest of the British and Russian forces arrived. As the British waited, however, the 
weather showed no signs of improvement and Brune and Daendels gathered their forces in 
preparation for an attack upon the British lines. The attack was to be made in three columns. 
Daendels was to advance with a force of Batavian infantry against the village of St Martins 
on the British left. In the centre another Dutch force, this time under General Jean Baptiste 
Monceau, was ordered to advance upon the village of Krabbendam, whilst a third column, 
composed entirely of French troops, was to assault the village of Petten on the British 
right.101  
 At dawn, on 10 September, the French and Dutch attacks managed to catch the British 
by surprise, with shots being exchanged as the British sentries fell back upon the villages 
along the Zype. Crucially for the defenders Moore was able to remove a series of makeshift 
bridges, which had been laid by the British, in front of the Zype.102 This quick-thinking on 
the part of Moore’s men delayed the French advance long enough to allow Moore to ready 
his troops to receive the enemy onslaught. Moore later recalled the engagement in his diary:  
Some artillery also began to play upon us, and under cover of their fire a large 
column attempted, with shouts and drums and bugles, to charge us. Till now our 
men had remained concealed on the reverse of the dyke…but upon the column 
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advancing the whole sprang up and threw in a fire so galling, that, being supported 
by some artillery…forced the enemy to give way and retire in confusion.103  
   
The Franco-Batavian attack was repulsed along the British line. The fighting was 
fierce, but the British infantry were more than a match for the enemy: 
The enemy advanced, particularly on the left and centre with great intrepidity and 
penetrated with the heads of their columns to within a hundred yards of the 
position…they were however everywhere repulsed owing to the strength of our 
position and the determined courage of the troops. 104 
 
With the repulse of the main French and Batavian forces, the battle for control of the 
Zype was effectively over. The battle had been a test of British mettle and the British infantry 
had withstood the onslaught. What was encouraging for Abercromby, however, was the 
conduct of the ex-militiamen, under Don and Cavan, particularly the four battalions of the 
20th and 40th infantry regiments. The former, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
George Smyth, had held Krabbendam against Monceau’s column, whilst the latter, under the 
bold leadership of future Peninsular War General, Brent Spencer, had held St Martin against 
Daendels.105 These two regiments had withstood their baptism of fire and come out 
victorious.  
 
The battle for the Zype drew the initial stage of the campaign in north Holland to a 
close. Tactically it had been a success for the British; strategically, however, the British had 
failed. Poor planning and the underestimation of the strength and commitment of the enemy 
were the chief reasons for this scenario and meant that the British were given little choice but 
to wait for reinforcements before commencing an advance. This lack of impetus on the part 
of the British suited the French and Dutch defenders, with general Brune able to gather fresh 
troops and galvanise local support against the invaders.  
                                                          
103 Maurice, The Diary of Sir John Moore, Vol. 1 p. 347.  
104 TNA WO 1/179: Abercromby to H.Dundas, Headquarters Schafen Bas, 11 September 1799.   
105Ibid; Lt. Colonel Nathaniel Steevens (ed)., Lt .Colonel Charles Steevens, Reminisces of my Military Life, from 




The British brigades from Barham Downs and most of General Ivan Hermann’s 
Russians disembarked at the Helder, alongside York, between 13 and 15 September.106 
Whilst the Russian contingent was given time to rest after their long voyage, York met with 
Abercromby, to assess the situation in Holland.107  The Duke was eager to take to the 
offensive in the knowledge that the longer the Allies remained on the Helder, the easier it 
would be for the enemy to contain them, gather reinforcements, and strengthen their 
defensive positions in readiness to mount an offensive of their own. Aware that the 
politicians expected a swift advance upon Amsterdam, York had little choice but to break 
free from the Zype. 
 Ideally, York would have liked to have had the task of planning the forthcoming 
operation himself but instructions from Henry Dundas stipulated that all major decisions were 
to be made by a Council of War. The Council comprised York, Sir David Dundas, Lord 
Chatham, Hermann, Abercromby and Pulteney.108 In spite of Henry Dundas’s clear 
instructions, York decided to create a private plan of his own and only called a Council of 
War, on 18 September, to tell the gathered generals what he wanted them to do in the 
forthcoming battle. No aspects of the plan were discussed and nothing was altered. Neither 
did York provide his subordinates with much time to prepare their troops, having informed 
them that he wished an attack to be made the following morning.109 Before analysing the 
battle that followed, it is necessary to outline what York proposed.  
York’s plan was as follows: the army was to be split into four attacking columns. 
Three were ordered to seize a number of villages which commanded the main roads leading 
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to Alkmaar.110 Unfortunately for the Allies the enemy also recognized the importance of 
these roads. Brune and Daendels concentrated their forces at a number of key road junctions 
located in a series of villages. Brune placed the bulk of the French forces in the villages of 
Bergen, Schoorl and Schorldam with the reserve at Alkmaar. Daendels’s Batavian division 
meanwhile held a defensive arc facing the Allied centre and right at Warmenhuizen, 
Enningberg, Zuyder Sluys, and Oudkarspel.111 The French and Batavians were reinforced 
with the arrival of Vandamme’s force at Schorldam, which meant that by 18 September there 
were around 8,000 French and 10,000 Batavian troops in the area of operations. By contrast, 
the Allies could put up to 30,000 troops into the field and, on paper at least, this numerical 
superiority should have given them a major advantage over the enemy. A number of factors 
combined to weaken the Allied forces, none more so than the character of York’s plan and 
the poor calibre of Allied generalship.   
The largest of the Allied columns totalling nearly 10,000 British veterans and ex-
Militiamen, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, was instructed by the Duke of 
York to advance the evening before the battle to flank the enemy positions by marching 
across the muddy fields to the town of Hoorn on the banks of the Zuyder Zee. From here, 
Abercromby was then to march towards the village of Purmerend to the rear of the Franco-
Dutch army. Over to the other side of the front an advance was to be made along the sand-
dunes next to the seashore at four o’clock in the morning by Hermann’s Russian division, 
comprising twelve Russian infantry battalions under Essen and Schutorff, with the support of 
Manners’s brigade. This column was to clear the French forces along the coastal road at 
Camperdown and Schoorl, before pressing on to attack Bergen. To Hermann’s left, Sir David 
Dundas’s British division was to strike down the Great Road to Alkmaar at first light, seize 
Zuyder Sluys and Schoorldam and turn onto the coastal road to support Hermann. To David 
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Dundas’s left and in the centre of the Allied line, Murray-Pulteney’s division, with the 
support of Coote’s brigade, was to begin its march at around half past four in the morning, 
seize Enningberg and then Warmenhuizen before pressing on to attack Oudkarspel.112 
The biggest problem with these instructions to commanders was that they were too 
vague. The instructions given to Abercromby are a case in point, going no further than to 
order his column to march to Hoorn and push on to Purmerend. At no stage was Abercromby 
instructed to march to the sound of the guns, or of what to do if he decided to advance upon 
Purmerend. York does not appear to have recognised the importance of the distances 
involved. For instance, Hoorn was ten miles from York’s headquarters in the centre of the 
British position and nearly twenty from Bergen, which meant that if the Allies achieved a 
breakthrough at Bergen it would take much of the day for news to reach Abercomby and for 
the British general to march to the sound of the guns if necessary.  
Another important flaw was that, despite possessing a numerical superiority of about 
10,000 men over the enemy, York’s decision to send Abercromby with a third of the army on 
a semi-independent operation deprived the Allies of their extra manpower at the point of 
engagement with the enemy. As one of the Duke’s aides later noted, the plan was deeply 
flawed:  
The most unaccountable mistake, the great military blunder (which drew after it all 
the subsequent misfortune) was the plan of attack upon the 19th of September. A 
resolution having been taken to bring the enemy to battle, our best General and 10 
or 12,000 of our best troops were detached to Hoorn…Abercromby’s column never 
fired a shot or saw or attracted the notice of the enemy.113 
 
Abercromby’s column left its cantonments on the evening on 18 September. Progress 
was slow, however, with the muddy ground, waterlogged fields and occasional broken 
bridges forcing him to halt and take several detours.  These obstacles meant that, instead of a 
swift advance, Abercromby’s march turned into a near twenty-mile slog, with his brigades 
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forced to zigzag across the terrain. William Surtees recalled the sluggish and treacherous 
nature of the British advance “We moved off as it became dark, such was the state of the 
roads that it became the most trying and distressing march…the roads were literally knee 
deep in mud in most places, while every now and then they were rendered nearly 
impassable”. 114 
By the time Abercromby’s troops arrived at Hoorn, at half past two in the early hours 
of 19 September, his troops were exhausted.115 Bunbury noted the fatigued nature of the 
troops upon reaching Hoorn “Our men had been under arms twelve hours: they were dead 
tired; nor could they have been fit to resume their march much before midday.”116 Hoorn 
quickly surrendered and over the course of the next few hours all Abercromby could do was 
to wait for further instructions. The Allied defeat on the right, however, would lead to the 
recall of Abercromby’s column, which thus neither threatened the enemy rear nor protected 
the Allied left.   
The official signal for the main Allied advance to begin was scheduled to take place at 
around four o’clock in the morning. At about half past two, however, Schutorff was unable to 
prevent his impatient troops from beginning their advance.117 Once the initial advance was 
made, the Russian high command was powerless to halt it, despite the fact that the Russians 
could not see where they were going. Captain Herbet Taylor, another of the Duke’s ADCs, 
recalled the confused nature of the initial advance “The signal gun was fired when it was still 
impossible to distinguish any object, but Lt.General Hermann said that altho’ the attack was 
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certainly beginning too soon, the impatience of the troops was such that he could not delay 
it.”118  
It was about this time that Hermann called on a couple of squadrons of the 7th Light 
Dragoons and a battery of Royal Horse Artillery to move forward and take up position in 
reserve. With his rear protected, Hermann’s advance guard and supporting grenadiers overran 
the outlying French positions along the dykes. However, the ill-discipline and impatience of 
the Russian infantry to get into the action, combined with the poor visibility, soon meant that 
all sense of cohesion was quickly lost. In addition, there were several instances of friendly 
fire as the impatient Russian infantry inadvertently began to fire upon their own troops: 
To the fire from the troops to the rear I must principally attribute the very great loss 
which the Russian troops sustained and I was confirmed in this impression at the 
attack of the village of Groet where the resistance of the enemy was by no means 
obstinate, but where the shot was certainly flying in all direction.119  
 
The fighting along the coastal road soon alerted the attention of Brune at Alkmaar 
who reinforced Vandamme at Bergen with the 49th, 42nd and 72nd Demi-Brigades.120  General 
Rostallant, meanwhile, was left with the 54th demi-brigade to hold Schoorl for as long as 
possible. Before the French could put their main body into the field, the Russians seized 
Schoorl after some bloody fighting. The battle for the village of Schoorl was a confused 
affair, a situation which was not helped by the fact that Hermann had disappeared from the 
head of the column after his horse was shot from underneath him in Groet. With a general 
officer nowhere to be seen, the Russian infantry refused calls to halt: 
Such was the confusion that prevailed that more than one officer could not find their 
regiment. I shouted repeatedly to those who understood German and French that 
their troops were firing upon each other, and that if those to the rear would be 
formed …but took no steps towards effecting…no general officer was with them 
and they repeatedly expressed in strong terms their anxiety.121 
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As the dawn fighting continued into mid-morning, the British columns also advanced. 
The premature nature of the Russian attack, however, had made General Dundas’s task in the 
centre particularly difficult as his troops needed decent visibility in order to cross several 
muddy fields and waterlogged ditches before engaging the enemy. Despite the early morning 
gloom, Dundas’s troops crossed the swampy ground in quite time by using a number of 
makeshift portable bridges.122  Despite the darkness, the British infantry captured Zuyder 
Sluys at about half past four in the morning. At the same time Murray-Pulteney’s division, 
comprising Coote and Don’s brigades, began their advance to Oudkarspel. Murray-Pulteney’s 
division was supported at first by several Royal Navy gun-boats, under the command of 
Popham, whose guns peppered the Dutch positions but appear not to have had much impact 
on proceedings.123Before the full force of Murray-Pulteney’s division could reach 
Oudkarspel Coote had to seize Warmenhuizen.124 The Batavian defence of this village 
proved more stubborn than the British had expected and they were forced to send 
reinforcements in the form of three Russian infantry battalions under General Sedmoratzky to 
support Coote’s brigade.125  
 With Coote’s advance having been slowed by the battle for Warmenhuizen, Murray-
Pulteney ordered Don to commence his attack upon Oudkarspel before Coote arrived.126 This 
task would be a major test for Don’s troops because “The head of the village was strongly 
fortified with a double line of entrenchments, containing eight or ten pieces of 
artillery.”127Making the most of the cover provided by the Lange dyke, Murray-Pulteney 
swiftly ordered the three companies of light infantry, the first battalion of the 17th Foot and 
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the 40th Foot under Spencer, to commence an attack upon the village. 128 As Spencer 
advanced, his force was bolstered by Murray-Pulteney who also sent forward two regular 
infantry battalions in the form of the first battalion of the 3rd Guards and the second battalion 
of the 5th Foot and two pieces of artillery. Murray-Pulteney, meanwhile, sent Don with four 
companies of the 40th to reconnoitre the left flank of the village. Spencer’s raw troops 
advanced in good order but soon came under a heavy fire from the Dutch guns. With 
Spencer’s attack stalling, the Dutch launched a couple of audacious counter-attacks but they 
were pushed back by the British.129 Spencer’s ex-militiamen had done themselves proud in 
seizing Oudkarspel but, despite forcing the Dutch into a retreat, the events on the Allied right 
soon forced a halt to the British advance. 
Several hours before Murray-Pulteney’s division attacked Oudkarspel, on the Allied 
left, Hermann’s Russians had reached Bergen. The Russian forces were now by far the most 
advanced of the Allied forces and several miles ahead of the nearest British troops at 
Schorldam. The Russian infantry had also neglected to place troops to guard their flanks, with 
the troops hemmed in by the enclosed fields and sand dunes. On reaching the village, the 
Russians were immediately confronted by the French, who quickly surrounded the Russian 
forces and poured a deadly fire into them from almost all sides. As Taylor noted: 
As we advanced…the fire of musketry from both flanks and the village in our front 
was extremely serious…the troops however proceeded…but here they were 
checked by the fire of the French artillery which was now directed against the head 
of the column, and by the appearance of the cavalry and infantry drawn up upon the 
left. The troops were crowded together in a most confused mass.130  
 
Hermann finally reappeared and, under heavy fire, formed up a body of grenadiers in 
front of the village church in the centre of Bergen. The divisional commander left his 
subordinate, Essen, to oversee the church whilst he moved to one of the nearby side streets in 
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an attempt to shore up the flank.131 The French advanced, but the ensuing battle for control of 
the village was a chaotic affair with the French fighting street for street and house for house 
against the beleaguered Russians and, after a twenty minute struggle, the Russians were 
encircled and Hermann taken prisoner: 
In this situation we remained about 20 minutes losing men very fast…the enemy 
appeared in our rear and we received their fire upon the right. Almost at the same 
time the enemy were penetrating through the opening upon our left…every spot in 
the village was exposed to their fire….At this moment the enemy penetrated into 
the village upon the right and front and the Russian troops after firing…gave way 
and fell back in the greatest confusion into the avenue. Lieut.General Hermann was 
taken prisoner.132  
With the loss of Bergen, the Russian forces were sent into a headlong retreat to their 
cantonments at Petten, with only Essen able to restore order for a short while. Before the 
troops broke fully he despatched Taylor to York and asked for Manners’s brigade to make a 
stand.133 The crowded state of the roads and speed of the French advance, however, meant 
that the village of Schoorl was also lost before the British troops could be ordered forward. 
Thus, in the space of barely an hour since the Russian infantry had reached Bergen, almost 
the entire right wing of the Allied army was broken and in full-blown retreat. This left the 
York with little option but to shore up the Allied right by ordering General Dundas to send 
Prince William’s brigade and a detachment of Burrard’s brigade to support Manners. The rest 
of his division was ordered back to the Zype. Although a necessary, the movement of the 
British battalions to Schoorl deprived the Allied army of its strike power.  
With Dundas’s and Murray-Pulteney’s attacks having ended prematurely, the focus 
was once again upon the Allied left. Here Manners, Burrard and Prince William were given 
the unenviable task of holding back the French attacks until dark. Despite stern resistance, the 
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weight and ferocity of the French attacks forced the militia and guards back and by the 
evening the situation on the Allied right had reached a critical point: 
The enemy had followed up the retreat of our troops with great activity and such 
boldness, and the French now showed themselves in such numbers opposite the 
right of our position, and to the village of Krabbendam, that we began to feel 
apprehensions of their making attacks on the lines…a great part of our army was in 
sad confusion. Of the Russians there remained only three battalions under 
Sedmoratzky in a condition to fight…some of the newly formed Militia regiments 
of the English were in great disorder; a large proportion of their officers had fallen; 
and the men were panic stricken by this result of their first encounter with the 
enemy.134 
With the Allied right about to crumble and the Zype position under threat, York 
despatched Bunbury, in a last gasp mission, to rally as many troops as he could and, after 
several trials and tribulations, Bunbury was able to persuade the weary guardsmen of Colonel 
Frederick Maitland’s battalion, part of D’Oyley’s Guards brigade, to make a stand.135 In the 
resulting engagement the dogged spirit of the Guards saved the day, but it had been a close 
run thing.  This was reflected in the losses of both sides, with Allied losses totalling 
somewhere in the region of 4,500 officers and men 1,414 British and 3,017 Russian, the latter 
included 1,300 prisoners. The Franco-Batavian army lost a total of 3,427 officers and men, 
with the Batavians alone suffering 2,591 casualties, of whom 1,052 were captured.136  
As the sun set in the evening of the battle of Bergen, both sides counted the cost of the 
fighting. The battle had been a disaster for the Allied army and, despite high expectations of a 
breakthrough, the offensive had petered out. The Allies had blundered into the battle of 
Bergen without thinking through how best to maximise their initial numerical superiority 
over the enemy. However, in his official dispatch York viewed the result of the battle with 
little disappointment, save for the losses sustained: 
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The well-grounded hopes, I had entertained of complete success in this operation, 
and which were fully justified by the result of the three and by the first success of 
the fourth attack upon the right, add to the great disappointment I must naturally 
feel upon this occasion, but the circumstances which have occurred, I should have 
considered of very little general importance, had I not to lament the loss of many 
brave officers and soldiers who have fallen.137 
Crucially York did not seek to analyse the battle in any detail and nor did he seek to 
conduct a review of the engagement in order to identify potential lessons. Blind to his own 
failings, just as he had been in 1793, York blamed the Russians for the defeat and did not 
consider himself, or his British troops, to have acted poorly.   
The Allied defeat at the battle of Bergen on 19 September marked a turning point in 
the character of Allied relations in Holland. Before the battle, expectations had been high that 
a breakthrough would be won and the road to Amsterdam opened. Instead, the Allied army 
failed to achieve its objectives, with the British and Russians being forced back to their 
starting positions. The British were quick to lay the blame upon the Russians who, according 
to the York, had undermined the success gained by the British.138 Unfortunately for the 
working relations of the coalition, York did not hide his frustrations. As Henry Bunbury 
noted, “The Duke of York took up a violent contempt, as well as dislike of the Russians. He 
ridiculed them at his table, and talked of them disparagingly.139  
York was not alone in openly criticising the conduct of the Russians. Stories of 
Russian cowardice and incompetence quickly spread throughout the British army. However, 
many of the surviving British accounts of the Russian attack on the right were based on the 
word of others, rather than the result of first-hand experience. A typical British account of the 
conduct of the Russians is that of the Lieutenant-Colonel of the 49th Foot, Isaac Brock, the 
future British commander in North America in the War of 1812. Despite being on the other 
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side of the battlefield from the Russians and thus unable to have witnessed the events as they 
unfolded, Brock was all too eager to blame the Russians for the Allied defeat, arguing that the 
Russians’ decision to plunder the villages proved to be their downfall.140 Similar comments 
to those made by Brock can be found in many of the British memoirs and diaries regarding 
the campaign. Surtees, posted with Abercromby on the opposite side of the battlefield to the 
Russians, felt qualified enough to describe how the ‘grotesque’ Russians had failed to operate 
effectively and had naively allowed themselves to be surprised by the French.141   
Bunbury was also critical of the Russians, both of the rank and file and the officer 
corps. Of the Russian generals, Bunbury labelled Hermann a “bad general” and Essen as both 
“false” and “intriguing.”142 The overriding image of the Russian army in Holland which 
emerges from the British sources is that of an ill-disciplined and poorly led army, equipped in 
out-dated attire and lacking all sense of tactical flexibility. The most scathing criticism of the 
tactical capability of the Russians at Bergen was made by Brock:  
The Russians in their persons are rather short of stature, and very thick and clumsy; 
they having nothing expressive in their features…The officers in general are the 
most despicable wretches I ever saw: accustomed as they have always been to fight 
with troops much inferior to themselves, they thought themselves 
invincible…and…never dreamed it possible, from their former experience, for 
troops to rally after being once beaten. This fatal security was the cause of the 
misfortune which befell the allies on the 19th.143  
Brock’s analysis of the Russian defeat at Bergen typified the manner in which the 
British perceived the Russians. The British viewed the Russian rank and file as physically 
and socially backward, whilst the Russian officers were typecast as incompetent commanders 
who were unaccustomed to the ‘serious’ type of warfare fought in the western world. This 
latter point is particularly interesting, in that Brock’s analysis of the campaigns fought by the 
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Russian Army totally ignored the hard fought victories won by the Russians against Frederick 
the Great during the Seven Years’ War and in its clashes with Turks.  
The Russian Army was far better than Brock and his British contemporaries gave it 
credit for. The Russian conduct at Bergen, although poor, was not the result of the overall 
quality of the Russian Army per se, but was instead due to a number of interrelated factors, 
the majority of which were not of the Russians’ making. What is also clear from the British 
source material is that the British actually knew very little about the quality and operational 
skills of the Russian Army. At no point prior to the Helder campaign had the British actually 
had first-hand experience of a Russian Army, a lack of experience which gave rise to myth-
making amongst the British forces.  
One  myth, which no doubt had played a part in convincing the British government to 
seek an Anglo-Russian alliance, held that the Russian Army was the largest in Europe and 
could thus afford heavier rates of loss than other European armies. In reality the Russian 
Army, although large by British standards, was not that much bigger than those of the French, 
Prussians and Austrians. One of the main reasons for this was that the Russian Army drew its 
manpower from Russia’s serf population. The Russian state could not afford to recruit large 
numbers of serfs for fear of crippling the Russian economy and risking provincial discontent. 
The situation was compounded further because once enlisted the Russian soldier was 
effectively taken out of civilian society for the rest of his life, with soldiers expected to serve 
in the army for 25 years. The low life expectancy of the age, combined with the attrition of 
war, meant that in Russia the act of ‘going for a soldier’ was viewed with dread by the 
serfs.144  
                                                          




The Russian Army in this period was not the vast ‘Nation in Arms’ that it would 
become in later years.145 In the case of the campaign in 1799, for instance, the total Russian 
military commitment to the war in Europe totalled about 70,000 men, of whom barely 12,000 
were sent to aid the British in Holland. In comparison, the Austrians fielded around 84,000 
men in Germany and Switzerland, not to mention a further force which operated on the 
Rhine; in April 1800 the Austrians and their Piedmontese Allies were able to field two 
armies, each of over 100,000 men.146  The Russian Army which fought in Holland and in 
central Europe in 1799 was an expeditionary force and one which could not easily be 
reinforced.  
 The British were also unaware that deep divisions existed in the Russian 
officer corps between those who favoured Prussian-style tactics and others who advocated the 
adoption of the type of tactics and training which the Russian Army had employed in its 
many wars with the Ottoman Empire.147  This ‘dualism,’148 to quote Mark Melenovsky, 
within the Russian officer corps prevented the establishment of a commonly agreed Russian 
‘way of war.’ Russian troops often fought in different ways depending on the ethos and views 
of the officer commanding. Perhaps the best known advocate of ‘Ottoman’ tactics in Russian 
service during these years was Suvorov who defeated the French in Northern Italy in 1799. 
Suvorov’s grasp of mobile operations and recognition of the need to foster them amongst the 
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Russian Army encouraged him to write several military books, the most famous being How 
to Win (1795) and Art of Victory (1798).149 Other notable Russian generals of the Napoleonic 
wars who also began their careers against the Turks included Kutuzov and Bagration.150  
Under pressure to reform the Army the Tsar, an ardent admirer of Frederick the Great, 
refused to implement radical reforms and instead introduced conservative change in the form 
of Prussian-style infantry drills. He also purged the reformist element in the officer corps.151  
However, the coming of war in Europe forced the Tsar to reinstate many of the reformists 
and many, such as Suvorov, openly ignored the Tsar’s Germanic drills in favour of mobile 
‘Ottoman’ tactics.152 The presence of a dual set of ideas within the Russian officer corps 
explains why Russian military performance varied from one theatre to the next in 1799. For 
instance, as Suvorov’s Russian force was sweeping the French back in a series of dashing 
victories in northern Italy, the Russian forces in Holland “Waddled slowly forward to the tap-
tap of their monotonous drums” and “if they were beaten they waddled slowly back 
again”.153 
 Thus, Russian forces sent to Holland were not of the same fighting quality as those 
that had been sent to northern Italy and they also lacked cavalry, artillery and a supply 
train.154 Exhausted after their long voyage and without adequate supplies, it was not 
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surprising that the Russian infantry took to plundering their way through North Holland, 
whilst both Hermann and Essen failed to control their men. The speed with which the 
Russians withdrew after being counter-attacked, combined with Hermann’s capture, was 
humiliating for the troops and the officers alike. Despite these issues, the Russians had 
showed considerable tenacity and had done well to drive the French forces from the villages 
to Bergen. It should also be pointed out that the Russian troops had never fought in the Low 
Countries before, whilst their position on the extreme left of the Allied line prohibited any 
tactical flexibility. Furthermore Hermann’s Russians had never faced the French in battle 
before and perhaps acted as rashly as they did because they wanted to test themselves against 
the vaunted French Army. All of these factors meant that once the Russians advanced it was 
impossible to stop them. Similarly, once broken, the Russian troops lost all cohesion and 
could not be prevented from falling back in chaotic fashion. With the French at their backs 
and with little British support, it is little wonder that the Russians fled as they did.    
Tactically the Allies had fought with energy and vigour, but operationally the four 
Allied attacks were badly coordinated and lacked the reserves to enable a breakthrough to be 
supported and exploited. York’s failure to concentrate the full striking power of the Allied 
army against the enemy was central to their lack of success. It meant that at crucial moments 
the Allied columns strike power was blunted by the need to redeploy troops to support hard-
pressed commanders in other sectors. Once again this situation was of York’s making, with 
several thousand veteran British troops having spent the day with Abercromby at Hoorn, 
powerless to influence events. 
 If Abercromby had been held in reserve behind General Dundas, then the Allies 
could have supported both the Russians earlier in the day and then thrust down the great road 
to Alkmaar, splitting the enemy line. Who knows what the Allied commanders might have 
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achieved if this had been the case? Instead, York committed the cardinal sin of dispersing his 
forces in the face of the enemy, a decision which York surprisingly viewed in a positive light 
after the battle. He argued to Sir Henry Dundas that the Allies had almost won a 
breakthrough even though “nearly 15,000 of the allied troops had unavoidably no slice in this 
action”.155 Although it is conceivable that York simply sought to shift the blame for the 
defeat from himself to ‘unavoidable’ factors, his correspondence with the minister was 
remarkably optimistic throughout, giving the impression that he simply did not recognise his 
planning blunders.  
 The Duke of York’s second blunder was to underestimate the problem posed 
by the terrain. Lacking maps, the Allied infantry was left with little choice but to advance and 
overcome the obstacles that confronted it piecemeal. Nor did the infantry possess any 
knowledge of the strength of the enemy forces that awaited them. The timing of the attack 
was also crucial, in that the different routes allotted to the different Allied formations had 
their own distinctive geographical features which would require the assaulting columns to set 
off at a variety of different times. The eagerness of the Russians to advance at two in the 
morning, however, forced both Generals’ Dundas and Murray-Pulteney to set off too early on 
their divergent routes. The holding of Manners in reserve of the Russian advance was perhaps 
the only sound decision of the day, for if Manners had been attached to one of the other 
columns it would have been more than likely that the Russian retreat later in the day would 
have seen the French drive a wedge between the two Allied armies.  
The Allied defeat at the first battle of Bergen was a crushing blow to the Allied 
chances of success. Not only had the Allies failed to achieve the breakthrough they wanted 
but Allied relations had also taken a major turn for the worse. The lull over the course of the 
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following few days played into the French and Dutch hands and enabled them to strengthen 
their forces.156 As the French and Dutch readied their forces, York once again took it upon 
himself to plan the next offensive and instructed his commanders to prepare for another 
attack to propel the Allied army towards Amsterdam. A further factor which influenced York 
in his decision to attack again was the growing shortage of food and forage, with the Allies 
having overestimated the quantity of grain and fodder which they could procure from the 
Helder peninsula itself.157 The bad weather also meant that the fleet had been unable to 
resupply the army for several weeks, whilst the fields around the Allied camp had turned into 
a swamp. As E. Walsh noted, “The storms and rains were violent and incessant the roads 
became impassable...and the fields might be easier navigated than marched through”.158 
 York opted to pursue a tactical plan of attack in which the bulk of the Allied army 
would advance against the enemy on the morning of 2 October 1799. York’s instructions 
were as follows: Abercromby was ordered to advance with a column of around 8,500 British 
troops from Petten, along the sea shore, to the village of Egmond-aan-Zee so as to envelop 
the French positions on the sand hills.159 To Abercromby’s left and in the Allied centre, 
Essen’s 8,000 Russians were to advance along the same route as they had undertaken in the 
previous battle, pushing along the sand hills to Schoorl and then on to Bergen. In the 
meantime, General Dundas, with around 7,000 British troops was to advance alongside 
Essen’s Russians, whilst Murray-Pulteney with the remainder of the army was instructed to 
advance on the extreme left of the Allied line towards the village of Oudkarspel. Finally a 
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force of around 2,000 Russians were to be kept in reserve at the village of Krabbendam.160 
Popham and a squadron of British gun boats were also ordered to sail down the Alkmaar 
canal and provide fire support for the Anglo-Russian columns.161  
 As with the previous Allied attack, the initial British and Russian advance on the 
morning of 2 October was successful, with Abercromby’s troops advancing quickly along the 
undefended sea-shore at half past six in the morning, whilst Essen’s Russians and David 
Dundas’s British infantry also made good progress in the Allied centre. Surtees, whose 
regiment was part of Dundas’s column, recalled the scene on the Allied right as the Allied 
forces began to advance: 
On ascending a small eminence, we got a view of the village of Old Petten, where 
we discovered about 10,000 or 12,000 of our army drawn up near the sea beach. We 
passed them, and moved forward in direction of a high range of sand-hills, which 
commenced about a mile from the village, and which overlooked all the plain 
below.162 
Within a few hours, the Allies had swept all before it along the beach and in-land. 
York’s forces, however, struggled to clear the French and Batavians from their strong 
defensive positions in the sand dunes which separated Abercromby’s column from the rest of 
the Allied army.163 As long as the French held the sand-dunes, Abercromby’s troops would 
be stranded on the beach, unable to turn the French flank or support the rest of the army. 
There was also the impact of the incoming tide to consider, with the danger that, if the British 
troops remained on the beach, they risked being swept away. The fight for control of the sand 
dunes was intense, and one which saw the slow-moving British regulars struggle forward 
against the flexible tactics of the more fleet-footed French and Dutch light infantry:  
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The French had now lined some high sand hills with a body of riflemen, who began 
to keep up a very smart fire upon the British; shortly they were considerably 
reinforced, and they galled our troops from almost every eminence and outlet of the 
multitude of sand hills. In spite of all, our troops advanced with that ardour and 
perseverance which so eminently distinguish the British soldier. Though perfectly 
unacquainted with the system of sharp-shooting (and it is impossible not to lament 
the want of that species of warfare in our army), though galled on all sides by 
offensive weapons that did their mischief partly unseen and always at a distance; 
though momentarily deprived from the encouraging presence of their officers by 
wounds they received, and though they were themselves neither equipped for light 
service, not had the advantage of a light body for that purpose...our brave 
countrymen persevered and fought their way for four miles.164   
The French control of the sand dunes caused major delays to the Allied advance. Not 
only did the rough, broken ground favour French and Dutch light infantry tactics, but the high 
ridge of dunes isolated Abercromby’s column from the rest of the Allied army and allowed 
Brune and Daendels to contain Abercromby’s flank attack and maintain a steady fire upon the 
other Allied columns.165 One of the reasons why Abercromby was unable to force his way 
through the dunes was due to the fact that the officer tasked with protecting Abercromby’s 
enveloping manoeuvre, MacDonald, advanced too eagerly with his brigade of 2,500 British 
regulars and lost contact with the rest of Abercromby’s force. As Bunbury recalled:  
Abercromby had reckoned on his protégé, Colonel MacDonald, for the security of 
his left flank during the march along the beach…But MacDonald was a very wild 
warrior. On first entering the hills, he met with small parties, afterwards with larger, 
of the enemy; he got excited, followed them up, met with more, entangled himself 
in the waves of these great sand-downs…had a battle to himself, and so completely 
lost sight of Sir Ralph’s column which he did not re-join until dark.166  
What began as an orderly advance on the Allied left quickly degenerated into a 
somewhat chaotic series of skirmishes for control of the sand hills. On the beach the British 
regular line infantry had the advantage, with Abercromby able to advance some six miles 
before turning to his left so as to assault the French forces in the sand hills just to the north of 
the village of Egmond-aan-Zee. The fighting here was intense and confused, as 
Abercromby’s brigades pushed forward into the sand hills, only to be met by determined 
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French resistance. One of Abercromby’s commanders was Moore. The experience of his 
brigade, comprising the 25th, 49th and 79th Regiments of Foot, was typical. In the morning, 
Moore’s troops had been unopposed on the beach and had quickly marched the six miles 
from Petten to Egmond without suffering any losses. However, on reaching their destination, 
Moore’s regiments were then ordered to clear the sand hills north of the village and duly 
hurried forward only for his advance guard to be engaged by a force of French hussars and 
light infantry.167  
With his usual bravery and disregard for his own safety, Moore then led the main 
body of his brigade forward with fixed bayonets. Although initially successful in driving the 
French back, Moore’s brigade quickly lost all sense of cohesion, with each of his regiments 
becoming separated in the maze of sand hills and it was not long before each of his isolated 
battalions were counter-attacked by French reinforcements.  Brock recalled the confused 
nature of the fight:   
It is impossible to give you an adequate idea of the nature of the ground, which I 
can only compare to the sea in a storm…the instant I came up to the 79th I ordered a 
bayonet charge, which…was executed with the utmost gallantry, though not in the 
greatest order, as the nature of the ground admitted none…our loss would have been 
trifling had the 79th charged straightforward; but unfortunately it followed the 
course the 49th had taken, thereby leaving our right entirely exposed.168  
Luckily for Brock, the French were driven back in confusion as a result of this attack, 
but it had been a chaotic affair and one which had dramatically showed up the British lack of 
tactical flexibility when it came to fighting in broken, hilly terrain. If Brock’s battle had been 
confusing, Moore’s was totally chaotic: 
My brigade, as a consequence of five hours’ constant movement and action in so 
broken a country, were dispersed and infinitely fatigued and from the absence of 
some of the regiments which had not been able to keep up on the left, the enemy 
had struck upon the flank of the 25th Regiment, which was the most forward. The 
fire was extremely galling. Three companies of the 92nd regiment were sent to their 
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support: but coming so incautiously into so hot a fire, they suffered prodigiously, 
and the whole began to give way…I saw myself on the point of being surrounded, 
when turning round to get back, I was knocked down by a shot, which entered 
behind my ear and came out at my cheek under my left eye. Just before I received 
this shot I saw the impossibility of rallying or stopping my men under such hot 
fire.169  
Shortly after Moore received his wound, Paget’s British light dragoons defeated a 
force of French cavalry on the beach next to Egmond.170 Whilst on the other side of the sand 
hills, Dundas and Essen pushed the French back and, though failing to link up with 
Abercromby, eventually secured Bergen.171 To the far left of the Allied line, Murray-
Pulteney’s column managed to fix Daendels’s Batavians, but otherwise played little part in 
the proceedings.172  
The Battle of Alkmaar was a pyrrhic victory for the Allies. As with the engagement at 
Bergen, what started as a rapid Allied attack had quickly degenerated into a battle of attrition, 
with the difficult terrain again causing problems for the attackers. Casualties amongst both 
armies were great, with the Allies coming off worse with over 2,000 losses, the vast majority 
British.173 The weather in the immediate aftermath of the battle was a contributing factor in 
the number of deaths amongst the Allied army, with several hundred wounded British 
soldiers having little or no means of keeping warm, or supplies to consume, as they lay 
exposed on the wet and windy sand hills. As Brock recalled: 
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We remained that night and the following on the sand hills; you cannot conceive 
our wretched state, as it blew and rained nearly the whole time. Our men bore all 
this without grumbling, although they had nothing to eat but the biscuits they 
carried with them, which by this time were completely wet.174 
Aftermath  
The Allied army was exhausted. It had fought three major battles, suffered the loss of 
nearly a quarter of its total strength in terms of killed and wounded, suffered also from a lack 
of supplies and, most importantly of all, had failed to achieve the breakthrough which the 
Allied high command wanted. Although the Allies had forced the French and Batavians to 
abandon the sand hills and relinquish Bergen and Alkmaar, they had little else to show for 
their efforts. If the defeat on 19 September had dented the Allies’ chances of success, the 
bloody yet indecisive Allied victory on 2 October effectively extinguished the Allies’ hopes. 
Until that time the Allied army as a whole had not been fully engaged whilst York had 
retained a numerical superiority over the French and Batavians. Allied losses, however, 
combined with the continued arrival of French and Batavian reinforcements, soon brought 
numerical parity, which enabled the French to mount a second offensive of their own.  
As with the battle of Bergen, the Allies had failed to make the most of the forces 
available to them and had blundered into a confused battle of attrition on their right flank. 
York’s planning must again be called into question, in that yet again the Allied army was 
spread out across a wide frontage, and thus was unable to bring its numerical superiority to 
bear at the crucial point against the enemy. Bunbury was particularly scathing in his criticism 
of the plan of attack formulated by York, “The plan of operations was complicated…intricate 
movements were to be executed by raw troops in a country where communications were 
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difficult and uncertain, it is not surprising that many blunders and disappointments 
ensued.”175  
What is particularly interesting about the Allied conduct of the battle is that, in 
contrast to the Allied experience at Bergen, it was the British and not the Russians who 
struggled on the right of the Allied line. It was also British, rather than Russian blunders, 
which contributed to the chaotic nature of the fighting on the sand hills and on this occasion 
MacDonald, like Sedmoratzky twelve days earlier, lost control of his troops and advanced too 
far forward. The frantic British advance into the dunes was also similar to the manner in 
which Hermann’s Russians had pushed forward at Bergen and almost resulted in an exact 
repeat of events when Moore, in an attempt to rally his men, was almost captured by a French 
force.176 It is indicative of the nature of much of British military history that the poor conduct 
of the British in the sand hills has not been remembered whilst, in contrast, the defeat of the 
Russians in the battle of Bergen has been singled out as a significant factor in Allied defeat.  
 The poor conduct of the Allies at Alkmaar had proven yet again that they lacked the 
operational skills necessary to achieve a decisive victory.  At Bergen and then Alkmaar, the 
Allied forces had formed up neatly and had set off with great speed and bravery but, once 
battle was joined, both the British and Russians proved unable to coordinate their attacks. The 
British lack of professional staff officers, in particular, was significant and helps explain how 
the Allied columns at the twin battles of Bergen repeatedly lost contact with one another. 
Poor Allied planning, a lack of good inter-Allied relations, combined with stern French and 
Batavian resistance and a lack of Orangeist support undermined the Allied effort. The Allies 
had also performed badly at the tactical level and specifically in their attempts to dislodge the 
French forces posted in the sand hills.  
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 Although it was certainly the case that the French and Batavians had superiority in 
the number of light troops, the fighting in the dunes was not simply a case of light infantry 
against line infantry. On the contrary, the French and the Batavians had deployed all arms 
formations in the sand hills and defended in depth. In the battle of Bergen, for instance, the 
Russian column had first met French chasseurs on the sand hills and in the outlying villages, 
only to run into formed bodies of French line infantry with artillery and cavalry support. 
Likewise, in the British advance on the beach in the battle of Alkmaar, McDonald’s brigade 
encountered both French light troops and line infantry.  
Although the Allies had won a victory at Alkmaar and advanced several miles in the 
process, success had been bought at a high price. Supplies, meanwhile, were running 
perilously short, whilst the incessant wind and rain had made the dyke roads almost 
impassable. Poor Anglo-Russian relations had also caused a rift between the two Allied 
armies, whilst there was still no sign of Grenville’s promised Orangeist Dutch uprising. The 
conditions had also greatly worsened, the roads were in poor condition and life was also 
unpleasant for the troops in the wind-swept sand in the hills.177 The situation looked bleak 
and, with winter on its way, it would not be long before the Texel froze over; an eventuality 
which would threaten to isolate the Allied army from the Fleet.  
Despite the near hopelessness of the situation, York still clung on to the faint hope 
that one last push could be decisive and therefore readied the exhausted Allied army for 
another attack, which was scheduled to take place on 6 October. The ensuing battle was a 
disaster for the Allies, as four columns, three British and one Russian, bungled their way 
forward amidst a rain storm. The battle followed the now familiar pattern of initial Allied 
success, followed by attrition. The Russians, supported by the British, at first drove all before 
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them, but they both advanced too far and were counter-attacked by the French and Batavians. 
An infamous episode then took place. Following the battle, Abercromby dispatched an 
officer, Major James Kempt, to headquarters to warn York that the French and Batavians 
looked to be readying a major attack of their own. On arrival at headquarters Kempt made 
every effort to convince the Duke of the need to ride to the front but York refused to do so 
until after he had finished his dinner.178 It was to prove a fateful decision.  
With the C-in-C far to the rear and bad weather reducing visibility the battle 
degenerated into a series of confused skirmishes until darkness forced a close on 
proceedings.179 This engagement, which later came to be known as the Battle of Castricum, 
was the final nail in the coffin for the Allied campaign in north Holland. Tired, hungry and 
disease- ridden, the Anglo-Russian forces needed time to recuperate and resupply but the 
longer they remained in the flooded fields south of Alkmaar there was little hope of them 
achieving this. Poorly supplied and vulnerable to attack, the Allied position was desperate:  
Directly opposed to it lay the enemy, in a position almost impregnable, and 
confident, from an accession of strength, having just been reinforced by six 
thousand French troops. A naked, barren and exhausted country extended all 
around, thinly scattered with a few ruined villages that scarcely afforded a scanty 
shelter for the wounded…the weather had set in, since the evening of the 6th 
October, with increased inclemency; clouds discharged themselves in torrents; and 
the roads were so entirely broken up, that the urgent necessities of the troops could 
not, with the utmost exertions, be presently relieved. To these complicated evils the 
army lay exposed on unsheltered sand-hills, their ammunition spoiled, and their 
clothes drenched with rain water.180  
Rough seas, particularly in mid-September, also prevented the shipment of supplies to the 
Helder.181 Thus, by October, the pressing question for the British was that, if the army was 
forced into winter quarters, how would the troops be sustained if the Texel froze completely 
and the army was cut off from the fleet? It was a question for which the British had no 
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answer and, in light of this issue and the other difficulties, the senior British generals 
(Abercromby, Dundas, Murray-Pulteney and Hulse) had met in the aftermath of battle of 
Alkmaar to discuss the options open to the Allied army. They concluded that the situation 
was untenable and that there was no option but to retreat to the defensive positions on the 
Zype: 
Since the landing of the army in Holland it has sustained five considerable actions 
without being able to make any considerable progress in the country, or to obtain 
any permanent, or strong situation. That in these actions the Army has suffered a 
diminution of between 9 and 10,000 men, and a very considerable proportion of its 
officers, those naturally the best and bravest…We had a large, nominal army 
formed of raw soldiers, hastily assembled, ill clothed, and a very great proportion of 
inexperienced officers…we have no assistance, or encouragement from the 
country…nor do we even obtain accurate intelligence…From what we see, and 
from what we feel and have experienced: from the state of the troops, the greater 
part of whom have been now four days under arms in the sand hills and other 
situations, from the want of present, and the impossibility of bringing up future 
supplies: from the unparalleled inclemency of the season, and weather: from the 
advantage of defence the enemy possesses, his growing numbers and his absolute 
command of the resources of the country: from the almost impassable state of the 
roads, and the country from the diminished condition of our cavalry and horses of 
every description: from our being now in a situation which is not an advantageous 
military position: and from many other concurring unfavourable circumstances. We 
are humbly of the opinion that…we should return to the position of the Zype…and 
there await a more favourable change of circumstances.182  
With no hope of advancing further and the army in very great danger York decided 
that there was little choice but to retreat back to the Helder and to seek an armistice with the 
French. A further factor which no doubt contributed to the British decision to retreat was that 
word had finally reached York regarding the weak state of the Orangeist movement in North 
Holland. Since Abercromby’s landing in late August, the British had not received any form of 
communication from the local inhabitants or British paid agents concerning the willingness of 
the local population to rise up in support of the Prince of Orange. As a result the British had 
dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Sontag, a Dutchman, to act as a commissary to the Dutch 
troops whom the British thought were located in the islands north of the Texel. Delivery of 
Sontag’s report was crucially delayed because he had been wounded on his return to the 
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British lines during the Battle of Alkmaar. When his report eventually reached York it did not 
speak positively of the Orangeists, stating that though around 5,000 men had declared for the 
Prince of Orange (roughly half were Storj’s ex-sailors) they were in a bad state and had low 
morale: 
They are in want of necessities of all kind, of clothing, of arms and accoutrements. 
They are divided in different places…that the retrograde movement of the troops 
has alarmed those men, who according to the decree of the Batavians as well as 
their officers are not to expect mercy should the chance of war put them into their 
hands. 183 
A further aspect which hampered the Orangeist forces was that the areas in which 
they had gathered were largely inhospitable, with the people of the coastal towns and villages 
suffering from famine. It would thus have been almost impossible for the British to 
concentrate the Orangeist troops in one place for fear of starvation.184 Faced with their poor 
state and the logistical problems inherent in gathering the Dutch troops together for training 
and supply purposes, the British opted not to transport them to the Helder but instead 
discussed the best way of evacuating them.  
Another factor which (perhaps) contributed to the Allied decision to retreat and seek 
terms was that news had reached Holland in early October of the crushing defeat of 
Korsakov’s Russian army at the second battle of Zurich on September 25. Although the 
Russians had not performed to the best of their abilities, the Allied offensive in Switzerland 
also failed because the Austrians had not supported their Russian Allies. Indeed, long before 
Suvorov’s army reached the Swiss frontier, the Austrians had transferred their main army to 
Northern Italy and left the Russians in the lurch. With fewer troops available to them and 
lacking in artillery, cavalry and supplies, it was only a matter of time before Korsakov was 
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defeated and forced to retreat. Angered by the conduct of the British and the Austrians, Tsar 
Paul I pulled out of the coalition, leaving the British and the Austrians to their own 
devices.185  
With the Allied cause in tatters in both Switzerland and Holland, York instructed 
Knox to meet with Brune and an armistice was duly signed. The British were granted 
permission to evacuate the remainder of the Anglo-Russian army, with its artillery and 
horses, in exchange for the release of 8,000 French prisoners of war.186 Interestingly, Brune 
clearly did not feel it essential to reclaim the Dutch fleet, a decision which no doubt angered 
the Batavian government.  
So ended the Anglo-Russian expedition to north Holland, a campaign in which the 
British had lost nearly 5,000 men killed, wounded and missing, whilst the Russian contingent 
had suffered around 6,000 losses. The campaign had been a battle of attrition, with the Allies 
suffering around 11,000 casualties, roughly a third of their combined strength, in the period 
from 19 September to 6 October. This was a heavy price to pay for a narrow slice of north 
Holland and even this hard-fought area of territory was lost to the Allies at the armistice. 
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THE EXPEDITION TO THE SCHELDT, 1809 
 
The expedition to the Scheldt in 1809 was the greatest amphibious expedition 
mounted by Britain before the Crimean War. Its architect was the Secretary of State for War 
and the Colonies, Robert Stewart Viscount Lord Castlereagh. Like Grenville before him, 
Castlereagh wanted to re-establish a foothold on the continent and restore a balance of power 
to Europe. The expedition had two principal objectives. The first was to destroy French naval 
power in the Low Countries, via the destruction of the naval dockyards at Antwerp, and the 
second was to provide military support to the Austrians.  
The expedition, however, was undermined by a number of factors, most notably by 
poor strategic and operational planning on the part of Castlereagh and the main British 
military and naval officers. Inclement weather and stern enemy resistance also hampered the 
expedition, which ended in failure. The spread of a deadly epidemic amongst the British 
soldiers on the islands in the Scheldt decimated the British expeditionary force and the island 
of Walcheren became “The Grave of the Army.”1 The political ramifications of the debacle 
were quickly felt back in Britain as the government of the Duke of Portland collapsed and a 
Public Inquiry was initiated.  
Although largely forgotten today, due to the popularity of Wellington’s campaigns in 
the Iberian Peninsula, the expedition to the Scheldt was a serious setback and marked the 
nadir of the British war effort against Napoleon.  
 
                                                          




The British Army: fit for service?  
Following the year-long Peace of Amiens, which collapsed in 1803, the British Army 
increased in size to meet the demands of the next conflict with France.2 Renewed fears of 
French invasion during the period 1803-1805 also served to galvanise British public support 
for the war effort and encouraged thousands of civilians to volunteer for part-time military 
training.3 As the conflict with France intensified over the course of the following years and 
more British troops were sent on active operations in Europe and across the globe the British 
struggled to find enough new recruits to make good on past losses.4 In 1809, for example, the 
British Army suffered over 25,000 casualties but was only able to recruit around 12,000 
men.5  
Furthermore, although the reforms made by York had improved the administration of 
the Army, British military performances continued to disappoint. One of the main reasons for 
this was the military’s inability to learn from the past and to plan operations effectively. For 
example, poor strategic and operational planning were hallmarks of the disastrous British 
expeditions to South America in 1806-07.6 The first expedition was the brainchild of the rash 
adventurer, Popham, who after the successful British mission to capture the Cape from the 
Dutch in 1806 persuaded Major-General Sir David Baird to send a small force, under 
Brigadier-General Beresford, to seize the Spanish cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo.7  
Although initially successful, this unofficial enterprise suffered from poor planning and 
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inaccurate intelligence and ended with Beresford’s capitulation to a mixed force of Spanish 
Militia and civilians.8 Although Popham was recalled to face a court martial, he was not 
forced to resign and continued in the service.9 In 1807 a second expedition was launched, 
under the command of Whitelocke, but again poor planning greatly undermined the ensuing 
campaign which came to a disastrous end when Whitelocke’s forces were forced to surrender 
at Buenos Aires.10 Defeated and dejected, the British were forced to evacuate the region, the 
reputation of the British Army in tatters.  
In Europe Napoleon’s victories over the other European powers over the course of 
1805-07 had isolated the British from the continent of Europe and meant that the British 
Army had had relatively few opportunities to conduct large scale operations on the 
continent.11 A rare success for the British was achieved in Italy in 1806 when a small British 
expeditionary force, under General Charles Stuart, defeated a small French army, 
commanded by General Jean Reynier, at Maida.12 Stuart was also successful in conducting 
operations in the Kingdom of Naples in 1809 and defeated the French invasion of Sicily in 
1810. Other small-scale expeditions were also mounted in the Mediterranean and the British 
established garrisons on the Ionian Islands and Cephalonia.13 Troops were also sent to 
Hanover in 1805, Stralsund in 1807 and Sweden in 1808.14 However, none of these 
expeditions placed serious pressure on France and Napoleon’s economic policies soon forced 
the British to act far more ruthlessly.  
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Following the end of the War of the Fourth Coalition in 1807, which witnessed the 
near destruction of the Kingdom of Prussia by the French, Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I 
had signed the Treaty of Tilsit. This realigned the Russians and Prussians with France and 
enabled Napoleon to isolate Britain further and reduce her influence over European affairs.15 
It also reinforced Napoleon’s ‘Continental System’ which since 1806 had sought to exclude 
British goods from European markets in response to the British blockade of France.16  
Napoleon also hoped to pressure the smaller maritime states of Europe to exclude 
British shipping from their ports, forge a grand alliance of the other naval powers in 
opposition to Great Britain and rebuild the French Navy following its humbling defeat at 
Trafalgar in 1805. 17 Napoleon also tightened his grip over the Low Countries when he 
transformed the Batavian Republic into the Kingdom of Holland and placed his brother, 
Louis Bonaparte, upon the new Dutch throne in June 1806.18 The British were also concerned 
by reports which suggested that Napoleon wanted to seize the neutral Danish fleet and about 
the implications this might have for British trade.19  
Locked in a new naval arms race, the British desperately sought a means to strike 
back and did so with a vengeance in August 1807 when the Royal Navy launched a surprise 
attack upon the great Danish naval base at Copenhagen.20 The ferocity of the British attack 
caught the Danes completely by surprise and greatly weakened the Danish fleet. 21 The same 
year Napoleon also tried to seize the Portuguese fleet following the Franco-Spanish invasion 
of Portugal, only for the British to rescue the Portuguese Navy and Royal family at the last 
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minute.22  This was only the start of a general crisis in the Iberian Peninsula and in 1808 the 
French ousted the Spanish Bourbons and subsumed the former Spanish state into the French 
Empire. Horrified by the French betrayal, the Spanish people duly rebelled against the French 
in May and defeated a French army at the battle of Bailen in July.23 This rare French defeat 
provided a great piece of propaganda for the rebel cause and helped convince the British to 
dispatch troops to support the Spanish. British confidence received a further boost in mid-
August 1808 when Sir Arthur Wellesley defeated the French at Vimeiro.24   
Although this success was later marred by the controversial Convention of Cintra, the 
British remained committed to the war in the Iberian Peninsula and in October they 
dispatched Moore to command in Spain and Portugal.25 Once again, however, the ensuing 
campaign in Spain was poorly planned and badly executed and resulted in Anglo-Spanish 
defeat at the hands of Napoleon.26 Although Moore fought the French to a standstill at 
Corunna and managed the British evacuation, he was mortally wounded in the process. The 
army Moore commanded at Corunna had also suffered terribly in its retreat to the coast of 
northern Spain and was thus a shadow of its former self.27 The largest British military 
expedition to the continent since 1799 had almost witnessed the destruction of a British army 
and the campaign was labelled a ‘shameful disaster’ by the London Times.28 Despite 
suffering badly during this campaign, many of the same soldiers who fought with Moore in 
Spain would find themselves bound for the Scheldt only a few months later.  
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Rationale for British intervention  
In the late summer of 1809 British troops were once again despatched to the Low 
Countries, the catalyst for a new British expedition to the region being the renewed hostility 
between Austria and Napoleon. Since signing the humiliating Treaty of Pressburg in 1805, 
following the battle of Austerlitz, a small group of Austrian diplomats headed by Count 
Phillip Stadion had watched events in Spain and Portugal with interest.29 This ‘war-party’ 
became increasingly vocal and managed to persuade the Emperor and his inner circle within 
the Habsburg court that war with France was essential for the future of the Empire.30 The 
head of the Austrian Army, the gifted Archduke Charles, sided with the more cautious 
elements at court and impressed upon the Emperor the need for a breathing space so as to 
make the Army fit for service.31 
Before committing themselves to another major conflict the Austrians set about 
finding potential allies. The first port of call for Austria’s diplomatic agents was St. 
Petersburg. Following negotiations at Tilsit and Erfurt, Tsar Alexander I had agreed to 
support Napoleon if France was attacked by Austria or Prussia.32 Austrian fears regarding 
Russian intervention were soothed, however, following reports from St Petersburg that 
Russia was unlikely to provide the French with military aid in the event of a new European 
war.33 However, military and financial support for Vienna would not be forthcoming.  
The Austrians now turned their attention to Great Britain. In October 1808, a secret 
message was received by the Foreign Office from Vienna asking for financial assistance. The 
Austrian proposal was audacious. The Austrians wanted an initial loan of £2.5 million and a 
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further £5 million over the course of 1809. In return the Austrians promised to put almost half 
a million men into the field against Napoleon.34  The British were sceptical of the Austrians 
because of their previous poor relations, especially regarding financial matters.35 During the 
following weeks, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir George Canning, discussed 
matters with his cabinet colleagues and much to the Austrians’ frustration the British refused 
the proposals.36  
In March 1809 the situation changed markedly. Instead of witnessing a major victory 
in Spain, the British were counting the cost of the disastrous Corunna campaign and Canning 
was eager to secure better Anglo-Austrian relations.37 This time the British promised to 
provide both financial instalments and military support and, after a last-minute declaration of 
hostilities, the Austrians advanced into French-held territory on 12 April 1809.38  Before the 
Austrian declaration of war, the British had started to consider where to strike at the French. 
Although the Habsburgs had suggested the Weser estuary, the British focused their attentions 
upon the Scheldt with a view to striking at the French naval base at Antwerp.39  
Since the French defeat at Trafalgar and Napoleon’s creation of the Continental 
System, the British had been watchful of Napoleon’s efforts to rebuild the French Navy.40 
Despite suffering heavy shipping losses at the great naval battles of the Nile and Trafalgar, 
the expansion of the French Empire in the period following Trafalgar meant that by 1809 the 
French Navy had increased in size. The key to France’s naval regeneration was the French 
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possession of a number of well protected deep water harbours, from Antwerp to Genoa, 
where they were able to construct ships-of-the-line unmolested by the Royal Navy.41  The 
Royal Navy, by contrast, was suffering from the pressures of war. Forced to patrol the oceans 
and blockade French ports, the Admiralty’s main concern after Trafalgar was the battle 
against the scourge of wear and tear. In addition, manpower shortages posed serious 
problems for the Royal Navy, with losses being compounded by a decrease in recruiting.42 
Although Napoleon’s plans had received a set back at Copenhagen, the British were adamant 
that the French naval establishments in the Low Countries needed to be destroyed. The 
British had long contemplated mounting such an expedition.  As early as 1798, for instance, 
the First Lord of the Admiralty, George Second Earl of Spencer, had discussed at length a 
scheme put forward by Popham to seize the smuggling port of Flushing on the island of 
Walcheren and the British had also toyed with the idea of seizing Flushing by a coup de main 
in 1799.43 The British were also wary of the invasion threat posed by the presence of a 
French fleet at Antwerp. As General Craufurd noted: 
From the Scheld he will be able to combine a formidable invasion with the greatest 
facility…with invasion, certain invasion, of the most formidable description, 
approaching, the success of which would be attended with every horrible calamity 
that could possibly befall this great and prosperous and happy country…the 
destruction of all its power and consequence, of every species of property, of all 
domestic comfort, of all personal security, the annihilation of our liberties and our 
whole political existence…44 
These sentiments expressed by Craufurd a year after the Scheldt expedition mirrored 
those of the Admiralty in 1809. Since the recommencement of hostilities in 1803 the 
Admiralty had maintained a constant sentinel over the Scheldt, with the estuary being 
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watched by a small squadron under the command of Admiral Thomas Russell.45 Information 
regarding the French naval establishment at Antwerp flooded into the Admiralty office both 
from blockading British vessels and also from less trustworthy sources, such as smugglers. 
An example of a typical report received by the Admiralty from the British naval forces off the 
Scheldt reads as follows: 
At Flushing there are…seven 74 gun ships, a frigate, and 7 gun boats, on the stocks 
two 74 gun ships, a frigate and a brig. In the roads a frigate and a brig. Among all 
the vessels at Flushing not more than 800 men. At Ramaskins 7 gun boats. At 
Caampveer about 40 sail of smugglers…46 
 
Over the course of 1805 to 1809, numerous reports such as this were received by the 
Admiralty from vessels off the Scheldt. Many reports not only gave information about the 
ever changing strength of the French naval forces at Antwerp and Flushing, but also advised 
the Admiralty of the need for an expedition to be sent to the region. One such call for military 
action was received by the Admiralty from an anonymous source on 7 March 1808 which 
stated that “It would be advisable for the present moment to get possession of the town and 
port of Flushing- and of the whole island of Walcheren as there is in the port 6 sail of the line 
and 16 smaller vessels which are meant for an expedition”.47 By 1809 the Admiralty and the 
ministers of the Portland government were convinced that Antwerp posed a major threat to 
British interests. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Mulgrave, stated in a speech to the 
cabinet on 25 March 1809 that:  
…the formidable Naval Force assembled in the Scheldt and its rapid increase is of 
more importance…to this country than any naval force, that is, or can be assembled 
by the enemy…that the Scheldt fleet is within a short distance of the vulnerable 
ports of the coast of England…that the British fleet in the Baltic could be exposed 
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to an attack from the Scheldt, and the existence of a strong fleet there would place 
in jeopardy all our blockading squadrons from Brest to Toulon…48 
 
What is important is that Antwerp, rather than Flushing, was the principal target of the 
British strategists. For the Admiralty, the destruction of the dockyards at Antwerp promised 
to cripple Napoleon’s ship-building plans, whilst the forcing of the Scheldt would also offer 
the potential for the possible capture or destruction of the French squadron stationed there.  
Planning and preparation  
At the centre of initial planning for the new Anglo-Austrian alliance had been 
Canning.49 When Canning had suggested the idea the ministers had been unsure of whether 
to support the Austrians. However, when news reached London that the Austrians had 
defeated the French at the Battle of Aspern-Essling on 21-22 May the government 
unanimously supported the need for a new British intervention in the Low Countries.50 By 
this point, Canning’s main rival in government, Castlereagh, had assumed responsibility for 
the expedition.  A gifted protégé of Pitt the Younger and a former head of the Board of 
Control, Castlereagh had been readied by Pitt for high office and was the natural successor to 
both Lord Grenville and Sir Henry Dundas.51   
Before gaining the cabinet’s official approval of the scheme Castlereagh sought the 
advice of the newly appointed C-in-C of the British Army Sir David Dundas.52 Dundas had 
only been appointed to the post in March, after the resignation of York, following the latter’s 
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embroilment in a scandal regarding the sale of commissions.53 Dundas quickly put his 
thoughts to paper and also called on several officers at the Horse Guards to do likewise.54 
The generals agreed that the operation would be difficult and that success would 
depend upon tight army and navy cooperation. They also agreed that troops would need to 
land on the islands on both sides of the Scheldt before an advance to Antwerp could be made. 
The words of General Calvert can be taken to sum up the general feeling of those consulted, 
“The service would be arduous, and the troops employed on it must undoubtedly be exposed 
to considerable risk...”.55 These opinions should have warned Castlereagh against launching 
the expedition, but the Austrian victory at Aspern-Essling convinced him that the expedition 
had to be launched.56  
The Admiralty was also asked to provide its opinion of the operation and the First 
Lord, Henry Phipps Lord Mulgrave, was asked about the practicalities of transporting a large 
military force to the Scheldt. Mulgrave in turn also sought the advice of Captain Sir Home 
Popham. When questioned at the Parliamentary Inquiry following the expedition to the 
Scheldt in 1810, Popham recalled his meeting with Mulgrave: 
…as nearly as I can recollect, my Lord Mulgrave said there was a large disposable 
force, and that as the French had a very strong fleet in the Scheldt and were still 
building more ships, it would be very desirable to make an effort to destroy them, 
and he requested that I would turn my thoughts to that subject, as it would be very 
desirable that I should see Lord Chatham and Lord Castlereagh in the course of a 
day or two.57 
 
Popham’s tasks were to assess the topographical, tidal and climatic conditions in the 
Scheldt and to procure transports for the expeditionary force – Popham having performed the 
latter role before in 1799.  Popham was quickly made aware of the topographical difficulties 
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which an expedition to the Scheldt would encounter. The River Scheldt did not flow in a 
single course from Antwerp to the North Sea, but instead broke into two channels bypassing 
the islands of North and South Beveland and Walcheren.58 These two channels were known 
as the West and East Scheldt, the entrance to the West Scheldt was known as the Wielingen 
Channel, while the entrance to the East Scheldt was known as the Veere Gat, the former was 
reached by the deep anchorage known as the Stone Deep while the latter was entered from 
the Roompot.59 
The West Scheldt was the larger of the two channels and was the most direct route to 
Antwerp.  The West Scheldt, however, was bordered by high sand dunes and dykes, which 
obscured much of the French and Dutch coastal defences, while the presence of the French 
squadron also meant that it was almost impossible for the British to gain a clear view of the 
Franco-Dutch positions around Antwerp. This meant that Russell could give little information 
to the Admiralty as to the precise location of the French ship-building centre at Antwerp.60  
The lack of information posed another serious question: how would the British navigate their 
way up the Scheldt? As one of the Navy’s best pilots Popham was one of the few men 
available to the Admiralty who could answer this question, but given the lack of information 
about the conditions in the Scheldt the only way Popham could provide a definite answer was 
if and when the British fleet sailed into the Wielingen Channel.  
The first problem facing Popham with regard to naval operations was how to nullify 
the French gun batteries along the banks of the Scheldt, whilst also steering a course that kept 
the fleet safe from the West Scheldt’s turbulent currents and shifting sandbanks. Faced with 
similar circumstances in previous operations the Royal Navy had achieved mixed results. In 
the forcing of the Sound at Copenhagen in 1801, the British warships had managed to silence 
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the Danish gun batteries but had suffered severe losses in the process.61 The British had faced 
a similar set of problems again in 1807 when Admiral Sir John Duckworth’s squadron 
attempted to force the Dardanelles.62 In the case of the Scheldt, the British were faced with a 
difficult series of operations. This time the Navy would have to work closely with the Army, 
as British troops were scheduled to land on the banks of the Scheldt to capture the enemy gun 
batteries. The act of forcing a heavily defended coastal position would pose problems for the 
Royal Navy for many years to come, with the expedition to the Dardanelles in 1915 being a 
case in point.  
Tidal and climatic conditions were also important. Popham was aware that the British 
needed to commence the navigation of the Scheldt when the tide was high, if the British 
waited too long and went at low tide they risked being stranded on the many sandbanks of the 
West Scheldt. With late summer fast approaching and daylight hours shortening, Popham 
advised Castlereagh that time was once again of the essence, “I see the season advancing fast; 
and, if we are imperceptibly led on till the midsummer fine weather is past, we shall have the 
most dreadful of all difficulties, the elements to encounter”.63 Like Calvert before him, 
however, Popham’s warnings fell on deaf ears and Castlereagh ploughed on with 
preparations.  
With transport issues likely to consume precious time, Popham again stressed the 
need for the expedition to be despatched as quickly as possible, “Transports are the greatest 
clog to every sort of expedition, particularly those in which promptness and celerity are so 
essential to success.”64 With no dedicated military transports of their own, military and naval 
officials were forced to hire secure civilian vessels for several months at a negotiated rate; the 
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net result of this haphazard system was that the cost to hire greatly fluctuated.65 With so little 
time to work with, Popham advised Mulgrave to convert several old warships into troop 
transports instead of relying on civilian vessels.66  
Whilst Popham pieced together a memorandum about transport issues and assessed 
the obstacles and dangers the navy would encounter, Castlereagh continued to urge the 
Cabinet to launch the expedition. Prior to the Austrian victory at Aspern-Essling, Castlereagh 
had been buoyed by intelligence reports which stated that French troop strengths in Holland 
and Flanders were particularly low: 
The intelligence received from the northern parts of France, from Flanders, and 
from Holland, although not such as will enable me to furnish you with any precise 
statement of the enemy’s force…represents them as drained as low, if not lower 
than at any former period, of regular troops, and I apprehend it may be generally 
assumed, that we can never expect to find the enemy more exposed or more 
assailable in that quarter nor is it probable that Great Britain will ever have a large  
disposable force applicable to such a service than at the present moment.67  
 
The apparent weakness of the Dutch and French forces in the region, combined with 
Austria’s victory over Napoleon and the eagerness of the Admiralty to attack Antwerp, 
convinced Castlereagh that the operation had to be launched quickly.68 However, the quality 
of British intelligence was patchy. As Carl A. Christie has noted, the British lacked accurate 
information about enemy activity in the Low Countries, “Reliable intelligence about the 
upper reaches of the Scheldt was virtually unobtainable. Nothing was known about Flanders 
or Brabant, both of which could send reinforcements if they were available”.69 
Flushed with news of Aspern-Essling Castlereagh failed to question the quality of 
British intelligence or fully consider the doubts of the military.70 Throughout June, 
Castlereagh worked feverishly to prepare the armed forces, with the help of Dundas, while 
also spending considerable time in finding a command pairing for the expedition.  
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Castlereagh’s choice for commander of the army was the Master-General of the Ordnance 
John Pitt, Second Earl of Chatham and brother of the late Pitt the Younger. A senior 
Lieutenant-General, Chatham, was also a former First Lord of the Admiralty and had 
commanded a brigade in Holland in 1799.71 Although Chatham was not the most experienced 
front-line general, he was available for command which was more than could be said for 
many of his contemporaries. Indeed, for the first time in the conflict there was a serious 
shortage of senior military commanders available to Castlereagh.  For instance, Sir John 
Moore had been killed at Corunna; York had only recently resigned, whilst generals Burrard 
and Dalrymple had had their careers cut short following the Convention of Cintra in 1808.72 
Wellington, meanwhile, whose reputation had also been tarnished by Cintra, was already 
employed commanding British forces in the Iberian Peninsula. With so few candidates for the 
role, Castlereagh had little choice but to appoint Chatham as the commander of the 
expeditionary force.  
By contrast, the Navy had a wide range of officers available for appointment as 
commander of the naval force. The Admiralty’s decision to appoint Admiral Sir Richard 
Strachan was surprising for he had no experience of amphibious operations.73 Like the Army, 
promotion in the navy was a potentially difficult business. Although rewarding service and 
experience, this could be problematic, an example being if the Admiralty wanted to promote 
a gifted captain to the rank of Rear Admiral, it had to promote all officers above the chosen 
captain in the naval officer list to a higher rank. Another problem for the navy was that, 
despite there being many gifted junior commanders there was not the same number of gifted 
admirals; by 1809 many senior naval leaders had either retired or been killed including 
Collingwood, Nelson and Vincent.74 This left Strachan as the only viable option. Strachan’s 
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role in the forthcoming expedition was to be a man-manager, overseeing a wide spread of 
interdependent naval and amphibious operations, without necessarily having to take an active 
role in any of them. Like Chatham, he was to pull the strings while junior commanders 
carried out the plans.  
The Admiralty’s choice of Rear Admiral Sir Richard Keats, a dynamic naval 
commander to serve under Strachan was consistent with its selection policy. In previous joint 
operations older commanders such as Admiral George Elphinstone, later Lord Keith, and 
Admiral James Gambier had been appointed to command the overall naval force, leaving 
more dynamic commanders, such as Nelson and Cochrane, to oversee more active operations. 
Despite this, Strachan’s lack of experience in amphibious warfare should have sounded a 
warning to the Admiralty before it appointed him to command the naval forces for the 
expedition. Brave and headstrong ‘Mad Dick’ Strachan, as the sailors refereed to him, also 
lacked detailed knowledge of the Scheldt estuary.75  Strachan’s lack of experience in 
coordinating naval action with military operations, coupled with his ignorance of the Scheldt, 
would severely hamper the expedition. 
 Chatham was appointed, with the King’s blessing, in early June and Strachan’s 
appointment came at the same time.76  With the King’s acceptance of the expedition, all that 
remained was for the cabinet to offer its approval, which it gave on 21 June.77 Whilst 
Castlereagh consulted with key figures in London, the final preparations were made and the 
south coast of England, from Portsmouth to Ramsgate, became a hive of activity. From the 
middle of June onwards regiments stationed across the British Isles were to be seen marching 
towards the coastal towns of the southeast. Rifleman Benjamin Harris recorded the sight of 
an army on the move on the road to Dover: 
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From Hythe to Deal was one day’s march: and I remember looking along the road 
at the good appearance the different regiments made as we marched along. It was as 
fine an expedition as ever I looked at, and the army seemed to stretch, as I regarded 
them, the whole distance before us to Dover.78  
The coastal towns were soon swamped by thousands of soldiers. An anonymous 
officer of the 81st Regiment of Foot recalled the scene he found on arriving in Ramsgate: 
“Everything is bustle, agitation, running backwards and forwards. The place is full of wives, 
friends, and daughters of the officers about to embark”.79The generals also received their 
marching orders. One such commander, General William Dyott, noted his surprise on 
receiving his orders to prepare for active operations: “The move from Winchester turned out 
what I little expected... I was to go without delay to the Isle of Thanet, to take the command 
of a brigade consisting of the 6th, 50th, and 91st regiments…”.80 
Whilst the British readied their forces Napoleon managed to outmanoeuvre and defeat 
the Austrians at the battle of Wagram on 5-6 July.81 The Austrians opted to seek an armistice 
with the French and the news of these negotiations reached London roughly two weeks 
later.82 Despite Napoleon’s victory over the Austrians, Castlreagh remained hopeful about the 
prospects of the expedition and continued to oversee preparations. Of vital importance at this 
stage was the need for a clear and precise operational plan, but in the hectic rush to get the 
expedition underway, the British failed to create anything remotely resembling a sound plan 
of operations.  
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Castlereagh, Chatham and the naval representatives met over the course of June and 
early July to finalise the objectives of the expedition, assess transport issues and plot where 
the army would be landed. What was lacking in these meetings was a discussion of what the 
troops would do once they had disembarked on the islands in the Scheldt and ultimately upon 
the continent. Chatham knew that somewhere in the vicinity of Antwerp the French navy was 
constructing ships-of the-line. His task was to force the Scheldt by landing troops along its 
banks, capture the French gun batteries there and then land a force close enough to Antwerp 
to destroy the French ships. What was not clear was how the troops would actually operate 
beyond their beach heads.  How would commanders communicate with one another? Would 
the army need to storm Antwerp? These questions needed answers. Chatham and Strachan, 
however, appear not to have deemed it necessary to raise them. As Chatham recalled to the 
Scheldt Inquiry, once the guns along the Scheldt had been captured by a series of landings, 
there was no plan of operations to guide the British troops who would land near to Antwerp. 
Commanders were simply expected to react to the circumstances, “No plan in detail was ever 
concerted for the attack on Antwerp: it must have depended entirely on circumstances after 
we had landed on the continent.”83  
Not only did no plan exist for the crucial later stage of the campaign, in which 
Chatham sought to land two divisions of British troops at Sandvliet near to Antwerp, but even 
the initial landings to be made on the islands in the Scheldt (Walcheren, Cadsand and South 
Beveland) were not part of a clear plan of operations. In effect, once the troops had landed, 
the British commanders had no guidance other than to advance and clear their respective 
beachheads of enemy troops and artillery. Once this task was completed, they had no other 
instructions. Chatham really had no idea of what he wanted his troops to do once they had 
landed save advance beyond the sand hills and neither did he know the actual location of the 
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dockyards, “I was not distinctly apprised of the situation of the docks, nor do I know that 
there were any docks at Antwerp…I had no distinct knowledge before I left England where 
the arsenals were”. 84 
Instead of making a clear plan of operations and gathering together accurate 
intelligence about Antwerp and its environs, Chatham relied instead on his ability to make 
things up as he went along and react to the circumstances “The duty of the Admiral and 
General [is] to decide according to circumstances and information on the spot”.85 Confident 
in his and his naval counterparts’ ability to find a way to Antwerp, Chatham eschewed the 
need to create an operational plan and concentrated instead on readying the troops for active 
service.  
Execution 
After weeks of preparation, in which British troops had to wait aboard ship for long 
periods, the British expedition to the Scheldt finally set sail at 5 am on 28 July 1809.86 The 
initial British landing plans were as follows. Sir Eyre Coote, Mackenzie Fraser and Thomas 
Graham’s divisions, comprising just over twelve thousand men, were to land at Zoultand Bay 
on the south-west coast of the island of Walcheren in waves of 3,000 men at a time and with 
orders to clear the landing beaches. Whilst this operation was being undertaken, a smaller 
landing was to take place on the Bree Sands, on the north-west coast of Walcheren, in order 
to clear the French forces covering the Veere Gat, a small waterway separating Walcheren 
from South Beveland.87 Once these operations were completed Sir John Hope’s division was 
to make its way along the East Scheldt and through the Veere Gat to South Beveland. Finally, 
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General Huntly’s division was to land on the island of Cadsand, with orders to clear the 
beaches of French gun batteries in preparation for the fleet to move up the West Scheldt. 
Once these landings were complete, the British would then be in a position to seize Flushing 
and move towards Antwerp.  
Before the fleet sailed, however, a series of developments combined to affect the 
character of the initial British operations on the Scheldt. Whilst final preparations were being 
made, the British were forced to alter the location of their main landing on the island of 
Walcheren. This change of plan was brought about as a result of a number of factors: the first 
was the result of a last minute council of war which met on 24 July. Attended by a number of 
senior commanders, the meeting had been called by Strachan who wanted to shift the main 
landings from Zoutland Bay to the Bree Sands in order to land the main body more 
efficiently. Strachan also suggested that if this operation was to be undertaken, it would be 
best for Hope’s division to wait until the British were in a position to land on the Bree Sands 
before sailing through the Veere Gat and on to South Beveland.88 After a brief consultation 
the council accepted Strachan’s proposal. Following the meeting, Strachan received word 
from Captain William Bolton, of HMS Fishguard, who reported that the French had moved 
their naval squadron from Antwerp to Flushing.89 Strachan reinforced Admiral Gardiner’s 
squadron and informed Chatham that the main landings were to be switched from Zoutland 
Bay to the Bree Sands and that the fleet would move from its current anchorage to the 
Roompot.90  This decision was welcomed by Chatham who was happy to shift the main 
landing to the north of the island on account of the rough sea:  
The wind shifted to the westward, and continued to blow very fresh. The anchorage 
of the Stone Deep being much exposed to the heavy sea which this wind 
occasioned, it became necessary to secure a [move] to leeward, in which the fleet, 
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particularly the small craft, might ride in safety and…as the surf rendered a 
landing…at West Capelle or Domburg impracticable, the Left Wing of the Army, 
destined for the reduction of Walcheren should be put on shore at the Bree Sand out 
of range of shot of the Fort Ter Haak.  The Roompot off the S.West end of the 
island of Schouwen affords the best shelter.91  
Anchored safety in the Roompot, the British high command seemed content with the 
smoothness of the initial operations off the Scheldt. Despite this, however, the decisions 
made on 24 July, and the willingness of Chatham to accept these decisions, were to have 
major consequences for the expedition. By landing on the northern shore of Walcheren, 
Strachan, with the compliance of Chatham, had inadvertently added to the obstacles facing 
the expedition in that, instead of being able to make a swift advance upon Flushing, the 
British now had to undertake a potentially difficult advance across the island.92 Thus in the 
space of barely a few hours, the British high command had dramatically altered the dynamics 
of the military operation from a potentially fast moving series of attacks into a potentially 
drawn out advance.  
While the final preparations were being made, the embarkation of the expeditionary 
force was also completed. The embarkation of the expeditionary force was a major 
achievement for the Admiralty owing to the limited number of transports which had been 
available to the British in May and July. The initial shortfall in the number of transports 
resulted from both the unprecedented number of transports required for the Scheldt 
expedition and the fact that several hundred had already been despatched to the Iberian 
Peninsula.  The Transport Board solved the problem by converting several of the fleet’s 
versatile seventy-four-gun ships-of-the-line into troop transports, which saw the ship’s gun 
decks cleared in order to provide space for the soldiers and stores.93  William Thornton Keep, 
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an officer in the 77th Foot, recalled the commotion and excitement during the embarkation of 
the regiment at Spithead:   
I suppose there is about 14 hundred on board now we are embarked, as she carries 
the whole of our regiment in addition to her own complement of seamen, and I 
leave you to judge what an animating scene it is, to see so many red coats and blue, 
thus assembled together, with a large body of the largest fleet that ever was seen on 
the coast of Old England!94 
Although providing a quick fix to the transport shortage, the cramped conditions 
experienced by the soldiers aboard ship were not conducive to a long voyage, with the 
soldiers crammed together in conditions not too dissimilar to those of a slave ship. Private 
William Wheeler aboard HMS Impetueuse recalled:   
I descended by the main hatchway, all was darkness, and the deck completely 
covered with the troops. The first step I took off the slips was some one’s leg, the 
second on an Irishman’s face…I made another stride and found there was nothing 
but living bodies to walk on, I was soon arrested in my course for someone seized 
hold of my leg and down I threw myself across half a dozen of my comrades…95 
Overcrowding also threatened to accentuate another common issue affecting 
combined operations: inter-service friction. The scourge of many a combined operation, 
inter-service friction could be sparked by a number of factors, such as the lack of respect 
between the two services, particularly of the Navy towards the Army, this being perhaps a 
by-product of many years of naval success which contrasted sharply with military failure. 
During the voyage to the Scheldt, the overcrowded conditions aboard many of the line-of-
battle-ships resulted in tempers flaring in a few cases between soldiers and sailors.96  An 
officer of the 81st Foot later recalled how the overcrowding aboard ship affected the work of 
the sailors and frustrated the soldiers who were eager to land, “The men having been some 
days on board, had already enough of the sea, and were seemingly panting for breath on the 
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crowded decks. The sailors had no room to execute the necessary work of the ship.97Another 
instance of inter-service friction en-route to the Scheldt occurred aboard the frigate HMS San 
Lorento, with tempers flaring between soldiers and sailors owing to the conduct of army 
Captain Peter Bowlby who, on feeling sea sick, decided to lie down on the quarterdeck.98 
Unbeknown to Bowlby, such an act went against naval regulations and was seen as a mark of 
disrespect by the ship’s crew. Thankfully for all concerned the voyage was of short 
duration.99  
Following the changes in the British landing plans the final orders were completed.100 
The left wing of the army comprising Paget, Fraser and Graham’s divisions, under the overall 
command of Coote, was to land on the Bree Sands, with the support of Admiral Robert 
Otway’s warships. This force was to be supported by the gunboats of Admiral Lord 
Beauclerk, whom Strachan had tasked with providing fire support for Coote’s landings.101 
Whilst Otway undertook the landings on the Bree Sands, the right wing comprising Hope’s 
Division was to be transported by Keats’s squadron, with the aid of Popham, towards the 
Veere Gat with orders to wait at anchor in the Roompot in preparation to land on South 
Beveland.102  
Another force under the command of Commodore Edward Owen carrying the 
Marquis of Huntly’s Division was to land on the island of Cadsand. Finally, the reserve, 
comprising Sir James Erskine Second Earl of Rosslyn’s Light Division and Lieutenant-
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General Thomas Grosvenor’s Division, under the naval direction of Captain Robert Barton, 
were ordered to the coast of Walcheren.103  
One of the first problems which the British experienced concerned communications. 
For despite thinking through when and where to land, Chatham had not planned how he 
would communicate with his subordinate commanders when aboard his flagship. The 
mechanics of the landing, such as timing and the organisation of the various waves of rowing 
boats, were the responsibility of Strachan rather than Chatham.104 Thus until Chatham could 
land he had little or no control over events. Indeed when asked at the Scheldt Inquiry as to 
whether he had been able to have any control once aboard ship over the navigation of the 
Scheldt and the landing of the troops, Chatham was forced to state that he had no such 
authority.105  
Chatham was faced with the prospect of attempting to oversee several major landings 
over an extended area of operations amounting to roughly seven hundred square miles. Not 
only was his line of sight affected by the weather but, having left England with a shortage of 
adequate maps and inadequate military intelligence, he also lacked in-depth knowledge of the 
strength of the enemy and the local topography.  Unsure of the true strength of the French 
forces in the area, concerned perhaps by the movement of the French naval squadron and 
lacking recent experience of combat, Chatham was faced with two immensely difficult tasks 
of attempting to control and then coordinate the landings. Chatham found that not only could 
he not coordinate the landings, but neither could he have much influence over the deployment 
of the assault forces on their landing beaches. Only when Coote’s forces had cleared a 
beachhead could the commander of the army take command. Fortunately for the British, the 
main landings on the Bree Sands were led by Coote and Hope, officers who had extensive 
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experience of amphibious operations: Coote, for instance, had commanded the Ostend raid in 
1798 and had spearheaded the landing at the Helder in 1799. Hope was equally well versed in 
beach assaults. Both commanders were fortunate to be in command of the two landings 
which were to take place in close proximity to the main part of the fleet, thus benefiting from 
superior fire support and from their numerical superiority to the weak enemy forces that were 
guarding the beaches north of Walcheren.  
The most significant landing to be made at this stage was on the island of Cadsand.106 
Cadsand’s importance to the expedition owed itself to the fact that the islands northern shore 
formed the south bank of the all-important West Scheldt, the main route by which the British 
fleet was to sail to Antwerp. The north shore of the island was not without its defences, 
however, with French artillery positions being located at various points along Cadsand’s 
coast. It was imperative that the British cleared these artillery batteries before the fleet 
attempted to sail up the West Scheldt. As Sam Willis has noted: 
In such engagements the fortification on land always held an advantage. Large 
warships were out of their element so close to shore…The ships’ gun crews were 
beset by the usual problems, not least by the pitching and rolling which affected 
their aim, whereas those on dry land had the advantage of solid ground and the 
protection afforded by stout, thick walls.107 
If the British failed to achieve this, they would be forced to besiege Flushing before 
being in a position for the navy to cooperate fully with the army and move up the West 
Scheldt towards Antwerp. As Vincent Robert Ham has noted, “The first operation was to 
quiet the batteries on Cadsand…for only then could the channels be secure enough for 
Chatham to take the main part of the fleet up to Sandfleet (Sandvliet) without having to wait 
for the fall of Flushing”.108  
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The British landing on Cadsand was the responsibility of Lieutenant General George 
Gordon, Marquis of Huntly.109 An experienced commander, Huntly knew the dangers 
inherent in amphibious warfare, having served in the failed expeditions to Flanders in 1793-
95 and the Helder in 1799 where he was wounded.110 Before meeting with his military 
superiors Huntly journeyed to Deal and met with Captain Edward Owen to discuss the 
transport arrangements for the impending operations against Cadsand. During this meeting 
Owen had informed the general that, owing to the limited number of flat-bottomed boats 
available, he could only land six to seven hundred troops at a time.111 Huntly’s instructions 
from Brownrigg were vague at best and stated that: 
The possession of the batteries established by the enemy on the Island of Cadsand 
being judged essential to the free navigation of the entrance of the West Scheldt, I 
have the honour to acquaint you, by Lord Chatham’s directions, that this service is 
to be executed by such proportion of the 2nd Division of the Army under your 
Lordships’ command as you may judge, on a personal view of these defences, and 
in conjunction with the opinion of Commodore Owen, who commands a division of 
the Fleet to cooperate with you in this service.112   
Not only did Brownrigg say nothing of how Huntly was to land but neither did he tell 
Huntly what resistance he should expect. The only other point Brownrigg made to Huntly 
was to state that “It would appear that 2,000 men…will be a sufficient force.”113 This 
suggestion concluded Brownrigg’s instructions to Huntly and left the general with the belief 
that his orders were to land 2,000 men in one wave on Cadsand, but only to land these troops 
                                                          
109 When summoned to sit in the House of Lords in 1807 Huntly temporarily assumed the title of Baron Gordon 
of Huntley, a minor peerage in the county of Gloucestershire, which had formerly been held by his late father 
the 4th Duke of Gordon. Although Huntly continued to hold his original title, and eventually abandoned the 
name 'Huntley,' he was wrongly referred to as the 'Marquis of Huntley' in the minutes of the Scheldt Inquiry. In 
order to avoid any further confusion, I have chosen to ignore Huntly's temporary title and have referred  
to the General throughout by his more prestigious title: the Marquis of Huntly. 
110 Ron McGuigan, ‘British Generals of the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815’. The Napoleon Series: Research. 
http://www.napoleonseries.org/research/biographies/BritishGenerals/c_Britishgenerals219.html.Placed on 
database: January 2011.  
111 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Lieutenant General the Right Hon. The Marquis of Huntly to the Committee, 20 
February 1810, p.145.  
112 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Huntly to the Committee inc. ‘Details of Instructions to the Lieutenant-General the 
Marquis of Huntly from Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Brownrigg Q.M.G to the Forces, 25 July 1809’, p.145.  
113 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Huntly to the Committee, 20 February 1810, p.145.  
173 
 
if the conditions enabled him to do so.114 Once aboard ship Huntly and Owen discussed 
matters more closely, “A question arose as to the number of men that could be 
landed;…Huntly’s instructions supposed that I had the means of landing 2,000 men at one 
operation; I had not the means for that number; the number for the Men of War was 
615…that number was carried to 700”.115 
Lack of sound information about the enemy was also an issue for Huntly. With little 
knowledge of the strength of the Franco-Dutch forces on Cadsand, Huntly was unwilling to 
risk landing batches of 700 men at a time. Huntly’s lack of knowledge about the enemy was 
again the result of a poor planning on the part of the British high command, with Chatham 
having told Huntly nothing about the strength of the enemy’s forces on the island.116 With 
time of the essence and a lack of inter-service communication causing confusion, Huntly set 
sail aboard a brig on the afternoon of 28 July in order to try to reach Chatham aboard HMS 
Venerable and clarify his instructions. Despite his best efforts rough weather and thick fog 
forced Owen to recall the General.117  
With Huntly unable to reach Chatham, Owen took it upon himself to procure extra 
shipping from Strachan and wrote to the Admiral on 29 July to state that, “I must…press 
upon you the usefulness of the boats of Gardiner’s squadron to us, both in the power of 
landing men quickly and in covering their landing to their launches”.118 Strachan’s reply 
arrived on the evening of 30 July and in it the Admiral notified Owen of the need to wait 
upon better weather, but suggested that Gardiner would be in a position to help with the 
landings.119 At this point, the weakness of the British communication network was fully 
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exposed when Strachan’s message to Gardiner failed to arrive.120 The failure of this order to 
reach Gardiner meant that the Admiral remained fixed to his position off the mouth of the 
West Scheldt, so near yet so far from Owen.  What made the situation all the worse was the 
fact that Strachan assumed that Gardiner had received his message and did not deem it 
necessary to repeat his instructions. Thus both Owen and Huntly remained stranded off 
Cadsand and blind to the state of the French defences.  
It was at this point, when all else had failed, that a contingency plan would have been 
of great use to Huntly and Owen. Lacking such a plan, and not possessing a decent map of 
the island, Huntly had little choice but to remain in wait off Cadsand.  As Dyott recalled, 
Huntly’s troops were anxious to land but from what could be seen of the French defences an 
attack by a battalion sized force might have led to disaster: 
We were kept in a state of hourly suspense from the 29th July until the 4th 
August…the constant state of suspense we had been kept in was irksome in the 
extreme. Three of four times we had made every preparation to land, the boats 
alongside and the troops all prepared; but as the enemy appeared in great force, and 
were strongly defended by cannon and works, it was fortunate we did not attempt to 
get on shore, as in all probability the six hundred men we embarked would have 
been sacrificed”.121   
Owen had also received reports of enemy troops arriving in force upon Cadsand from 
the mainland, but had failed to see anything for himself owing to the height of the sand 
dunes. Deserters meanwhile also stated that there were over 1,400 French troops on the island 
and with more arriving daily.122 Continued bad weather meanwhile combined with French 
reinforcements meant that the British hopes of conducting a landing lessened by the hour. 
Indeed, if at this point the British had finally been able to land, there are considerable doubts 
that they could have held on to Cadsand, given that by the last day of July there were close to 
six thousand fresh French troops, albeit of middling quality, on the island with more troops 
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continuing to arrive.123 With the situation clearly beyond them, Strachan finally called a halt 
to the Cadsand operation.124 Although affected by poor weather, Huntly’s landing on 
Cadsand was the product of poor planning and the fragile British communication system. 
Lacking enough boats to land his entire force, bereft of intelligence about the strength of the 
enemy forces and isolated from both Chatham and Strachan, Huntly and Owen had little 
choice but to abandon the Cadsand landings and take part in the operations to the north.125  
The ramifications of this decision were significant in that by leaving the French 
batteries intact, the navy would find it difficult to sail up the West Scheldt without suffering 
heavy losses. This complication made it necessary for the British to secure a new passage to 
Antwerp and forced them to lay siege to Flushing. If they failed to find a new passage, they 
risked running up the West Scheldt with Flushing intact, which would have risked the loss of 
much of the fleet.126  
A further unforeseen development was that with the main British force now landing 
far from Flushing, the French were free to ferry troops and supplies from Cadsand to 
Flushing, a vital lifeline which would enable the French forces on Walcheren to withstand the 
British onslaught for longer.  Blame for the confused state of affairs which affected the 
British operations against Cadsand can also be levelled at Strachan, who as the man 
responsible for coordinating the British landings and naval operations, failed to coordinate his 
forces “His intelligence was too narrow to grasp the full purport of his task, or to comprehend 
the multitude of complicated operations by which it was to be accomplished…he appears not 
to have possessed the ability or the greatness to act solely as director in chief”.127 
The British failure at Cadsand, resulting from poor planning and poor operational 
decision making, was a major blow to the expedition’s chances of success. As the Cadsand 
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operation ground to halt, the main British landings on Walcheren and South Beveland got 
underway. Before the troops landed, they were greeted with a view of the coastline. An 
anonymous officer of the 81st Foot recalled the scene awaiting the British, “The Dutch coast 
lies extremely low. When seen at a distance, the sea seems to overhang it. The tops of the 
trees are first seen, and the land appears as if it were rising from the bosom of the ocean”. 128 
 
On the afternoon of 30 July the British troops under Fraser and Graham stormed the 
beaches of the Bree Sands. The decks of the warships provided the men of the other divisions 
a fine view of the landings. As Wheeler noted: 
The Gunboats had taken up their position along the shore, the flats full of soldiers 
and towed by the ships boats, formed in the rear of the Gunboats. On a signal the 
flats advanced. All now was solemn silence, saving the gunboats, who were 
thundering showers of iron on the enemy. Their well-directed fire soon drove them 
to shelter, behind the sandbank. The flats had now gained the Gunboats, shot 
through the intervals and gained the shallow water, when the troops leaped out and 
waded ashore, drove the enemy from behind the hills where they had taken shelter 
from the destructive fire of the Gunboats. 129 
With the supporting fire of the gunboats scattering enemy resistance, the British 
assault force quickly brushed aside the enemy troops on the sand dunes and moved inland.130 
With the French and Dutch forces in retreat the 71st Regiment of Foot, under the command of 
Colonel Dennis Pack, drove the enemy eastwards along the coast and silenced the guns at the 
weakly defended Fort Ter Haak.131 Pack was an ideal choice as leader of the first landings on 
Walcheren having commanded the regiment throughout the campaigns in South America, 
Portugal and Corunna.132  
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Eager to oversee the advance of Pack and the remainder of his brigade, Picton quickly 
advanced to aid his subordinate at the head of the first battalion of the 36th Foot.133 On their 
arrival, Picton found that the fort had already surrendered .With the threat from Fort Ter 
Haak nullified, Pack had moved on to mount an attack on Veere. By now the light was fading 
and with darkness quickly covering the dykes and fens the British were forced to call a halt to 
the day’s proceedings. Whilst Fraser’s division had moved to the right of the Bree Sands, the 
rest of Coote’s force was landed on Walcheren. By nightfall the British army on Walcheren 
numbered roughly 12,500 men.134 At daybreak on the morning of 31 July the British 
advanced on Veere in two columns.135 William Thornton Keep recalled the character of the 
countryside as the British advanced: 
I took the Colours and fell in, and we moved forwards in the best spirits, towards 
Fort [Ter] Haak It had been taken by our light troops at the point of the bayonet 
overnight and the guns spiked. After a fatiguing march of several hours through 
deep sands we halted on the dike to refresh the men and wait for orders. We were 
soon however in movement again, and towards evening reached Veere, which we 
found to be a strongly fortified place on the margin of the sea. 136 
Whilst the main body of the army on Walcheren advanced southwards, Fraser’s 
Division, with the aid of Beauclerk’s gunboats, attacked Veere.137After a day-long 
bombardment the five-hundred strong garrison of Veere surrendered.138 Despite the weather 
and the lack of information about the enemy, the fall of Veere capped what had been a 
successful couple of days for the army on Walcheren, proving that at the tactical level at least 
the British were capable of swift action and successful inter-service cooperation  
The following day was one of steady progress for the British, as the army moved 
towards Flushing, with Graham’s and Paget’s divisions encountering pockets of resistance 
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around the various villages between Middleburg and Flushing. As Wheeler recalled, the wet 
roads were a major nuisance:  
We could not form into any other order…neither could we render much assistance 
to the advance as there were deep ditches full of water, each side [of] the road. A 
few of us did manage to get across into the field on our left, but was soon obliged to 
return for we met other ditches, wider and deeper, than those beside the road. 139 
 
After navigating the muddy conditions, the British eventually ended the day on the 
outskirts of Flushing.140 Graham’s division also made gradual progress and eventually 
captured a series of French naval-gun batteries at the villages of Dishoek, Vygenter and Nolle 
along the shoreline to the south of Flushing.141 In the meantime, Fraser’s division, which was 
fresh from seizing Veere, advanced along the eastern side of the island to Fort Ramaskins.142 
Like Veere, Ramaskins was a strategically important position and the fort’s guns commanded 
the navigable Slough passage, which divided Walcheren from South Beveland. It was vital 
for the British to seize Ramaskins because Chatham hoped to use the Slough passage in the 
future advance upon Antwerp.143  With time of the essence, the British swiftly erected a 
heavy artillery battery about seven hundred yards from the fort.144 After a brief 
bombardment, supported by rifle fire, the garrison surrendered: 
At daylight  [3 August ] the garrison directed a good deal of fire on the battery, till 
the 95th rifle corps were pushed forward close to the ramparts, wherever an 
individual could find cover; and one or other of these cool fellows fired at such of 
the garrison as showed themselves above the parapet…till they had silenced the 
fort. In the afternoon, the battery being nearly complete, the garrison, consisting of 
127 men, surrendered.145  
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As the main body of Chatham’s army advanced across Walcheren, Sir John Hope’s division 
landed on South Beveland and established a camp at Goes.146 With much of Walcheren and 
South Beveland under British control, Chatham and the British senior commanders turned 
their attention to Flushing.147 As far as the British were concerned Flushing needed to fall, 
and fall quickly, if they were to maintain their tight schedule and seize Antwerp before the 
wet late summer weather deteriorated any further. But as with the operation on Cadsand, poor 
planning would again undermine British operations, this time with fatal consequences.   
 ‘The town will be a perfect ruin’148: The siege of Flushing  
Although not the principal town of Walcheren, that honour going to Middleburg, the 
port of Flushing was the focal point of trade and military activity on the island. With direct 
access to the North Sea, via the West Scheldt, Flushing was the gateway to Antwerp and was 
a famous smugglers’ haunt. As with all the ports along the Dutch coastline, Flushing was 
well defended. During the Eighty Years’ War Flushing’s defences had been tested on a 
number of occasions and the port had been taken from the Spanish by the Dutch in 1572.149 
Flushing’s defences had been improved after this siege and were greatly added to during the 
subsequent decade and had been strengthened by the French as recently as 1807.150 Not only 
had the main walls been strengthened but the French garrison also had a network of defensive 
canals at their disposal. Not only did these waterways allow for the movement of troops 
throughout the islands, but they could be also be used to inundate the surrounding 
countryside. Thus, despite not being a major fortress, Flushing could not be taken lightly.  
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On 1 August a scouting party of Royal Engineers had assessed the state of the town’s 
defences and advised Chatham that an assault of the town was not practicable owing to the 
strength of its defences. Instead of immediately assaulting the town, the engineers told 
Chatham that a bombardment was needed, one which if well-managed might force the 
garrison to surrender before an assault was made.151 The British troops soon found 
themselves organised into working parties and ordered to prepare the necessary offensive 
works, with work commencing on the first battery of guns and the first trenches, on 3 
August.152 Wheeler recalled the scene before Flushing: 
 
The enemy is completely shut up in Flushing, and we are going on with the 
necessary work for the destruction of the town. There is not an idle hand to be 
found, some are building batteries, digging trenches, filling sand bags, making large 
wicker baskets, carpenters making platforms, Sailors bringing up guns, Mortars, 
Howitzers, ammunition, Shot shell etc.153 
 
 As Michael Duffy has noted, sailors played a vital part in amphibious operations on 
land and were used to drag guns, stores, supplies and to man naval gun batteries.154 As an 
officer of the Thirty-Second Regiment of foot recalled, the sailors of the fleet worked hard in 
helping the troops prepare their positions around Flushing, “A strong division of sailors was 
landed, when we appeared before Flushing, to assist in the erection of the batteries. Their 
station was on the extreme right; they threw up a considerable work, armed with twenty-four 
pounders”.155  
Whilst the British worked feverishly to erect their siege works, the French 
commander of Flushing, General Louis-Claude Monnet, continued to ready the town for the 
impending siege. Since the British landings, Monnet’s first priority had been to reinforce the 
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garrison; this he had been able to do as a result of the failure of the British to seize Cadsand 
and their inability to cut Flushing off from Antwerp. By leaving the West Scheldt free for 
shipping, the British had left a lifeline open for Monnet, whose call for aid resulted in French 
reinforcements being ferried across the West Scheldt to Flushing between 4 and 7 August. In 
this way, Monnet received around 4,000 extra troops, bringing his force to around 8,000.156 
The British high command seem only to have realised the significance of their failure to seize 
Cadsand at this point, with Chatham suddenly calling on Strachan to “bring in the ships of 
war without a moments loss of time, as the enemy might easily be reinforced from 
Cadsand”.157 The navy however was not yet in a position to accede to Chatham’s request, 
with the general being forced to step up preparations for the siege as best he could, ordering a 
party of engineers to work on the first of many mortar positions, located at Nolle House.158  
Poor inter-service relations were already having a profound effect on the conduct of 
the expedition. Lack of communication had already resulted in the failure of the operations 
against Cadsand, whilst the British attempts to force the garrison of Flushing to surrender 
were being undermined by the fact that the navy had so far failed to force the West Scheldt 
and cut Flushing off from reinforcement. Both Chatham and Strachan were to blame for this 
situation, with a lack of effective planning prior to the launch of the expedition combined 
with tunnel vision with regard to their own areas of operation. Strachan was blinded by 
concerns about the movement of the French squadron, to the detriment of both Huntly’s and 
Coote’s initial landing plans, while Chatham and his Quartermaster-General, General 
Brownrigg, had been guilty of over eagerness with their desire to land the troops on 
Walcheren. Both lacked an understanding of the likely, catastrophic, effects of a failure to 
secure Cadsand. Before the British could prepare their gun batteries the French were 
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preparing a strike of their own and, after a detailed consultation, Monnet decided to inundate 
the flat ground around Flushing.159 French engineers promptly began to cut holes in the many 
sea dykes and to open the defensive sluice gates that ringed the town’s outer defences. Many 
of the British troops were forced to leave the trenches momentarily so as to avoid 
drowning.160  
This stratagem had two advantages: by flooding the low-lying land around Flushing, 
the French were able not only to hamper the British as they prepared their siege works but 
were also able to reduce the points from which the British could mount an attack. With a 
potential British advance now forced to move along a limited series of uncut dykes, the 
French commander succeeded in limiting the number of troops which the British could use at 
any one time to attack Flushing and enabled his troops to pinpoint where a potential British 
attack was most likely to be launched. The delays made to the construction of the British 
siege works were particularly frustrating for the Royal Engineers who were forced to devote 
precious time and effort to shoring up existing positions and clearing excess water out of the 
flooded British trenches. As Colonel William Fyers recalled, “Great exertions were 
required…to preserve the communications from being inundated by the sudden rise of the 
water. Parties were everywhere at work to let off the water from the trenches, and to prevent 
its further entry…The Artificers were kept constantly at work”.161  
With a prolonged siege now on the cards, the British were faced with the fresh 
problem of how to transport a heavy siege train quickly across the muddy hinterland of the 
island. It was an issue which the British had not thought about before and stemmed directly 
from the British decision to land the bulk of the army at the Bree Sands, instead of Zoutland 
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Bay. Had the British decided to land at Zoutland Bay, the artillery would have only had to 
make a short journey to Flushing. As it happened, however, when the British shifted their 
landings to the Bree Sands they failed to consider the logistical difficulties inherent in 
transporting their heavy guns from such an exposed beach to any future destination. It was 
only on reaching Flushing that Chatham realised the full extent of the problem but by that 
point in time he could do little except invest the town and wait upon the guns to be moved 
from Veere to Flushing; a distance of nearly thirteen miles. As Fortescue has noted, once the 
guns were landed, the British struggled to move them across the island, “This work was 
found to be too heavy for the artillery-horses, the roads being so narrow and the ditches so 
numerous that accidents were frequent; and, accordingly, the whole of the guns were hauled 
over a deep soil, soaked with constant rains, by a huge team of men”.162  
By landing the siege train miles from Flushing, Chatham and Strachan increased the 
pressure on the engineers to transport the siege train to Flushing and also jeopardised the 
speed of the British advance; the lack of wheeled transport also greatly delayed the 
movement of the siege train.163 The Navy, meanwhile, was not without blame in its handling 
of the situation and instead of landing the siege train and equipment in an orderly fashion, the 
train had simply been dumped in a disorderly mess upon the beach.164 Precious time was thus 
taken up sifting through the equipment before it could be used. Chatham should have known 
better given that he was the Master-General of the Ordnance and had been First Lord of the 
Admiralty when York had made a number of similar mistakes before the siege of Dunkirk in 
1793. Chatham, like many of his contemporaries, clearly had learnt nothing from his previous 
experiences.  
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Over the course of early August, the engineers supervised the construction of the 
British works before Flushing. It was back breaking work for the troops involved and the 
hours were long and intense; on 4 August, over 600 men worked through the day, and into 
the early hours of the following morning, to construct a mortar battery and a communication 
trench.165 As Captain William Paisley of the Royal Engineers noted, however, many of the 
senior engineers were incompetent: 
In six days since the Trenches were opened we have made only one 6 Gun one 6 
Mortar Battery with a parcel of infernal ins and outs from 8 to 1100 yards from the 
place…The Corps of Engineers is disgraced and damned for ever. The Cry of the 
whole Army & Navy is against us. I found Jones when I landed in a state of despair. 
Boteler wished that the first shot might take off his head. The French are making 
counterworks & do them faster than we do ours. We were offered the whole Army 
to act under us…but what could we do with a parcel of old men or rather old 
women at our head, with fellows without Souls to direct the operations of Armies. 
With fellows old in years, poor in spirit, beardless in military experience, destitute 
of knowledge, not merely block heads but block bodies…Gen. Brownrigg says that 
the Engineers are not fit to be employed in war.166  
 
This damning attack upon the senior engineers attached to the expedition highlights 
that poor operational command was not confined merely to Chatham and Strachan, but 
affected the lower levels of the command hierarchy. Poor senior command at the highest 
level of the expedition had already taken its toll, the fact that the two senior engineer 
commanders were also lacking in command skills was still more alarming.  Alongside a lack 
of urgency on the part of the senior commanders was the fact that both D’Arcy and Fyers 
exhibited equally poor skills in coordinating the siting of the offensive artillery batteries:  
To the Left of our Lines, a Battery had been made of 3 24 Pounders, so distant that 
it could not reach the place, nor injure the Enemy in any way. This was again owing 
to the ignorance of the Engineers I mentioned who had the chief direction, & placed 
their works by guess, instead of measuring distances which is, or ought, always to 
be done in placing batteries.167 
 
These elementary failings on the part of the two senior engineer officers encapsulate 
the unprofessional and shoddy manner in which the British conducted the siege. Paisley’s 
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account of the conduct of his superiors also provides an important insight into the conduct of 
the expedition at a lower level. Another target of Paisley’s criticism was Coote: 
Sir Eyre Coote however wanting to improve upon my plan, ordered us to keep 
possession of the French Battery if possible, he was also anxious that I should fill 
up the cut that the Enemy made to let in the sea-water….both these things were 
impracticable till we had entrenched properly…but a Commander-in-Chief must 
have his way.168 
 
Paisley’s account of the expedition to the Scheldt is an important source and one 
which serves to highlight the many faults in the British Army’s conduct of the campaign, not 
only at the highest level but also further down the command chain. Although no doubt eager 
to make sure that his reputation was left untarnished by the failings of the expedition, Paisley 
was an astute engineer officer who went on to establish a fine reputation within the Ordnance 
Department.169 His comments, therefore, should not be taken lightly.   
Before the British bombardment could finally open, the French made a desperate bid 
to spike some of the British guns. On the night of 7 August a French sortie was launched 
against Graham’s Division, which was entrenched on the right of the British line near the 
Nolle Battery.170  The French force was not the most experienced and suffered from a lack of 
coordination, owing to the difficult nature of the flooded terrain and the fact that the attacking 
troops were mostly drunk.171 The French were quickly pushed back, leaving the British 
battery at the Nolle position unmolested.   
Another reason for the sluggishness of the British siege preparations was because 
Chatham and Strachan had fallen out with one another. Chatham had grown frustrated by the 
disorganised fashion in which the navy had dumped the siege train upon the Bree Sands, 
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while Strachan was upset by Chatham’s criticism of the navy in its apparent unwillingness to 
force the West Scheldt. A proud defender of the values of the Royal Navy, Strachan was 
greatly displeased with his army colleague and reacted badly to Chatham’s views. As 
Chatham and Strachan’s relationship deteriorated, so too did relations between the 
services.172 Following the French sortie, Chatham reminded Strachan of the need for the navy 
to cut Flushing off from Cadsand, so that no more fresh enemy forces could be used to bolster 
the garrison. On 11 August, Strachan decided that enough was enough and forced the West 
Scheldt, “Yesterday afternoon Lord William Stuart with 10 frigates availed himself of a light 
wind from the westward and though the tide was against him passed the batteries between 
Flushing and Cadsand nearly two hours under the enemy’s fire”.173  
By moving up the West Scheldt, Strachan was able to inform Chatham that Flushing 
was completely isolated from the mainland. This not only prevented the French from gaining 
reinforcements from Cadsand, but it also provided the British with an opportunity to bombard 
Flushing from both land and sea and, on 13 August, almost all of the British batteries 
received the signal to commence the bombardment.174 In a matter of minutes the ground 
trembled as twenty-six 24 pounders, eight 8-inch howitzers, and sixteen 10-inch mortars sent 
their deadly projectiles shrieking through the sky towards the spires and rooftops of 
Flushing.175  For the tired working parties of British troops the spectacle of over fifty heavy 
guns firing, both day and night, was awe inspiring. As Keep recalled: 
The shells sent an immense height aloft into the air appeared like falling stars, 
producing on their descent into the town a distinct reverberation, and the Congreve 
Rockets with their trains of fire crossing each other illuminated the Heavens, the 
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whole of which was reflected in the waters around us…our fire kept increasing, 
until showers of rockets and shells…set the town in flames! 176 
 
The ferocity of the initial British bombardment greatly weakened the French defences 
and, following this show of force, Chatham instructed Graham to destroy a French battery, 
which had lobbed several shells into the British lines from atop one of the nearby dykes. With 
fire support from Nolle position, Graham instructed the 3rd Bn of the 1st Foot (Royals) and the 
1st Bn of the 14th Foot, alongside a detachment of the light infantry of the King’s German 
Legion (KGL), to advance and attack the French position. The Royals cleared all before them 
along the dyke, while the 14th and the KGL moved against another dyke close to the outskirts 
of Old Flushing.177 The commanding officer of the 14th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Jasper 
Nicholls, distinguished himself at the head of his troops and captured both thirty French 
troops and an artillery piece.178  
Over the course of the day both sides traded shells, but the longer the duel went on the 
more accurate the British shelling became and by the end of the day Flushing had been set 
alight. Buoyed with these events and eager for the town to surrender, Chatham boldly called 
on the French to surrender for the sake of the civilian population: 
It being manifest that the present, and well directed fire, both of His Britannic 
Majesty’s Sea and land forces, now before Flushing, has been so effectual, that if 
continued much longer the town will be a perfect ruin. The General Commanding is 
induced by feelings of humanity to summon you to surrender.179 
 
The French had other ideas and refused Chatham’s request. This rebuttal greatly 
frustrated Chatham who was now very anxious to push on to the dockyards at Antwerp. 
Chatham’s anxiety about the situation was raised following the receipt of a number of 
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intelligence reports from Hope, between 6-12 August, which suggested that the French and 
Dutch had gathered 40,000 men at Antwerp and had moved several warships down the 
Scheldt in order to defend the approaches to the dockyards.180 
Chatham again called on Strachan for aid but, before the British ships could 
commerce their deadly work, the rising water forced Chatham to take action and the situation 
became so perilous on the night of 14 August that a force under Pack was ordered to advance 
and repair the dykes to the front of the flooded British positions.181 Pack once again excelled 
himself, advancing in the face of enemy fire several hundred metres to the site of the cut 
dyke. The British commander not only stormed an enemy battery, but also managed to shore 
up the cut in the dyke and return with a large number of prisoners of war.182  
With the British position secure, the stage was set for the navy to bring the 
bombardment to its climax. At 11 am on 15 August seven warships sailed up the West 
Scheldt and proceeded to pound Flushing with a number of thunderous broadsides.183 Faced 
with the prospect of Flushing’s total destruction, Monnet quickly changed his mind about the 
whole situation, and surrendered to the British. With the support of the navy, Flushing fell 
only thirty-eight hours after the start of the British bombardment.184 Napoleon was not best 
pleased when he heard the news of the capitulation.185  
With Walcheren secured, the bulk of the British forces were transported to South 
Beveland in preparation for the final descent upon Antwerp. Chatham displayed little desire 
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to join the troops and spent the next ten days trying to rebuild civil relations with the people 
of Flushing. As the British dallied, the French continued to bolster their garrison at Antwerp 
and, by 22 August, almost 60,000 Franco-Dutch troops and national guardsmen were 
stationed in the vicinity of Antwerp, whilst there were also 22 large ships in the West 
Scheldt.186 It was later also discovered that Marshal Bernadotte was in command of the 
French force at Antwerp.187Additionally British troops on South Beveland had started to 
suffer bouts of fever, which rendered an increasing number of soldiers unfit for duty.188  
With the fate of the expedition in the balance, Brownrigg came to the conclusion that 
there was little hope of success; a view which was accepted by several other senior 
commanders. With sickness ravaging the troops and his subordinates unsure of success, 
Chatham met with the other commanders on 27 August and it was decided to cancel the final 
advance to the dockyards.189 Before news of this decision reached London, the British press 
had already suggested that the expedition was doomed to failure. The London Times argued 
that “No achievement of magnitude” was likely and as every hour passed by “hopes of a 
successful issue” greatly diminished.190 These were prophetic words.  
With active operations at an end, the next question facing the British was what they 
were to do with Walcheren? Once again poor planning returned to haunt the British high 
command in that it had failed to assess what it would do if they failed to seize Antwerp but 
still had possession of the islands in the Scheldt. On paper, Walcheren was a potentially 
useful site for a minor naval base. But in reality, with Flushing’s dock having been badly 
damaged and with British troops dying of fever in and around the town, such an idea was not 
particularly welcomed by the British. However Castlereagh instructed Chatham to retain 
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Walcheren as a potential bargaining piece whilst negotiations between Austria and France 
continued.  
This decision, like many made by Castlereagh during the campaign, was made 
without any personal experience of the situation on the ground. By ordering Chatham to 
retain the island, Castlereagh effectively condemned many thousands of British soldiers to 
death. Chatham meanwhile returned to England, leaving Coote in command of 16,500 troops 
on Walcheren. Austria eventually agreed to Napoleon’s harsh peace terms on 14 October 
1809, signing the Treaty of Schoenbrunn, which brought an end to the campaign of 1809. 
Peace was of little consolation for Coote’s men who were instead engaged in a desperate 
battle against the deadly ‘Walcheren fever’.   
‘Wasting fever’  
The epidemic which ravaged Chatham’s army on the islands in the Scheldt was the 
worst medical catastrophe experienced by the British Army during the Napoleonic period.191 
Medical expert Dr. Martin Howard has suggested that Walcheren fever was not one disease 
but was in fact a deadly cocktail of illnesses, the chief components being Malaria, Dysentery, 
Typhus and relapsing fever. In a matter of a few short weeks almost half of Chatham’s army 
was suffering from the effects of the epidemic.192 Understaffed and ill-prepared the medical 
services struggled to cope with the epidemic and could not halt the spread of the disease. As 
with the Walcheren expedition in general there was plenty of blame to go around, not least 
for Castlereagh who had not informed the Medical Board of the expedition’s destination.193  
Once again Castlereagh’s decision-making must be called into question with his role 
in the medical preparations having consequences not merely for the progress of the 
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expedition but also for the health of the British Army itself. The Medical Board also attracted 
criticism in that they failed to make sure that the ‘attached’ medical men actually sailed to the 
Scheldt. As T.H McGuffie has noted, out of the official number of some ninety-six medical 
officers and hospital mates officially attached to the expedition, a figure which was supposed 
to have included thirty-seven surgeons/ physicians and sixty hospital mates, only sixty-three 
men, comprising thirty-three surgeons/physicians and thirty hospital mates actually sailed 
with the force.194  
With barely sixty medical men of varying degrees of skill and experience to care for a 
force of nearly forty-thousand, the Board can be said to have failed to prepare the medical 
arrangements effectively. A further area in which the Board acted poorly was in the 
procurement of transportation. Like the rest of the expedition, space for wagons and carts was 
limited. For the medical officers this meant that they would need to procure the necessary 
transport they needed from the local population. The French, by contrast, had found a 
solution to the problem of how to move the wounded quickly away from the field of battle 
with the creation of dedicated military ambulances.195 It would be a long time before the 
British followed suit and this meant that, in the case of expeditions like that to the Scheldt, 
sick and wounded men were often forced to huddle together until some form of transport was 
procured, a policy which increased the spread of infection. Given the fact that the British 
military had a long history of campaigning in the Low Countries, it is suprising that past 
experiences were not taken into account by Lord Castlereagh and the leading military figures.  
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With the Medical Board kept in the dark, Castlereagh and his military commanders 
were the ones who should have made every effort to assess the medical problems that the 
British force would likely encounter. As recently as 1747, for instance, a British force sent to 
Walcheren had been decimated by fever, an episode which had been well documented by Dr. 
William Pringle.196 Not only did Castlereagh fail to take this into account but he also failed to 
study the events of the Flanders campaign of 1793 in which York’s army suffered dreadfully 
from fever.197 Castlereagh also failed to read a memorandum written in 1799 by Abercromby 
about the practicality of military action on Walcheren. If Castlereagh had taken time to read 
this document he would have been apprised of the medical issues inherent in mounting such 
an operation and read Abercromby’s warning that the islands in the Scheldt were “Extremely 
unhealthy.”198  The French had also suffered from disease on Walcheren; in the autumn of 
1808, for instance, seventy French soldiers had died of fever, while four more died from the 
disease in January 1809.199  Unlike the British, however, the French were quick to learn from 
this experience with the majority of French troops remaining on the mainland during the 
campaign. Once medical experts reached Walcheren it soon became clear that the islands 
were unhealthy. As Dr. Webb noted in his journal:  
The bottom of every canal…is thickly covered with an ooze…Every ditch is filled 
with water, which is loaded with animal and vegetable substances in a state of 
Putrefaction; and the Whole island is so flat, and so near the level of the Sea that a 
large Proportion of it is little better than a Swamp,...The effect of these Causes of 
Disease is strongly marked in the appearance of the inhabitants, the greater part of 
whom are pale and listless.200  
Surrounding Webb, but unnoticed by the Doctor as a threat to his health, would have 
been millions of mosquitoes which had found a perfect home in the swampy ground found on 
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the islands of Walcheren and South Beveland. British medical officers such as Webb believed 
that the disease was caused by the spread of unhealthy vapours, emanating from the putrid 
substances which filled the canals. Picton noted in his diary, like Webb, that the disease was 
spread by putrid substances contaminating the air “It lies in the air we breathe- every 
inhalation is a putrid poison”.201 
Once the vapour had infected the victim, medical officers were to employ a variety of 
procedures designed to cleanse the patient’s infected blood. These techniques ranged from 
the deliberate bleeding of a patient, to the prescription of cigars so as to clear the air from 
harmful vapours, as well as the much more successful use of Peruvian bark.202 However, this 
latter substance was in short supply. Lack of knowledge about how diseases were spread 
greatly hindered the medical response and large numbers of sick men were placed alongside 
the wounded in dreadfully unhealthy conditions. As surgeon John Wrangle recalled “I passed 
a barn where about …100 poor fellows lay suffering from this dreadful calamity”.203 
Unbeknown to Wrangle, the crowding together of the sick accelerated the spread of the 
epidemic and also enabled it to mix with a variety of other illnesses, such as Dysentery, 
which affected the British troops – factors which meant that the hospitals were breeding 
grounds for the disease.204  
The government in London first received reports of the fever from Dr. Webb on 11 
September.205 Within the space of a couple of weeks Castlereagh, urged by reports from 
Walcheren to despatch extra medical staff, called on medical men from across Britain to 
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volunteer to serve on Walcheren.206 Castlreagh particularly hoped that a senior physician and 
two respected doctors could be sent at once to the region. However, on being asked to go to 
Walcheren, the Physician-General, Sir Lucas Pepys, stated in no uncertain terms that he had 
no experience or in-depth understanding of military medicine.207 There was even less 
enthusiasm on the part the civilian medical profession who mostly felt that to volunteer to 
serve would increase their chances of getting the disease; those who did eventually volunteer 
included Dr Gilbert Blane and Dr James Borland. As Elizabeth Crowe has noted, however, 
these men were also advocates of reforming the Medical Board and  may well have gone to 
Walcheren more in order to fulfil their political ambitions.208  
Understaffed and unprepared for such large numbers of sick, the medical department 
was simply not up the task of caring for the thousands of sick and dying. The ordinary 
regimental surgeons, the front-line medical men attached to the expedition, had to work 
within a limited framework of understanding and with inadequate supplies at hand and this 
challenge was beyond them. Reports of sickness surfaced on South Beveland. Here one of the 
first soldiers to encounter it was Harris:  
The first I observed of it was one day as I sat in my billet, when I beheld whole 
parties of our Riflemen in the street shaking with a sort of ague, to such a degree 
that they could hardly walk; strong and fine young men…seemed suddenly reduced 
in strength to infants, unable to stand upright- so great a shaking had seized upon 
their whole bodies from head to heel.209  
Following the capture of South Beveland in early August, Sir John Hope’s Division 
had seen little active service and the presence of thousands of inactive troops on a mosquito-
infected island meant that the fever quickly engulfed Hope’s troops.210 An unidentified 
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soldier of the 38th Foot recalled the speed with which his regiment succumbed to fever on 
South Beveland:  
We had not been many days upon the island before our men began to fall bad of the 
Ague and fever and so fatal did that disorder prove that in less than a month we 
buried more than 600 men so that out of the 1000…that we took out with us we did 
not bring 400 back. 211 
Battalions were quickly reduced in size to a few hundred healthy men, while whole 
companies were wiped out; such was the virulence of the epidemic and the inability of the 
medical department to stem the rising number of cases. The general officers were just as 
vulnerable as the rank and file. Picton recorded in his diary the harsh conditions and the anger 
he felt towards the ministers in London:  
The climate is to the full as destructive as that of the West Indies and will be the 
Grave of the Army…we are already beginning to be sickly to an alarming 
degree…The Regiments in my brigade have already above 100 each in hospital and 
the Artillery 80 out of four companies. If ministers are suffered to persist in their 
quixotic measure of attempting to retain this Golgotha it will be the most costly and 
disgraceful enterprise which the country was ever seduced into by Empirical 
Politicians.212 
Such angry words highlight the growing resentment amongst many of the lower 
echelons of the high command against the commanders in chief and the politicians in 
London. Unfortunately for the British, the conditions were to get worse long before they got 
better, with many officers dying before they could be granted sick-leave to return to 
Britain.213 One of the unlucky ones who died was Lieutenant-General Mackenzie Fraser, 
while many of Wellington’s best generals in the Peninsula, such as Charles Von Alten and 
Picton himself, also fell ill. By the start of September the situation had reached a crisis point, 
with thousands sick and many already dead. The symptoms varied depending upon which of 
a number of diseases the victim caught; common symptoms included having bouts of extreme 
                                                          
211 NAM 1979-12-21-1: Diary of an unidentified Soldier of 38th (1st Staffordshire) Regiment of Foot, p.10.  
212 Harvard, Wellington’s Welsh General, pp.106-107.  
213 Fletcher, In the Service of the King, p.65.  
196 
 
heat and then terrible chills, trouble with breathing, loss of strength and appetite, and inability 
to walk.214 
Such was the scale and virulence of the epidemic that, as late as February 1810, long 
after the expedition had returned to Britain, some 11,513 officers and men were still suffering 
from fever, while a total of 3,960 officers and men, some 10% of the expeditionary force, 
died from the disease. By contrast, the total number of British deaths sustained in combat was 
just 106.215 The dead were so plentiful and the disease so virulent that the British medical 
officers were forced to bury the dead in a series of mass graves around Flushing, as one 
soldier later recalled “They would take them (the dead) to the outside of the town and empty 
them down into a very large hole…and when the hole was full they would fill it up and make 
another so that many were (buried) in one grave”.216 
With conditions worsening the British decided to evacuate the worst hit regiments 
whilst a garrison of 15,000 men, under Coote, was to be maintained on Walcheren.217 This 
decision was long overdue, but by embarking both the ill and the healthy aboard transports, 
the disease continued to spread, meaning that healthy soldiers who boarded the boats on 
Walcheren were often struck down with fever when they reached the coast of England. On 
the English coast, many of the beaches were strewn with the sick, while the local inhabitants 
refused to harbour the returning officers.218 Bowlby recalled the number of losses sustained 
by his regiment and also noted the death of one of his comrades at Colchester barracks: 
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We had a fair wind to Harwich where we landed…One of the Captains who had 
been detained in Harwich overtook the regiment and seeing the corporal of his 
company said ‘where is the company?’ ‘I am the only man left sir’ was the reply, 
‘and the other companies are not much better off’. Lieutenant Cunninghame was 
one of the merriest of t[he] party, next morning he was taken ill and died after a 
short illness. Man[y] officers were down with the fever and two-thirds of the men in 
the hospital.219 
It would be a very long time before the final effects of Walcheren fever ceased to 
have an effect on those who took part in the expedition to the Scheldt. What made Walcheren 
fever all the worse, besides the high number of deaths that were directly caused by the 
disease, was its relapsing character. This meant that survivors were often subjected to bouts 
of fever later in life. Two of the most famous examples of soldiers who suffered throughout 
their lives from the effects of Walcheren fever were Keep and Harris, both of whom were 
forced to retire from the army owing to its effects. Keep remained in the army a good deal 
longer than Harris before finally deciding that he could not face up to a hard life of 
campaigning while still suffering relapses of fever.220  
Other more prominent sufferers from relapses of fever included none other than future 
peninsular generals Graham, Picton, Charles Von Alten, Sir James Leith and Sir William 
Stewart. This list could be extended to include many other junior commanders who would 
also engage the French in Spain and Portugal. Several battalions in the British Army were 
plagued with the disease for the rest of the war, with heavy rain and extreme heat often 
triggering renewed bouts. Wellington famously complained in 1811 that his ‘Walcheren 
battalions’ were a major liability.221 The failure at Walcheren lived long in the memory of the 
British Army and civil society and spawned many cartoons and works of poetry, the 
following extract written in 1812, is a particularly poignant example: 
‘Ye died not in the triumphing 
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Of the battle-shaken flood, 
Ye died not on the charging field 
In the mingle of brave blood;  
But twas in the wasting fevers 
For full three months and more 
Britons born, 
Pierc’d with scorn 
Lay at rot on the swampy shore’222 
  
 Aftermath: The Scheldt Inquiry and lessons unidentified  
As the remnants of Chatham’s army struggled to survive the winter months on the 
disease-ridden shores of the Scheldt, the Portland government was subjected to intense 
political pressure amid calls from the Press for a full governmental inquiry into the 
expedition.223 The government had also been rocked by a personal feud between Canning and 
Castlereagh, the latter having caught wind of Canning’s plot to oust him at the next 
reshuffle.224 This rivalry was only resolved when Castlereagh fired a pistol-ball into 
Canning’s thigh in a duel at Putney Heath on 21 September 1809.225 Shortly afterwards the 
Portland government collapsed and a new Tory administration was formed under Spencer 
Perceval.226 Although the old leadership had made way for new, the Whigs were not satisfied 
and lobbied for a full public inquiry into the disaster. Despite losing an initial vote on 23 
January 1810 the Whigs won a second vote in the commons three days later, thanks in part to 
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the surprise support of Castlereagh, and it was agreed that a ‘Committee of the Whole House’ 
would be created to conduct a formal investigation into the Scheldt expedition.227  
The Inquiry opened on 2 February 1810 and was initially chaired by the former Chief 
Justice of Bengal and member of the Privy Council, MP Sir John Anstruther.228 In order to 
develop a clear picture of how the expedition had been created and conducted, the inquiry 
was organised in a chronological fashion, with each of the key persons being called to give 
evidence of their role and involvement in turn. Thus the first witness was David Dundas 
because he had been the first military official to have been involved in the preliminary 
planning process by Castlereagh.229  Over the course of the following months over forty key 
witnesses were interviewed by the committee drawn from both the political world and the 
armed forces. Howard has noted “It was intended that the enquiry focus on the wider 
questions such as whether the expedition should have been undertaken, rather than it being a 
means of attaching guilt to individuals.”230 Crucially, although the committee wanted to 
know what had happened and why, they were not interested in identifying potential military 
lessons. Furthermore, the Inquiry was the result of political and press pressure and was not 
inspired by the military or a desire on the part of Horse Guards to learn lessons. Despite the 
importance of the Press in generating pressure for a ‘public inquiry’ the general public and 
press were excluded from the proceedings and the proprietors of Fleet Street were forced to 
publish only from official government reports.231  
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As the Inquiry progressed over the course of the spring its ability to conduct an 
objective review of the expedition was greatly undermined by the actions of Lord Chatham. 
Shortly after his return from Walcheren, in October 1809, Chatham had drafted a personal 
account of the expedition in which he heavily criticized Strachan and the Royal Navy for not 
forcing the West Scheldt when the fleet arrived off the coast of Walcheren.232 However, 
instead of sending the draft to the Secretary for War, Chatham had controversially forwarded 
two drafts to the King; the first on 15 January and the second almost month later on 14 
February 1810.233 Although the King instructed the General to send the second draft to the 
Secretary at War, the damage had already been done as news of Chatham’s private dealings 
with the monarch had leaked to the Press. As a senior cabinet minister Chatham’s actions 
were placed under intense scrutiny by the Whigs and the Press, the general public meanwhile 
were eager to blame someone for the catastrophe and Chatham was the perfect target. Slow 
and cautions, both as a General and politician, Chatham was placed under intense pressure. 
Whig-statesman William Pleydell-Bouverie Lord Folkestone, for example, described 
Chatham’s actions as, “Inconsistent with the constitution,” a view which was shared by a 
number of other opposition politicians, such as George Tierney and Samuel Whitbread.234  
The politicians were not alone in venting their anger with Chatham; Strachan was also 
displeased with his former comrade in arms and viewed Chatham’s actions as a slight against 
his reputation. Strachan had been oblivious to Chatham’s politicking and had only caught 
wind of the Generals’ actions by reading about it in the newspapers and through society 
gossip.235 Eager to defend his own reputation Strachan penned a guarded narrative of his own 
                                                          
232 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Chatham to the Committee, 27 February 1810, p. 209.  
233 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Chatham to the Committee, 27 February 1810, p. 213.  
234 The Annual Register, Vol. 52, Chapter IV: 1810, p. 51.   
235 PP Scheldt Inquiry: Strachan to the Committee, 13 March 1810, p. 299.  
201 
 
and blamed Chatham and the weather for the disaster.236 Strachan was even told by the 
Committee not to answer any questions which might incriminate him.237  
The heated nature of Chatham and Strachan’s personal vendetta, combined with 
existing inter-service tensions, meant that none of the senior military and naval commanders 
approached the inquiry with a desire to identify lessons. Just as his inability to plan had 
compromised the expedition, Chatham’s wanton disregard for official procedure, combined 
with his selfish desire to blame Strachan, undermined the Inquiry.238Additionally, the failure 
of the British military and naval establishments to conduct reviews of their own meant that 
another golden opportunity for the British to learn from the past was squandered.  
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THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE DEBACLE AT BERGEN-OP-ZOOM, 1813-14   
 
 On the night of 8 March 1814 a small and inexperienced British army, under the 
command of Peninsular War and Walcheren veteran Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, 
attempted to seize the French-held fortress of Bergen-Op-Zoom. Despite some initial success, 
the lack of detailed operational planning on the part of Graham and his senior commanders 
meant that the British assault was a muddled affair. The quality of the British generalship was 
also particularly poor. Not only did two of Graham’s senior subordinates fail to follow their 
orders but the experienced commanders of the Guards column also proved overly cautious 
under fire and did not secure the situation when the circumstances presented themselves. 
After having been “Fairly out-generalled and disgracefully beaten” in the battle for control of 
the town, the surviving redcoats were then forced to surrender.1 Before analysing the British 
defeat at Bergen-Op-Zoom it is necessary to place the campaign in the context of the events 
in Europe after 1810 and to analyse the reasons why the British returned to the Low 
Countries in 1813-14.  
British strategy, the European powers and the invasion of France in 1813-14 
 The destruction of the Grande Armée in the snows of Eastern Europe, following 
Napoleon’s ineffectual capture of Moscow in 1812, precipitated the near collapse of the 
Confederation of the Rhine.2 It was against this backdrop that the British Foreign Secretary, 
Lord Castlereagh, started to plan the creation of a new coalition to restore the balance of 
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power in Europe. In other words, Castlereagh sought to adopt Grenville’s 1798 scheme for a 
‘Grand Alliance’, except on this occasion the aim was the overthrow of Napoleon rather than 
the Parisian revolutionaries.3  
As Grenville had done fifteen years before, Castlereagh first turned to Russia for 
support and in January 1813 Lord William Cathcart was instructed to open negotiations with 
the Tsar about a possible alliance.4 Eager to strike a decisive blow against Napoleon, Tsar 
Alexander I welcomed the British proposals and agreed to an alliance.5 Castlereagh was also 
anxious to gain Prussian backing, the British having received reports which suggested that 
Prussian public opinion was deeply anti French. Ultimately it was the Tsar who was best 
placed to influence the Prussians and after a series of secret negotiations he persuaded the 
Prussian King, Frederick William III, to join the alliance.6 In return for their military and 
diplomatic support for the new coalition, the British promised to provide both the Russians 
and the Prussians with substantial financial assistance and armaments. By September the 
Prussians had received over 100,000 muskets, whilst the Russians had been provided with 
thousands of muskets and over 100 pieces of artillery.7 With the Russians and Prussians 
ready for war all that was left for Castlereagh to complete his strategic vision was to win the 
support of Vienna. Unfortunately for the British, the Austrians were not as war-minded as 
their Russian and Prussian counterparts and were unwilling to enter into a new round of 
hostilities. The Habsburgs chief strategist, Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, was wary 
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of the Russians and their long-term aims in central Europe.8 For the time being the Allies 
would have to make do without the Austrians.  
Despite hopes of a decisive victory, the Russian and Prussian armies struggled to 
cooperate fully in the ensuing campaign and a rejuvenated Napoleon eventually inflicted two 
defeats upon the Allies at the Battles of Lutzen and Bautzen in May 1813. Whilst both sides 
licked their wounds and considered their next moves, the Austrians decided to act and offered 
Napoleon the chance to negotiate a lasting peace at the Congress of Prague in August.9  
Unwilling to settle for anything less than supremacy, however, Napoleon refused the Austrian 
peace plan and continued to ready his forces for the next round of hostilities. This was a fatal 
decision on the part of the Emperor and the Austrians viewed Napoleon’s intransigence as a 
sign that peace was unlikely unless he was defeated. Convinced that a victory was needed 
over the French for a settlement to be concluded, the Austrians abandoned their neutrality and 
opted to join the Allies. As Munro Price has noted this was highly significant “The flaming 
beacons that announced the end of the armistice signalled a turning-point in the campaign of 
1813” and on 10 August “Austria was ready to throw 130,000 men into the balance against 
Napoleon”. 10 
With such a large injection of fresh troops at their disposal the Allied generals, who 
were under the overall command of the Austrian Field-Marshal Karl Phillip von 
Schwarzenberg, eventually achieved a decisive victory over Napoleon at the three-day Battle 
of Leipzig in mid-October 1813.11 Napoleon’s reputation was severely dented by this defeat 
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and with French troops again in retreat the bonds of unity which had held together 
Napoleon’s Empire gradually disintegrated. The Bavarians were first to display disloyalty 
and mobilised an army to confront the retreating French, only to be defeated by Napoleon at 
the Battle of Hanau on 30 October.12 Despite this reversal the Allied armies remorselessly 
pursued the broken Grande Armée as the Confederation of the Rhine gradually splintered in 
the wake of the French retreat. Faced with the prospect of a power vacuum in central Europe 
the Allied leadership met, at the beginning of November, at the city of Frankfurt-am-Main in 
order to outline what was to be done about Napoleon and the French state.13 
Although having come together to defeat Napoleon in the previous campaign each of 
the Allied powers continued to have different views about what needed to be done about the 
French Emperor. As far as the Russians were concerned Napoleon could not be trusted and 
the Tsar was adamant that the only course of action was the invasion of France and the root 
and branch destruction of the Napoleonic system.14 Although Frederick William III was more 
cautious than the Tsar, he was eventually persuaded to support the Russians by General 
Gneisenau and several other hawks in the Prussian military, who wanted revenge for the 
humiliation of 1806-7.15 In keeping with their earlier neutrality the Austrians were less 
openly belligerent whilst Metternich remained unsure about Russia’s long-term strategic aims 
and intentions and was determined to control the spread of Russian influence in central 
Europe.16 Thus, whilst the Russians and Prussians prepared invasion plans, the Austrians 
offered Napoleon one final olive branch in the form of the ‘Frankfurt Proposals’. The 
proposals offered Napoleon the chance to negotiate a new peace treaty and to remain master 
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of a new French state which would be enclosed within it’s so called ‘Natural Frontiers’, 
including the Southern Netherlands.17  
The fact that the Austrians offered Napoleon the Southern Netherlands and the vital 
port of Antwerp in return for peace greatly concerned the British government.18 Indeed, 
before news of the Austrian plans reached London, Castlereagh had been working on a 
strategic plan of his own for a post-war Europe based upon the ideas of his former political 
master, Pitt the Younger. This plan assumed that a defeated France would be contained by a 
number of powerful neighbour states and stripped of the Low Countries.19  Aside from the 
Austrians, the main impediment to Castlereagh’s scheme was Napoleon himself. The French 
Emperor firmly believed in the need to retain the Low Countries and later stated to his close 
confidant, Armand A.L de Caulaincourt, that “France without its natural frontiers, without 
Ostend or Antwerp, would no longer be able to take its place among the States of Europe.”20  
Napoleon had tightened his control over the Low Countries in 1810, when he 
dismantled the Kingdom of Holland and incorporated the former Dutch lands into the French 
state.21 Therefore, as far as Castlereagh and the British government were concerned, 
Metternich’s offer of ‘Natural Frontiers’ constituted a major threat to Britain’s long-term 
security. The British were thus greatly relieved when Napoleon rejected the initial Austrian 
proposals and, although he later tried to make a new agreement with Metternich, the 
Habsburgs refused further negotiations and readied their forces for the great Allied invasion 
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of France.22 Wary of a French popular revolt, akin to the one which had greeted the troops of 
the First Coalition in 1792, the Allied leadership was at pains to stress to the French people 
that their enemy was Napoleon and that they would not rest until a secure peace was restored:  
The Allied Powers do not wage war against France but against the preponderance 
that has been so loudly proclaimed; that preponderance, which for the misfortune of 
Europe and France, the Emperor Napoleon has too long exercised beyond the limits 
of his Empire…They will not lay down their arms until the political state of Europe 
is re-established; until solid principles have resumed the ascendancy over vain 
pretensions; finally, until the sanctity of treaties has established a solid peace in 
Europe.23  
 
In order to achieve these aims the Allies had decided upon a general plan of 
campaign. In the north the 30,000 strong ‘Army of North Germany’ under Bernadotte with 
the aid of the III Corps of the Prussian Army of Silesia was to drive the French from the Low 
Countries. In the centre Marshal Gebhard von Blücher at the head of the 100,000-strong 
Army of Silesia was ordered to cross the Rhine into Alsace. In the south Schwarzenberg and 
the 200,000-strong Army of Bohemia was to strike deep into southern France via 
Switzerland. The three armies would then make a coordinated thrust to seize Paris.24 In total 
the Allied powers assembled 327,000 troops and 1,106 pieces of artillery for the invasion of 
France not to mention Wellington’s 68,000 Anglo-Portuguese troops which had already 
crossed the Pyrenees. Indeed, once all the garrison troops and reservists are added to the front 
line forces gathered for the invasion, the Allies had over 1,000,000 troops at their disposal in 
Dec-Jan 1813-14.25  
 The French were not in a strong position. Although Napoleon had sought to raise a 
new Grande Armée in the aftermath of the Leipzig campaign, the Emperor had only been 
able to secure a further 120,000 conscripts out of the 936,500 Frenchmen he had hoped to 
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incorporate into the ranks.26 Napoleon distributed his meagre forces in three defensive sectors 
from North to South: guarding the Low Countries was Marshal Étienne Macdonald with 
around 15-20,000 troops. Although this force was expected to defend a wide expanse of 
country a large number of MacDonald’s troops were stationed at Antwerp under General 
Nicholas Maison; the bulk of the French army in Holland, under General Gabriel Joseph 
Molitor, was poorly disciplined and plagued by desertion. South of the Low Countries, 
between Koblenz and Landau, were a further 40,000 men, under Marshal August Marmont. 
In the south, Marshal Claude Victor had barely 10,000 troops to oppose Schwarzenberg and 
the massive Army of Bohemia. Other than the veterans of the Imperial Guard, under Marshal 
Édouard Mortier, the only other troops available to Napoleon were 30,000 National 
Guardsmen. It must also be remembered that around 100,000 French veterans, under Marshal 
Nicholas Soult, were needed to hold the southern front against Wellington.27  The stage was 
thus set for the invasion of France.  
Rationale for British intervention in 1813 
In the meantime the British received intelligence reports from Holland in early 
November which suggested that the Dutch were on the verge of revolution. These reports 
were confirmed on 21 November when two Dutch dignitaries arrived in England and 
informed the British government that the people of Amsterdam had declared their 
independence.28 The leading Dutch dignitary, Gijsbert Karel Van Hogendorp, requested 
British military support and proceeded to meet the Prince of Orange in order to secure the 
former Stadtholder’s return.29 The Prince of Orange duly informed the British government 
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that he intended to return to Holland in order to mastermind the fusion of both the Southern 
and Northern Netherlands into a new ‘United Netherlands’. He also suggested a marriage 
alliance between his heir and the daughter of the Prince Regent, Princess Charlotte of 
Wales.30  
Eager to provide aid for the Dutch, the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 
Earl Henry Bathurst, dispatched Major-General Sir Herbert Taylor and Dutch Colonel Robert 
Fagel to The Hague with weapons for the rebels (over 20,000 muskets) and orders to “collect 
the most correct circumstantial information” about the Dutch rebels.31 The British were also 
informed that elements of the Army of the North were already en route to support the Dutch 
and that a mobile force of Cossacks, drawn from Lieutenant-General Ferdinand Fedororich 
von Winzegorode’s Russian Corps, under Major-General Alexander Benckendorff, had 
arrived at Amsterdam.32 Bathurst was pleased to discover that the III Corps of the Prussian 
Army of Silesia, under Lieutenant-General Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Bülow, was also 
bound for Holland.33 With Allied troops already in the Low Countries, the British opted to 
place ‘boots on the ground’ and dispatched a small force of Royal Marines to the Scheldt and 
a contingent of Foot Guards to Holland. 34 Plans were drawn up for the dispatch of a much 
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larger British force to be sent to support the Army of the North and Bathurst also ordered the 
commander of the British garrison on the island of Stralsund, Major-General Samuel Gibbs, 
to ready several of his battalions for service in the Low Countries.35  
The man chosen to command the Guards was Major-General George Cooke. A 
veteran of the Revolutionary Wars, Cooke had seen extensive service in the Low Countries, 
serving in all three expeditions to the region in 1794-95, 1799 and 1809. He had been 
wounded in the fighting on the Helder peninsula in 1799 and was one of the many thousands 
to contract Walcheren fever during the expedition to the Scheldt in 1809.36 Cooke’s initial 
instructions were to proceed to the coast of Holland and then to Amsterdam in order to 
support “The efforts made by the people of Holland to re-establish their independence under 
the auspices of His Serene Highness the Prince of Orange.”37 Despite the circumstances, 
Bathurst did not entirely trust the Dutch rebels and provided Cooke with a second set of 
orders, which the general was to follow if the Dutch proved incapable of defending 
themselves. These were as follows: if Amsterdam was recaptured by the French, Cooke was 
to move his command to the Scheldt and to make contact with the Marines and Gibbs.38 Once 
the two British expeditionary forces were united, Cooke and Gibbs were to “Undertake any 
operation which may appear to you advisable for the purpose of gaining security to 
Rotterdam, The Hague and Amsterdam; or if your force be equal to it of expelling the enemy 
from any other position which they may occupy.”39 Unlike Cooke, who had extensive 
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military experience in the Low Countries, Gibbs had served there on only one occasion, 
having participated in the bungled raid on the lock gates at Ostend in 1798.40  
Although Bathurst can be applauded for his swiftness of action in response to the 
events in Holland, his decision to send two different sets of instructions no doubt confused 
the commanders. These criticisms aside the British government had at least shown an element 
of daring and it must be recognized that Bathurst’s main goal was simply to have British 
troops on the ground at a time when the fate of the Low Countries was in the balance. 
Cooke’s small flotilla reached the Dutch coast on 6 December 1813.41   
Whilst Cooke’s force was en route to the Low Countries, Bathurst had been busy 
making preparations for the dispatch of the main expeditionary force under Sir Thomas 
Graham. A seasoned campaigner, Graham had entered the Army late in life but had quickly 
demonstrated his quality, later commanding a sizeable portion of Wellington’s army at the 
decisive battle of Vittoria.42 Unlike many of Wellington’s generals Graham had achieved a 
victory of his own at the Battle of Barrosa in 1811.43 Suffering from eye problems, however, 
Graham had returned to England after Vittoria and was thus available for active service just 
when Bathurst needed a veteran commander. However, if anyone was ready for another 
chance to strike at the French it was Graham, the general having harboured a deep hatred of 
the French following the death of his wife and the mistreatment of her coffin by a mob at 
Toulouse.  Having served as a volunteer at the siege of Toulon in 1793, Graham had returned 
to Scotland and raised his own regiment: the 90th Foot (Perthshire Volunteers). Graham also 
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had some good connections in both political and military circles; his father in law being Lord 
Cathcart, whilst his cousin was Sir John Hope.   
Graham received his marching orders on 4 December and, like Cooke before him, 
was informed of the utmost importance of the need to support the Dutch Orangeists. Despite 
the importance of the mission, Graham was informed that few troops could be spared for the 
Low Countries and that he would simply have to make do with what he was given.44  
The British Army: fit for service?  
 The British forces commanded by Graham were of mixed quality. Gathered together 
at the last minute from garrisons across the British Isles the majority were raw recruits and, 
although Bathurst later provided four further battalions, Graham had barely 7,604 effective 
men at his disposal at the start of the campaign.45 Graham’s force was not the finest: 
The number of fit men available fell short of Bathurst’s expectations by nearly one-
third, and the total deployed – which, by default, must therefore have included men 
deemed unfit for their units – still fell short by nearly a quarter. What was more, 
over and above the units’ being understrength, the state of these battalions was 
frequently poor, with many lacking much of a cadre of old soldiers, and many 
having particularly young NCOs.46  
 
Attrition, combined with a shortfall in recruitment, were the main reasons why there 
were so few troops to send to the Low Countries in 1813. As Kevin Linch has noted between 
1808 and 1813 an average of 15,000 men joined the Army every year, although fewer than 
10,000 joined in 1810.47 During the same period the Army suffered on average 22, 695 
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casualties per year or 10.8% of the total strength of the British Army.48  Some years were 
worse than others particularly 1809 when the Army suffered around 25,000 casualties as a 
result of the fighting in the Iberian Peninsula and the Walcheren malarial epidemic.49 As a 
consequence the British opted to deploy second and even third battalions on active service, a 
measure which had not been countenanced earlier in the war due to the fact that the entire 
point of second battalions had been for them to remain at home in order to form a nucleus of 
recruits. By 1812, however, the losses sustained in Spain and Portugal prompted Wellington 
to create experimental battalions of his own and York also formed a number of second, third 
and even fourth battalions for active service.50 Graham was mostly provided with second and 
third battalions; the majority of his troops were either completely new to soldiering or had 
been encouraged to join the regulars from the Militia, veterans were few and far between.  
This was not the first time that former militiamen formed the bulk of a British 
expeditionary force; Henry Dundas had used such a scheme to provide extra manpower for 
Ireland in 1798 and for the Helder expedition a year later.51 Although militiamen were often 
fit and hardy, they were often thrown into action before they were fully ready for the rigours 
of campaigning. But, in spite of this, the British Army absorbed over 110,000 militiamen into 
regular service over the course of the Napoleonic Wars; 16,000 of whom transferred in 1809 
alone.52 The fact that Graham’s expeditionary force was chiefly formed of second third and 
even fourth battalions explains why his force was so inexperienced.  
Alongside Cooke and Gibbs, Graham could count on the services of the experienced 
Major-Generals John Byne Skerret and Kenneth Mackenzie. Mackenzie, the older of the two, 
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had joined the army at the age of thirteen in 1767 and saw active service in the West Indies 
and Flanders during the early years of the French Revolutionary Wars. Mackenzie had met 
Graham in 1794 when Mackenzie was appointed to serve in Graham’s newly formed light 
infantry regiment. A close friend of Sir John Moore, Mackenzie made his name as a skilled 
drill master of light troops and played a formative role in the creation of the Light Brigade at 
Shorncliffe camp in 1803. He commanded a brigade under Graham at Cadiz in 1810 but was 
ordered back to England due to ill-health and only returned to active service when he was 
ordered to the Low Countries in 1813.53 Skerret, in contrast, had only reached the rank of 
Major-General in 1813 having entered the army in 1783 and had held a number of 
administrative and active commands in the Iberian Peninsula before being ordered to the Low 
Countries.54 Despite their experience, both men would find the challenge of war in the Low 
Countries to be particularly difficult.  
Planning and preparation  
Despite knowing that only a small force could be spared for service in the Low 
Countries, Bathurst was eager to strike at the French as soon as the circumstances permitted. 
On 5 December 1813, the Prince of Orange had chaired a meeting of the representatives of 
the Allied powers in the Low Countries. Although each of the various persons present had 
different strategic ideas about the future campaign, Taylor had been instructed by Bathurst to 
talk up British commitment to the war with France and the Major-General promised the 
Allied leadership that Graham would support the Allied advance. In doing so the British won 
a firm friend in Bülow. The Prussian commander was delighted with the news of British 
support and made it clear that he intended to advance into the Southern Netherlands as soon 
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as his full force was assembled.55  With Graham still enroute, Bathurst ordered Cooke to 
support the Prussians.56 Cooke decided to move against the French-held port of Willemstadt 
and to place a garrison on the Island of Tholen.57 As Sergeant Thomas Morris recalled, the 
winter conditions did not make for a pleasant march “There was a partial breaking of the 
frost; and our first day’s march was the most miserable I have ever experienced. The roads 
were literally knee-deep in mud; many lost their shoes and boots. After toiling all day, we 
were only able to accomplish a distance of ten miles”.58  
As the British troops acclimatised to the wintry December weather, Taylor worked 
alongside the British ambassador, Richard Trench, Second Earl of Clancarty, to rearm the 
Dutch. The Prince of Orange also faced the difficult task of trying to instil a fighting spirit 
amongst a Dutch population which, during the years of French occupation, had eschewed 
violent popular protest in favour of peaceful demonstration.59 Whilst these matters were 
being dealt with Bathurst turned his thoughts to the coming offensive.  
  Bathurst was eager to secure British interests and turned his attention to the 
great French naval dockyards at Antwerp: “Our great objective is Antwerp. We cannot make 
a secure peace if that place be left in the hands of France”.60 Since the failed expedition to the 
Scheldt in 1809, the British had harboured the desire to destroy the French vessels based at 
Antwerp once and for all. In the intervening years, Napoleon had strengthened Antwerp’s 
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defences and, although the British had succeeded in burning the port facilities at Flushing in 
1809, shipbuilding at Antwerp had continued unabated.61 Flushed with excitement at the 
prospect of striking a decisive blow for British interests in the Low Countries, Bathurst, like 
Castlereagh before him became convinced that the time was right for the British force in 
Holland to strike at Antwerp: 
It is now my duty to call your attention to another object in which the British 
interests are deeply invested. I mean the destruction of the naval armament at 
Antwerp. If at any time you should find it possible by marching suddenly on 
Antwerp to occupy such a position as would enable you to destroy the ships which 
it is understood are now laid up there, you would perform an essential service to 
your county. Always bearing in mind that it is the destruction of the naval 
armament not the capture of the citadel or town which should be the principal object 
of your exertions. 62 
 
The politicians made every effort to furnish Graham with as many resources as could 
be spared, including a small train of field artillery and another 20,000 stands of arms.63 
Although bad weather delayed Graham and Gibbs’ arrival until 15 December, the Allied 
forces were quick to take the offensive. Russian General Benckendorff’s Cossacks were the 
first to drive south and with the aid of the local population seized Breda before Graham 
arrived in the Roompot.64 Once he had landed, Graham received news that the French had 
abandoned the Dutch coast and he therefore decided to join Cooke at Willemstadt. By mid to 
late December the Dutch port had turned into the main British supply depot alongside the 
smaller dockyard at Helvoetsluys.65Despite Bathurst’s expectation that Graham would be 
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able to make a quick advance in conjunction with the Prussians, the situation on the ground 
was less favourable. Although Breda had been seized and the islands north of the Eastern 
Scheldt secured, it soon became clear to Graham that the French were not in full retreat and 
intended to defend the main fortresses in Brabant.  
Before making an advance, Graham decided to organise his forces into two divisions. 
The 1st Division was placed under the command of Cooke and included Cooke’s old Guards 
brigade, under Colonel Lord John Proby, and the newly constituted First Brigade under 
Taylor. The 2nd Division, under the command of Kenneth Mackenzie, also comprised two 
brigades, one of which was placed under the command of Colonel John Macleod, whilst the 
other, formed of the army’s light troops, was handed to Gibbs. Both divisions had a company 
of artillery attached to them and could call on the support of the 2nd  Hussars of the King 
German Legion. For the meantime three further battalions, including the aged men of the 
Royal Veteran battalion, were left to garrison Willemstadt.66  
With Antwerp outlined as the main objective, Graham spent much of the rest of 
December and early January making the necessary preparations for an advance. Graham was 
greatly aided by his close friend Lieutenant-Colonel James Stanhope, who had served with 
Graham throughout the Peninsular War and was appointed to act as his Deputy QMG in 
Holland.67 As Stanhope noted in his journal, although the British wanted to advance and seize 
Bergen-Op-Zoom they first needed to secure Breda which, for a brief period, was in danger 
of being recaptured by the French:   
You will have heard of our having landed at Tholen in consequence of the 
evacuation of Willemstadt and Breda. We made a reconnaissance on Bergen-Op-
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Zoom the next day but reinforcement had entered that morning. Had the winds not 
detained us so long in England, I think we should have taken the place by a coup de 
main…That day is however gone by. On the 18th the French pushed a strong body 
supposed to be from 6 to 7,000 men to and invested Breda where Benckendorff was 
with 1,200 Russian infantry and 3,000 cavalry…General Benkendorff evacuates 
Breda tomorrow moving on Dusseldorf…We, although not half equipped, weak in 
numbers and having a most extensive line to defend, nevertheless send a brigade 
‘pour le moment’ to keep the French out if possible.68 
 
Allied intelligence also indicated that a further force of 5,000 French were en route to 
Antwerp. With only 8,000 men under his command and the French strength increasing, 
Graham informed Bathurst that he could, “attempt nothing against any of the strong places in 
Brabant” without Prussian assistance.69 A crisis was averted during the first week in January 
1814 when the approach of the Prussian advance guard persuaded the French to abandon their 
plans against Breda, Graham finally met Bülow in the city on 9 January and it was decided 
that both armies would seek to attack the villages north of Antwerp.70  
 
 Bülow assumed overall control of the offensive and ordered Graham to attack the 
village of Merxem which was located immediately north of Antwerp. Graham’s troops were 
to be assisted in this task by a force of Prussian infantry under General Adolf Freiderich 
Oppen.71 A further Prussian force was to attack the nearby villages of Minderhout and 
Wuustwezel, whilst General Borstel held Westmalle. The Prussians advanced first and 
managed to push the French from Minderhout and Wuustwezel over the course of 11-12 
January, whilst the newly organised British 2nd Division advanced from Calmhout and 
Roosendaal to the vicinity of Merxem.72 The British troops were heavily engaged for the first 
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time on 13 January and after some confusion evicted the French from the village.73 British 
jubilation proved short-lived for no sooner had the British seized Merxem than they were 
ordered to retreat by Bülow, whose own troops had been forced back by the French.74 After 
the skirmish at Merxem, the British retreated to the vicinity of Bergen-Op-Zoom. Despite the 
withdrawal Graham maintained the desire to strike against Antwerp and tried to convince 
Bülow of its importance. However, what convinced Bülow to order another forward 
movement was the Prussian general’s anger at Bernadotte who had announced in The London 
Times that he, and not Bulow, had masterminded the liberation of the Low Countries.75  
In late January the Allied forces advanced once more against the villages north of 
Antwerp but and pushed the French into Antwerp after a series of coordinated attacks.76 
Although keen to please his British, Bülow was ordered to link up with the rest of the Army 
of Silesia in northern France. The Prussian subsequently informed the British that he would 
protect the planned British bombardment of Antwerp’s dockyards for three days, but would 
vacate the Low Countries thereafter.77 With little choice in the matter, Graham accepted these 
terms, and with time of the essence he quickly established a series of batteries north of 
Antwerp. With too few heavy guns of their own the British were forced to rely on a mixed 
number of Dutch ordnance which, as Stanhope noted, was poor in quality: 
 
Our battering train was frozen at the emboucher [mouth] of the Scheldt & could not 
be landed & the ship with the rockets was wind bound at Harwich. We were 
therefore obliged to collect whatever guns could be found in Holland and they were 
bad in quality and inadequate in number. Several of the guns burst & the mortars 
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never carried with a correct range with the exception of three napoleons & they had 
but few shells belonging to them.78  
 
With the batteries built and the first shots fired those uninvolved in the bombardment 
made every effort to gain a good view of the events. Taylor was particularly well placed to 
observe the shells as they rained down upon the city of Antwerp: 
At 3 I went to the top of the church steeple of Merxem with Sir T. Graham, the 
Duke of Clarence, etc., to see the effects of the batteries. They opened at half-past 
three, but the shells in general seemed to fall short. However, towards 5 there was a 
blaze, and our fire continued until past dusk, when it ceased. That of the enemy, 
which had been very warmly kept up, ceased soon after. The buildings on fire 
proved to be Magasins de Comestibles, and a church this side of the arsenal. Our 
casualties were few, four artillerymen and a few horses wounded. Their shot and 
shells passed all our quarters and injured many houses of this place, also struck the 
church steeple occasionally while we were in it. All continued very quiet during the 
night, and some of our guns and mortars were moved to the right, more within 
range.79 
 
 The fire from the British batteries continued in much same manner for the next 
two days but, despite setting parts of the town and docks ablaze, they were unable to destroy 
the dockyards and the French ships moored therein.  One of the main reasons for this was 
that, whilst the Allies had gathered their forces for a fresh advance after the first Battle of 
Merxem, the French had had time to prepare for the British onslaught. The garrison at 
Antwerp had also greatly benefited from the sudden arrival of Lazare Carnot, the fabled 
‘organizer of victory’, who had recently been appointed by Napoleon to secure its defences.80  
A notable defensive measure taken by Carnot before the British arrival had been his decision 
to order that each of the French vessels in the harbour be covered by protective layer of 
timber and earth, which he hoped would absorb any future shelling.81 Following the British 
arrival, Carnot mounted a number of sorties designed to interrupt the bombardment and spike 
several British batteries and encouraged the French gunners to keep up such a ferocious 
counter- fire that the British were forced to withdraw some of their battalions from 
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Merxem.82 As Smyth later reported, the British bombardment ultimately failed to achieve its 
objectives:  
It was impossible not to entertain the most sanguine hopes of a favourable result, 
notwithstanding however the utmost exertion of every officer and man in the Army 
and the very excellent practice made by the artillery who threw more than 2,000 
shells, & a continued fire of three days we have not obtained the object in view. The 
ships were repeatedly on fire, several fires kindled in the buildings round them, and 
a large store room containing the biscuits & provisions for the fleet destroyed by 
being just on fire. The vessels themselves, however, have not been burnt; and I am 
afraid it is not possible to destroy them without much large[r] means than we at 
present possess.83 
 
Graham had little choice but to cease the bombardment and bid farewell to Bülow’s 
Prussians. The British had tried their best, but their best had not been good enough. Not long 
after Bülow had left the scene, Graham was forced to order a halt to proceedings in order to 
plan his next move.   
Following the ineffectual bombardment of Antwerp, Graham was obliged to place his 
army into cantonments between Bergen-Op-Zoom and Breda.84  As Graham considered his 
options, it gradually became clear to him that his force was too small to attack Antwerp until 
a greater array of heavy ordnance was available. With the government eager for signs of 
progress and having achieved little since his arrival in Holland, Graham turned his attention 
to Bergen-Op-Zoom:  
I am inclined to think that if the reinforcements were arrived and the weather 
tolerably steady we might get hold of Bergen-Op-Zoom, the garrison of which is 
certainly of a bad description...If we got Bergen-Op-Zoom…we should be able to 
cross the Scheldt at leisure below Antwerp should there be favourable 
circumstances in that part of Brabant.85 
 On the following day, Graham clarified his ideas to the British representative at The 
Hague, the Earl of Clancarty, with a view to gaining Dutch military support for the attack on 
Bergen-Op-Zoom: 
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An attack on Bergen-Op-Zoom provided no better garrison be thrown into it, would 
probably be on the whole the most beneficial of anything that [we] 
could…undertake. There is no probability of my being able to do anything alone 
against Antwerp which by the last accounts must have 10,000 men in garrison, nor 
is it possible that I could be able to look after that garrison and carry on the siege of 
Bergen-Op-Zoom.86 
 Despite promising to discuss Graham’s scheme with the Prince of Orange, Clancarty 
did not think it likely that the Dutch would be able to support Graham in the manner in which 
he would have liked. The Prince of Orange, Clancarty informed Graham, wanted instead to 
make himself master of Venloo and Maastricht.87 The only sizeable Dutch military assistance 
which Graham could count upon was a Dutch infantry brigade, under the command of 
General Hendrik George, Count de Perponcher Sedlnitsky.88  
Although Graham’s army was strengthened by the arrival of another British infantry 
brigade under General Gore, Graham remained of the opinion that Bergen-Op-Zoom was the 
only realistic objective that his small army could hope to seize before the end of spring.89 
Despite this, Graham continued to think beyond the immediate situation he considered the 
possibility of bribing the French commander at Antwerp, in order to gain the dockyards 
without loss of life. He also gathered information about the French military situation beyond 
Antwerp, in particular the strength of the French garrison at Ostend.90   
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 Before taking further action, Graham’s time was taken up with making two important 
personnel changes. Graham decided that his Commissary-General George Spiller and his 
Deputy QMG Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Trench had performed poorly during the 
previous operations and needed to be replaced.91 Despite Graham’s criticisms, both were 
experienced practioners. Spiller, for instance, had served on York’s staff during the Helder 
expedition in 1799 and as Deputy Commissary General on the home establishment, whilst 
Trench had served on Walcheren in 1809 and acted under Graham at Cadiz. Nevertheless, 
Graham was not satisfied with their conduct. However, instead of following the official 
protocols and writing to York, Graham instead mentioned the problem to Wellington.  
Instead of simply offering his views on the subject Wellington decided to take matters 
into his own hands. He informed Graham in mid-January that Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 
Cathcart and Thomas Dunmore were willing to serve in the Low Countries.92 Although both 
he and Wellington had subverted Army rules, Graham made it clear to Bathurst that the 
changes had been forced upon him because of the poor staff which he had been given by the 
administrators at the Horse Guards.93 With the changes having already been made and with 
greater matters to worry about, both Bathurst and York opted to turn a blind eye to the whole 
episode.  
As the British readied themselves for the next stage of the campaign, Graham became 
increasingly conscious that the war in France was not going as well as had been hoped. Both 
the armies of Silesia and Bohemia had driven deep into France by January 1814 but Blücher 
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and Schwarzenberg moved at different rates.94 With the Allied armies divided, Napoleon 
gathered his forces and prepared to strike against his enemies piecemeal. Although his forces 
were checked by Blücher at the Battle of La Rothière, on 1 February 1814, Napoleon 
launched a whirlwind-like offensive over the course of the following days and defeated the 
Prussians on three occasions at Champaubert, Montmirail and Vauchamps.95 Napoleon then 
turned his attention to Schwarzenberg and the Army of Bohemia which he defeated, at the 
Battle of Montereau, on 18 February.96 Despite these reverses, the Allied armies were not 
destroyed and both Blücher and Schwarzenberg resolved to ready their forces for another 
offensive.       
In the Low Countries, however, a lack of up-to-date intelligence meant that Graham 
did not have a clear idea of what was taking place in France and as he waited for further news 
he gradually grew more concerned about the situation. Graham’s anxiety was raised, on the 
last day in February, when he received word from Bathurst which suggested that his army 
might soon be broken to provide reinforcements for North America and Southern French 
theatres.97 According to Alex Delavoye, this information persuaded Graham that he needed to 
assault Bergen-Op-Zoom as quickly as possible “This unexpected intelligence made General 
Graham more than ever desirous of getting possession of one, at least, of the many 
strongholds held by the enemy before the means of so doing were taken from him”.98  
 Bathurst’s letter certainly confused the situation and accentuated the general anxiety 
of the British high command. Unsure about the fate of the Allied offensives in Champagne, 
perturbed by Bathurst’s letter, and worried by news of French troop concentrations to his 
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front, Graham decided that Bergen-Op-Zoom needed to be taken.99 Before planning the 
operation Graham dispatched Stanhope to gain permission for the attack from the Crown 
Prince and to ask for reinforcements. Stanhope used all his powers of persuasion to make it 
clear to Bernadotte that, with the British troops ‘likely’ to be withdrawn, bold action was 
needed to seize Bergen-Op-Zoom:  
I then brought forward the subject which was of the greatest importance and which 
had not been mentioned to any of the other commanders, the probability of the 
British corps being entirely withdrawn. This led me into the detail of the intended 
force which was promised, the failure of the militia bill on which those ‘hopes’ 
were grounded, the smallness of our corps at present, the extent of our cantonments, 
the necessity of keeping Tholen & South Beveland to have an eye on Flushing, the 
considerable numbers of the enemy opposed to us in Antwerp & Bergen-Op-Zoom, 
the necessity of reinforcing Lord Wellington’s army and the inadequacy of the 
means without breaking up the British corps, which was therefore in the 
contemplation of our government. I then stated the anxiety which General Graham 
felt to get hold of Bergen-Op-Zoom as it would facilitate our operations on the other 
side of the Scheldt, but that he had not a force sufficient to cover and besiege it.100  
  
By repeating the idea that Graham’s force was about to be withdrawn, Stanhope 
managed to convince Bernadotte that it was a good idea that Bergen-Op-Zoom was taken as 
quickly as possible. Stanhope also convinced the former French Marshal to send General 
Wallmoden and a force of fresh troops to support the British.101 Bernadotte clearly valued 
Graham’s presence in the Low Countries and, although it was unclear to Graham whether 
Bathurst would really divide his army, Graham had at least been provided with the ideal 
means to persuade Bernadotte of the need to seize Bergen-Op-Zoom.  
Another factor in Graham’s decision was that the latest intelligence suggested that 
there were no more than 3,000 poor quality French troops in the town and that they were also 
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low in morale.102 Graham was convinced of the need to strike as quickly as possible when, on 
4 March, he received intelligence from the Duke of Saxe-Weimar that a strong French force 
had been observed en route to Antwerp.103 Graham had also been informed that, due to the 
thickness of the ice at Helvoet, the heavy ordnance which had been shipped to the Dutch 
coast for the British could not be moved until the ice had thawed.104  Thus, with sizeable 
French forces apparently preparing for an offensive to his front, the Allies in retreat and his 
force seemingly on the verge of being broken up for other operations, Graham believed he 
had little choice but to mount a surprise attack on Bergen-Op-Zoom. A prominent influence 
over the resulting British plan of attack, Graham’s chief engineer, Carmichael Smyth, later 
justified Graham’s decision by stating that nothing else could have been done in the 
circumstances:   
The greatest difficulty…in making any arrangement for forward movement was the 
fortress of Bergen-Op-Zoom which could not be left in the rear without a 
considerable corps to mask it. Its capture also with a view to the security of Holland 
should any reverse of affairs take place is so very evident that Sir Thomas Graham 
was induced to make a considerable effort to gain possession of this important 
fortress.105 
 
With Bergen-Op-Zoom firmly in his sights, Graham rushed to ready his forces for an attack.  
Bergen-Op-Zoom is one of a number of towns located on an incline known as the 
Brabant wal, a twenty-metre high ridge which runs diagonally across northern Brabant 
between the River Scheldt and Roosendaal.106 The Dutch word Bergen roughly translates as 
‘hill’ in English and thus in the Dutch language Bergen-Op-Zoom equates to “The Hill upon 
the Zoom.” The Zoom, which was canalised before 1814, acted as a natural boundary 
between the north and south of the town. 107 The Zoom also provided water for both the 
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harbour area and a series of defensive ditches, which ringed the eastern side of the town. 
Bergen-Op-Zoom’s defences in 1814 were formidable and were still roughly based upon 
those which had been constructed, over the course of 1698 to 1701, by the great Dutch 
engineer Menno van Coehoorn. He had also been responsible for the maintenance and 
construction of the Dutch forts which had formed the old defensive barrier between Holland 
and France.108 Although sacked by the French in 1747, the fortress had been completely 
rebuilt over the course of the following decades.  
 Bergen-Op-Zoom’s reconstructed defences in 1814 were designed to repel an attack 
from the direction of France whilst the canalised River Zoom provided whoever commanded 
the fortress with direct access to the Scheldt estuary. Either side of the Zoom on the western 
side of the fortress were the sand-covered approaches to the Scheldt and, beyond that, a large 
area of marshland protected the western approaches to the harbour area. These natural 
obstacles shielded the western fringes of the town and were especially deadly at high tide 
when the rising waters of the Scheldt covered the sand flats. This whole area was also 
covered by the guns of the Water-Fort, which had been built upon the sands and was 
connected to the rest of the fortress by a slice of polder and to the harbour via the fortified 
Water-Gate. Both sides of the narrow harbour were protected by a series of water-filled 
ditches and earthen ramparts, features which have been described by Christopher Duffy as 
characteristic of Dutch military engineering.109 The area north of the harbour, meanwhile, 
housed the powder magazine, whilst the southern part was shielded by an inner defensive 
position known as the Orange bastion.  
Unlike the northern harbour walls, which were defended by stone-built angular 
defensive bastions linked to the rest of the northern ramparts by the Steenbergen Gate, the 
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south-western walls were made merely of compacted earth.110 To the south of the Orange 
bastion was an old fortified camp which had subsequently been incorporated into the town’s 
southern defences and was known as the Kijk in dem Pot.111 North of the Kijk in dem Pot 
was the central square at which point the Antwerp road crossed the route to Breda.112  
As the Napoleonic engineer and historian Sir John Jones noted the towns defences 
were strongest between the Kijk in dem Pot and the Breda Gate which “Were constructed 
with a variety of outworks flanked by galleries for reverse fire in their counterscarps, and 
were extensively countermined; and further, their right was supported by a system of 
detached lunettes.”113  The area between the Breda and Steenbergen gates was also strongly 
defended and was supported by the Lines of Steenbergen, which protruded in a diagonal line 
from the North-Eastern corner of the fortress in the direction of Breda. Bergen-Op-Zoom 
anchored this defensive line and, if viewed from a wider perspective, formed the southern 
corner of a grand defensive triangle, which had been created prior to the French Revolution to 
protect Brabant and Zealand from French attack.  
 Although well-defended, the French garrison could not make the most of Bergen-Op-
Zoom’s defences for a number of reasons. Firstly, the commander of the fortress, General 
Bizanet, had barely 2,700 raw levies men at his disposal, a force deemed too few to garrison 
the entire length of the town’s walls.114 Taylor certainly thought that the French were too 
weak defend the fortress properly and informed York on 22 January that “A surprise would 
be practicable.”115 Secondly, the French did not command the Scheldt estuary and thus could 
not reap the benefits of Bergen-Op-Zoom’s close proximity to the river and North Sea. 
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Indeed, had the weather been warmer, the British might have been able to sail down the 
Scheldt to within a close distance of the town. Finally, Bizanet did not know which direction 
a likely attack might come from given that the Allied forces had bypassed the town en route 
to Antwerp and held the surrounding countryside. The British needed to make the most of 
this situation.  
With the decision made to attack Bergen-Op-Zoom, Graham and his senior 
commanders rushed to put together a plan of operations. Lacking any personal knowledge of 
the fortress and its defences, Graham relied on the judgement of Carmichael Smyth. Smyth, 
however, was no expert on the fortress and instead sought the advice of two Dutch engineers, 
Captains Jan Egbertus Van Gorkum and De Bère. Both had close links inside the fortress and 
were related.116  
De Bère had been first to volunteer his services to the British and had made a 
reconnaissance of the fortress with Smyth towards the end of January. During this mission, 
De Bère had suggested to Smyth that the fortress could be taken by surprise and thought that 
an attack would best be made on the western side of Bergen-Op-Zoom. Smyth, however, did 
not place a great deal of faith in De Bère’s technical knowledge and later informed Taylor 
that, despite his zeal, De Bère knew “nothing of fortifications.”117  Van Gorkum was thus 
entrusted with finalising a plan of attack.  
Given the amount of intelligence work he had undertaken over the course of the 
previous weeks, it was no surprise that Van Gorkum was one of only a handful of officers 
who were called by Graham to attend a last-minute planning meeting at the village of Wouw 
on 7 March. What is surprising is that although Graham and his staff agreed to adopt Van 
Gorkum’s plan, including the date for the attack which was set for the night of 8 March, they 
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spent the rest of the meeting adapting it on the suggestion of De Bère. Thus, instead of 
assaulting Bergen-Op-Zoom with 6,000 men in two sizeable columns plus a third false attack, 
as Van Gorkum had suggested, the British decided that around 3,000 men were enough for 
the task and accepted a fresh proposal from De Bère who claimed that another attack to the 
east of the fortress would stretch the weak French garrison to breaking point.118 Van Gorkum 
was not amused by the changes, particularly since he knew that the area chosen for the new 
attack was well defended. Despite making this point to Graham, the general’s mind was made 
up and, as Van Gorkum was escorted out of the room, Smyth confidently boasted that 
numbers were irrelevant as British Guardsmen would easily triumph over French forces three 
times their number.119 Although Graham eventually added a further 300 men to the attack, 
Van Gorkum was left angered and frustrated by the British general.  
   For the rest of the British commanders, the planning meeting at Wouw was the first 
time they had heard of the idea to assault Bergen-Op-Zoom. Although no doubt excited by 
the prospect, they had little time to ready their men or think through their respective tasks. In 
rushing the planning process and placing his confidence in questionable intelligence, Graham 
had inadvertently emulated the mistakes made by the other British generals who had 
commanded in the Low Countries since 1793 and paved the way for another disaster.  
 The final version of the plan of attack called for four different attacking columns to 
assault the defences of Bergen-Op-Zoom at 10 o’clock on the night of 8-9 March.120 The so 
called ‘Right Attack,’ under the command of Skerret, Arthur Gore and Lieutenant-Colonels 
George Carleton and Frederick Muller, was to be made against the harbour side of Bergen-
Op-Zoom with a force of around 1,100 infantry drawn from the 21st, 37th and 44th regiments 
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of Foot. Led by a couple of Dutch guides and a group of engineers, the Right-Attack was to 
begin its advance at 9 o’clock from the village of Halsteren. From here Skerret, Gore and 
Carleton were to traverse the Tholendijk and cross the River Zoom close to the town walls. 
Skerret, Gore and Carleton were then to “Gain the ramparts” to their right and “proceed along 
it until met by the attacks made by the brigade of Guards.”121 The soldiers of the Right-
Attack, as with those in the other attacking columns, were also instructed to shout out ‘Up 
with the Orange’ if they encountered any other troops in the darkness, the reply to was to be 
‘God Save the King’.122 As the senior commander in the area, Skerret was also ordered to 
mount a diversion against the northern ramparts of the fortress. This ‘False Attack’ was to be 
made by around 250 men drawn from the flank companies of the 21st, 37th and 91st Regiments 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin Ottley.123  
 To the south side of the town the 1,000 strong ‘Left Attack,’ under Cooke and Proby, 
was to advance northwards from their camp at the village of Hoogstraten and enter Bergen-
Op-Zoom by way of the Kijk in dem Pot.124 Chiefly composed of detachments from the three 
Guards battalions, the Left Attack also benefited from the guidance of two of the habitants of 
the town and Van Gorkum, Smyth and Captain Sir George Hoste. Once inside the fortress, 
Cooke and Proby were to advance “To their left along the ramparts, to meet the troops under 
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Carleton.”125 Last but not least, 650 infantrymen, drawn 
from the 55th and 69th regiments under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morrice, were to 
undertake De Bère’s ‘Centre-Attack’ against the eastern face of Bergen-Op-Zoom. Morrice 
did have the 33rd Regiment in reserve, although these troops were much further back. Once 
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inside the fortress, Morrice was to establish communications with the other attackers and “be 
in readiness for any further operations against the enemy which may be necessary.”126  
 What was striking about Graham’s plan was its vagueness. Apart from informing each 
of the commanders that, once inside the fortress, they were to endeavour to link up with the 
other attackers no further guidance was provided. Although Carleton knew that he had to link 
up with Cooke and that Cooke’s column was to advance against the southern side of the 
fortress, he did not know when or where. The British also lacked detailed maps of the town 
and relied heavily on what the Dutch engineers said about the fortress.127 Furthermore, 
Graham’s underestimation of the fighting qualities of the French troops played a key part in 
the events of 8-9 March, events which not only tarnished Graham’s reputation, but also that 
of the British Army.  
 The first British troops to attack the fortress of Bergen-Op-Zoom belonged to Ottley’s 
False Attack which succeeded in drawing the bulk of the French garrison to the northern side 
of the fortress.128 Ottley’s soldiers were quickly forced to retire but had achieved all that 
Graham had asked of them. The first troops to enter Bergen-Op-Zoom were the men of 
Carleton’s advanced guard from the Right Attack who, after a silent march along the 
Tholendijk, reached the mud-laden ditches outside the walls and crossed the narrow River 
Zoom just as the False Attack commenced.129  
Carleton, with the 150-strong body of troops under his command, wasted little time 
and quickly secured the outer ramparts near the harbour. What Carleton and Gore needed to 
do at this point was to wait for the rest of the column so that they could push forward in a 
coordinated advance to link with the Left Attack in the vicinity of the Antwerp Gate. 
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Patience, however, was not one of Carleton’s virtues and he continued the rapid advance 
along the southern ramparts without waiting for Skerret. In their eagerness to push on, neither 
Carleton nor Gore decided to inform Skerret and so when Skerret and around 200 more men 
reached the ramparts they found no sign of the forlorn hope. By this stage, the False Attack 
had succeeded in drawing the bulk of the French garrison away from the harbour area and, 
although this feint was forced back with heavy losses, it had provided the Right Attack with a 
golden opportunity to push home its attack against no resistance.  
Skerret, however, had other ideas. Like Carleton before him he had only to wait for 
Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Muller and the reserve to appear before ordering a further 
advance. Skerret was motivated by a desire to achieve a notable victory of his own in order to 
redeem his reputation, which had been dented by his poor conduct under Graham during the 
bungled Tarragona expedition in 1811, under Cooke at Tarifa in 1812, and finally as a 
brigade commander at the siege of San Sebastián in 1813.130 During the planning process, 
Skerret had spoken at length to Van Gorkum about the need to capture the French magazine 
and arsenal and, although the Dutch engineer had agreed with him, Graham’s plan had made 
no mention of these as objectives.131 Undeterred, Skerret had convinced himself that the 
powder magazine was vital to the success of the operation and, when he reached the deserted 
ramparts, he disobeyed Graham’s instructions and hastened off at the head of a body of 
troops in the direction of the magazine.132 Skerret also failed to inform Muller who arrived 
with the reserve shortly after Skerret had moved off. On seeing British troops advancing 
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along both sides of the ramparts, Muller was unsure of which direction to take and decided to 
remain on the defensive.133  
The division of the Right Attack into three independent bodies undermined its impact. 
As the hours passed, Skerret and Muller gradually became embroiled in a minor battle of 
their own for control of the harbour area and powder magazine. This battle occupied their 
time and efforts for the rest of the operation and left them powerless to influence the events 
on the southern side of Bergen-Op-Zoom, events which ultimately decided the fate of the 
British attacks.  
Carleton and Gore with just over a hundred men were the only ones from the Right 
Attack to follow their instructions and were left to capture the entire stretch of ramparts from 
the harbour to the Antwerp Gate on their own. Thankfully for the British, there were only a 
handful of French troops stationed on the southern ramparts and both commanders were 
quickly able to push on to within the vicinity of the Antwerp Gate, where they expected to 
meet the troops of the Left Attack. Unbeknown to them, however, the severity of the weather 
had delayed Cooke’s advance and forced the guards to find another way into the fortress.134 
The route chosen by Graham for the guards to follow was particularly long and would have 
taken a while to complete even in good weather. The distance involved, combined with the 
terrible conditions, meant that the Guards did not enter Bergen-Op-Zoom until half-past 
eleven, over an hour after Carleton and Gore had entered the fortress.135 Cooke’s troops 
might even have been delayed longer had it not been for Lieutenant Charles Abbey and his 
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axe-wielding sappers who cleared a direct path for the Guards through an outer line of 
wooden palisades to the ramparts.136  
Oblivious of the reasons for the delay, Carleton and Gore proceeded along the 
ramparts and tried to link up with the Centre Attack near the Breda Gate. The Centre Attack, 
however, had been a complete failure with Morrice and his subordinate, Lieutenant-Colonel 
William Elphinstone, being wounded in the process. The survivors of this attack, plus the 
men of the reserve, under Major George Muttlebury, had then been redirected to support 
Cooke.137 Carleton, therefore, had marched straight into a trap and after a quick firefight; 
Carleton and Gore were both killed.138 With both their commanders down, the remainder of 
the force retreated back along the ramparts to the Antwerp Gate, where they finally met a 
party of Cooke’s Guardsmen, under Lieutenant-Colonel George Clifton.139 As Clifton 
considered his options, Van Gorkum, who had accompanied Clifton’s command, tried to 
open the Antwerp Gate but failed to do so.140 With no sign of any other British troops, 
Clifton boldly advanced into the maze of streets only to be killed by a blaze of French 
musketry and the rest of Clifton’s force surrendered.141  
Oblivious to Clifton’s fate, Cooke dispatched another party, under Lieutenant-Colonel 
Henry Rooke, to discover what had happened to the Centre Attack and Clifton’s party. Rooke 
found the Antwerp Gate to be back in French hands and returned to Cooke none the wiser as 
to Clifton’s movements.142 The fate of the Centre Attack only became clear to Cooke when 
Muttlebury arrived from the eastern side of the fortress with nearly a thousand infantry. 
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Though Cooke now had roughly a third of the total attacking force under his command, the 
disappearance of Clifton cautioned him against making any forward movement: 
The opinion of our leaders was that we should maintain quiet during the night, and 
take possession in the morning. Colonel Smyth then took his leave to report to the 
General, Sir G. Hoste accompanying him. The plan adopted seemed unhappy. Here 
we were, men and officers standing about in a cold night.143  
 
Having survived the various events on the southern side of the fortress, Sperling had 
made his way to Cooke’s headquarters and was well placed to observe the discussions 
between the commanders of the Left Attack. As Sperling noted, the most vocal officer 
amongst Cooke’s staff was Proby:  
Believing myself the only Engineer officer in the place, I made frequent visits to the 
look-out, to see if the General had any orders. Lord Proby, who commanded the 
Guards, was filled with melancholy forebodings. He had taken up his post with the 
General, and seemed occupied in instilling the diffidence with which his own mind 
was filled. He characterised our situation as desperate (although exactly the reverse, 
as any decisive measure must, humanely speaking, have insured success) and the 
importance of the safety of the Guards. 144  
 
John Proby, Second Earl of Carysfort, had been commissioned into the British Army 
in 1795 and had spent much of his career as a staff officer. He had risen to the post of 
Assistant Quartermaster-General to the British forces in Portugal and Spain in 1808-1809 but, 
despite seeing active service in the Low Countries during the Walcheren expedition and 
under Graham at Cadiz in 1811, he had little experience of commanding troops in battle prior 
to being given the command of the brigade of Guards in Graham’s army for the campaign in 
Holland.145 It is difficult to understand why Proby was so pessimistic about the situation for, 
although things had clearly not gone to plan, he and Cooke had nearly 2,000 men at their 
disposal atop the southern ramparts and would have been aware due to the firing to the north 
that at least one of the other columns had penetrated the fortress.  
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Proby’s concern regarding the safety of the Guards might have been influenced by his 
desire to avoid a repeat of the events at Ostend in 1798.146 Whatever influenced Proby’s 
judgement, he convinced Cooke of the need for patience and Cooke decided to wait until 
dawn before doing anything else. Cooke, it must also be remembered, was without the expert 
knowledge of both Smyth and Van Gorkum, the former having unwisely decided to vacate 
his post in order to report back to Graham, whilst Cooke had foolishly sent Van Gorkum with 
Clifton and had not seen the Dutch officer since.147   
Blind to the nature of the fortress, Cooke’s decision to remain on the defensive 
enabled the French to concentrate their forces against Skerret and Muller. Skerret, like 
Carleton and Gore, was already mortally wounded and his post was taken by Captain James 
Guthrie. Under renewed pressure and without reinforcement from Muller, the survivors of 
Skerret’s force filtered back to the harbour area. Dunbar Moodie, who had joined Guthrie’s 
party towards the end of the night fighting, described the chaotic nature of the events that 
followed, “ The enemy now brought an overbearing force against us…the slaughter was now 
dreadful, and our poor fellows, who had done all that soldiers could in our trying situation, 
now fell thick and fast”.148 The sight of Guthrie’s shattered troops streaming back from the 
powder magazine convinced Muller that retreat was the only option and the British troops in 
the harbour area retreated in chaotic fashion to the Water-Gate.  Moodie and his comrades 
were subsequently forced to surrender when they unexpectedly discovered the gate in French 
hands, whilst Muller surrendered his command under the guns of the Water Fort.149  
On the southern front, the situation had gradually worsened and, in the early morning, 
the French mounted a series of vigorous attacks which aimed to dislodge Cooke’s troops. 
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Although thwarted in these attempts, Muttlebury and the troops of the 69th and 55th 
Regiments thought the situation was bleak.150 Hemmed inside a small sector of Bergen-Op-
Zoom and with no word from the Right Attack, Cooke finally acquiesced to Proby’s request 
and ordered the guards to retreat under the cover of Muttlebury’s infantry. Shortly afterwards 
Proby’s retreat was interrupted when Cooke received official confirmation of Muller’s 
capitulation from Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Jones who had been taken prisoner by the French 
and had been sent to Cooke’s headquarters under a flag of truce. Bizanet called on Cooke to 
surrender.151 Dejected by the news, Cooke did not hesitate and capitulated on the spot.  
So ended the bungled British attempt to seize Bergen-Op-Zoom, an operation that 
suffered not only from being badly planned but also poorly executed. Total British losses for 
the assault stood at 2,552 killed, wounded and captured; the vast majority, at just over 2,000 
officers and men, were those who had capitulated.152 As 3,300 men had made the assault, the 
percentage of men lost, out of the total number of attackers, stood at around 77%, making it 
the highest rate of loss experienced by the British Army in the Napoleonic Wars.153  
Aftermath  
 Shortly after the attack on Bergen-Op-Zoom, Graham attempted to distance himself 
from the events in question. Not only did he report to Bathurst that he had had little choice 
but to mount the attack, but he also stressed that he had been persuaded by the Dutch 
engineers that an attack would be successful.154 Graham’s political masters received news of 
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the debacle at dinner in London on 13 March from Stanhope, whom Graham had dispatched 
immediately after the defeat.155 At a meeting convened by York on the following day, further 
details of the debacle were divulged by Stanhope to the assembled officers. Taylor also 
attended this meeting and noted that, according to Stanhope’s report, the defeat had been 
caused by the failure of the False Attack, the insubordination of Carleton, and Muller’s 
abandonment of the harbour area and subsequent surrender.156 Amazingly Stanhope managed 
to persuade York that the defeat at Bergen-Op-Zoom had not been deserved and in light of 
the courage shown by Graham and his men “It was settled that in consideration of Graham’s 
merit in the plan, it [the defeat at Bergen-Op-Zoom] should be treated as a victory & all 
persons mentioned were promoted & I among the others.”157 With this decision a golden 
chance to review the campaign and learn the lessons of the defeat was lost.  
On 18 March Taylor received a more detailed explanation of the events from Graham 
himself, the general making it clear to Taylor that the defeat was due to those under his 
command and not to his own failings: 
The subject is still too painful to think of almost. I am, however, satisfied that if I 
can blame myself for anything, it is for having placed more confidence than I ought 
in such young troops. At the same time I considered them much improved in 
steadiness by the Merxem campaign, and that they were less likely to run wild after 
plunder and wine than older soldiers. But above all, I could not reckon on their 
leaders behaving like subalterns carrying handfuls of men on without support or 
order to be uselessly sacrificed. It is quite heart breaking to have had such a 
melancholy result, instead of that which would have been that of good conduct.158 
 
 Although Graham had every reason to be angry with his subordinates, not 
least Skerret and Muller, he was not as innocent as he protested. As the commander-in-chief 
of the British forces in the Low Countries he was responsible for the attack and the manner in 
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which it was planned.159 Had Graham been more patient and waited just a few more days he 
would not have had to gamble on an attack because the Prussian and Austrian armies 
defeated Napoleon, at the two-day Battle of Laon, on 9-10 March 1814.160 Even before this 
defeat, the French had already decided to withdraw and had concentrated their troops at 
Antwerp in preparation to do so.   
The irony, of course, was that Graham believed these movements to be the first signs 
of an impending attack and became fixated with the idea that the British needed a secure 
base, north of Antwerp, from which they could defend the Dutch frontier. Quite why Graham 
believed the capture of Bergen-Op-Zoom would have aided the British position in the Low 
Countries if a French attack was imminent is unclear. Even if the British had made 
themselves masters of Bergen-Op-Zoom, the fortress would not have provided much in the 
way of defence if a major French counter-attack had been launched by Napoleon; Graham 
simply would not have had the means to defend the town against a large French army with 
heavy artillery. Ultimately Graham should not have panicked for, despite their defeats at the 
hands of Napoleon, the Prussians were not decisively beaten. Indeed, the Allied armies had 
suffered worse defeats during the campaign of 1813 and had still managed to regroup and 
defeat Napoleon at Leipzig. Graham’s lack of faith in the resilience of the Allies said more 
about Graham than it did anything else. It would also have been unlikely that Bathurst would 
have depleted Graham’s forces if a French counter attack had been launched, given that the 
safety of Holland was still a foremost British interest.  
Why Graham did not decide to retreat to his cantonments, or to the safety of the city 
of Breda is also hard to understand, given that either of these two positions would have 
placed his troops in contact with the Dutch and kept his forces close to the ice-bound supply 
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depots at Willemstadt and Helvoetsluys. The fact that Graham decided on an attack meant 
that the events at Bergen-Op-Zoom were of his making and one would have expected him to 
have at least thought through how his troops were to operate against the fortress. It was also 
strange that, having decided to gamble on an attack, that Graham only deployed a fraction of 
the forces available to him. Although he clearly needed to deploy some troops to screen his 
forces, his decision to deploy Gibbs, with around 4,000 men, for this task deprived him of 
extra striking power. In essence, had Graham attacked with the number of men suggested by 
Van Gorkum, he would have had sizeable reinforcements available to throw into the assault 
and seize the fortress.  
Much of the confusion which characterised the British assault stemmed from 
Graham’s mishandling of the planning process, not least his decision to alter Van Gorkum’s 
plan at the last minute in favour of De Bère’s scheme for a central attack. Indeed, why 
Graham placed so much trust in De Bère was strange given that Smyth clearly had little 
confidence in De Bère’s technical understanding, whilst Van Gorkum was also sceptical 
about de Bère’s grasp of the situation. Graham’s instructions to his subordinates were also 
vague. Instead of being provided with a detailed operational plan, outlining exactly how the 
various columns were to coordinate their operations and force the French to surrender, each 
of the commanders were simply told where to enter the fortress and that speed was of the 
essence.  
Another crucial failing was that nobody at the planning meeting had thought to 
question how each of the columns was to communicate. Graham and his subordinates simply 
expected that each of the attacks would be made on time, arrive exactly where they were 
supposed to, and be in positions which would be easy for the other columns to find. As it 
turned out, communication between the columns was almost non-existent. Without flares or 
rockets to pinpoint where the various columns entered, the commanders on the ground could 
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do little but dispatch small parties into the darkness in the hope that they would stumble upon 
troops from the other columns. Cooke, for instance, was forced to dispatch scouting parties 
off into the town, but fell victim to French counterattacks.161 Graham, therefore, played a 
major part in the failure.  
 Poor planning and insubordination aside, the British might still have achieved victory 
at Bergen-Op-Zoom had Cooke and Proby decided to throw caution to the wind and drive 
into the heart of the town when they had the chance. Although such a move would have been 
dangerous, by the early hours of the morning Cooke had control of much of the southern half 
of Bergen-Op-Zoom and also had an extra 900 infantry at his disposal after Muttlebury’s 
arrival. Although his instructions, like those of the other commanders were vague, it is 
unclear what Cooke and Proby thought they could achieve by waiting on the defensive until 
dawn, especially given that the French were clearly still in possession of much of the town 
and would need to have been dislodged one way or another. If Cooke’s inaction is hard to 
understand, Proby’s defeatism is even more inexplicable given that he commanded arguably 
the finest troops in Graham’s army and the most suited to an assault operation. As it was, 
however, the guards were given little opportunity to test themselves against the French. Proby 
rather cynically tried to save his Guardsmen whilst Muttlebury and the line troops covered 
their retreat. Unfortunately for Proby, Cooke was unable to guarantee the safety of the Guards 
and they too were forced to surrender.  
In spite of the embarrassing nature of the defeat and capitulation of a large portion of 
Graham’s army, including the Guards, Graham’s version of the events at Bergen-Op-Zoom 
was not questioned by the ministers in London, or by York. Unlike Major-General 
Whitelocke, whose career was destroyed by his surrender at Buenos Aires in 1807, Graham 
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was not even subjected to a Court Martial. Nor did the government seek to question 
Graham’s surviving subordinates in order to piece together a clearer picture of what had gone 
so badly wrong. No official inquiry was established and neither was there any official debrief 
for Graham back in London. Matters were quickly swept under the political carpet and 
attention was turned elsewhere. Remarkably, Graham’s military career was not jeopardised 
by the disaster and he was even raised to the peerage by the Prince Regent.162   
As the British placed a positive spin on the events, the Austrians, Prussians, Russians 
and Wellington’s army continued their relentless advance into France and Napoleon was 
forced to abdicate on 13 April 1814. Although the British had contributed much to 
Napoleon’s eventual defeat, their military performance in the Low Countries in 1813-14 was 
poor and would have achieved little had the Allied armies failed to defeat the French. It 
would not be the last time in European history that a British army would so heavily rely on 




                                                          




A number of clear parallels can be drawn between the British defeat at Bergen-Op-
Zoom in 1814 and previous British military failures in the Low Countries.  All were 
conceived by the politicians in London as a means to secure British interests in the Low 
Countries and all failed as a result of rushed strategic and operational planning, based upon 
unreliable intelligence. In addition, Anglo-Allied relations were often imperfect and the 
British habitually bemoaned the fighting qualities of their European Allies, despite their own 
poor military record in Europe. Repeated British defeats in the Low Countries, combined 
with the propensity of British generals to run for the safety of the ships after defeat in battle, 
severely damaged the reputation of the British Army. This habit almost resulted in the 
breakdown of Allied relations in 1815 and might have led to a completely different outcome 
had Gneisenau succeeded in persuading Blücher that Wellington would flee to the coast after 
Ligny.  
As has been demonstrated, the Low Countries played a pivotal role in the British 
pursuit of both European and global strategies. British interest in the Low Countries, 
however, was not a new phenomenon. The price of British defeat in the Netherlands in 1793-
5 was French dominance of the Low Countries for over twenty years and the intermittent 
threat of a French invasion. Although British strategists proved adept at remaining committed 
to the Low Countries over the course of the period 1793 to 1815, British military operations 
in the region routinely failed. Despite the fact that the generals were often responsible for the 
military fallings behind the defeats in question, the politicians were also responsible, not least 
for their propensity to deviate from existing strategic plans at the last minute in order to 
mount ambitious operations. In 1793 and 1814 the British deviated from existing aims in 
order to placate their Allies and secure a tangible victory of their own. Unfortunately for the 
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British, however, military blunders and strategic mismanagement resulted in defeat at both 
Dunkirk in 1793 and at Bergen-Op-Zoom in 1814.  
British ministers also routinely let their excitement at the prospects of victory cloud 
their better judgement and based their offensive strategies upon unreliable intelligence. As 
demonstrated by Grenville’s flawed perspective and planning prior to the Helder expedition 
in 1799. The politicians also regularly failed to consider the practicalities of their decisions 
and often committed their limited military and naval resources to a number of different 
operations at the same time. In 1793, for example, Pitt, Grenville and Dundas simultaneously 
dispatched British forces to the Low Countries, West Indies, India and the Mediterranean, 
despite having only a limited number of regular troops and vessels at their disposal. As the 
wars dragged on and the attrition rates increased, the British struggled to keep up the numbers 
by the usual means and were forced to take drastic measures in order to fill the ranks.  
Manpower worries came to a head in 1799, when Henry Dundas was forced to draft 
militiamen into the regulars, in order to provide enough troops for the Helder expedition. 
Dundas’s militiamen also required extra training before they could be deployed and this 
forced Abercomby to suspend operations until the new recruits arrived. This delay proved 
decisive and enabled the French and Dutch to ready their forces for the campaign. The British 
forces, under the overall command of York, made little headway in the ensuing campaign 
despite being able to call upon the services of a large Russian contingent. Defeat duly 
followed. A similar set of circumstances also prompted the British to draft a large number of 
militiamen into the regulars in 1813-14.  
The only occasion when British could call upon a sizeable disposable force for active 
service was before the Scheldt expedition in 1809. Castlereagh’s failure to forewarn the 
medical services of the intended destination of the expedition resulted in the near destruction 
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of the British forces by disease on the islands of Walcheren and South Beveland and caused 
many thousands of troops to suffer from severe relapses of the illness for the remainder of the 
Napoleonic Wars. Notwithstanding the problems caused by the ministers in London, British 
military operations in the Low Countries also failed because British generals routinely 
avoided making operational plans and did not learn from their previous mistakes. For 
instance, in the build-up to the siege of Dunkirk in 1793, York and Murray did not consider 
how their forces would operate after they had invested the French fortress and nor did they 
consider it necessary to scout the area before they reached the coast. They also failed to plan 
how a siege train would be transported to Dunkirk and disregarded the value of naval support. 
The British also lacked maps of the area and relied heavily on inaccurate intelligence 
information. As a result York made few preparations for the siege, divided his forces in the 
face of the enemy and was defeated. Despite the defeat York and the military administration 
in London did not investigate what had caused the reversal. No official military enquiry was 
ever convened and there was no attempt to analyse the campaign for future reference. With 
nothing learned from the defeat at Dunkirk, the British continued to commit similar military 
blunders over the course of the remainder of the conflict and eventually lost the Low 
Countries in 1795.  
In each of the major British campaigns in the Low Countries over the course of 1793 
to 1814, British desire to achieve a quick victory, combined with overconfidence in the 
fighting qualities of British troops and a reliance on inaccurate intelligence encouraged 
commanders to rush through the planning process so that their forces could get stuck into the 
enemy as quickly as possible. As has been shown, these factors also affected British 
amphibious operations. In 1799, for example, Abercomby and Mitchell were given little 
information about the Dutch coast and only decided where to land when they anchored off 
the Dutch coast. Similar planning blunders jeopardized the expedition to the Scheldt in 1809 
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and led to the near destruction of Chatham’s army. Chatham and Strachan not only failed to 
create a detailed operational plan for both the landings and the subsequent advance on 
Antwerp but also failed to consider how they would maintain good communication with their 
subordinates. Given the lack of preparation, things started to unravel for the British as soon 
they reached the Scheldt and got progressively worse until the expedition was aborted. 
Despite the establishment of an Inquiry, no attempt was made to identify lessons from the 
defeat and the British officer corps was left none the wiser from the whole experience.  
This pattern of defeat also blighted the British campaign in the Low Countries in 
1813-14. Not only did the British fail to plan their attempt to destroy the French dockyards at 
Antwerp, but they also bungled their way to disaster at Bergen-Op-Zoom. Like other British 
generals before him, Graham rushed to attack his objective in Bergen-Op-Zoom, having 
hurried the planning process. The British also relied on faulty intelligence and underestimated 
the fighting abilities of the garrison, mistakes which greatly contributed to their defeat.  
British defeats which followed the same pattern also occurred in South America in 1806-07, 
during the Corunna campaign in 1809, at Burgos in 1812 and, finally, during the disastrous 
Louisiana campaign in 1815, which culminated in the crushing defeat of Edward Pakenham’s 
Peninsular War veterans at New Orleans – clear evidence that the British never learnt from 
their mistakes.  
Although the reforms made by York made good some of the problems which had 
affected the army during the early years of the French Revolutionary Wars, the administrative 
changes did not directly impact upon performance because there was no emphasis on the 
need to learn from past mistakes and no mechanism for learning existed in the British 
military. According to Huw J. Davies, the British officer corps of the Napoleonic Wars was 
an intellectually minded body which shared ideas and was able to learn from the past: 
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It is clear that military thinking took place within a defined intellectual community, 
which prior to 1815 facilitated the transfer of ideas, innovative practices and 
adaptations across the wide theatre of operations that the British Army practiced in. 
These can be loosely termed ‘military knowledge networks’ and several existed 
within and between theatres.1 
Central to Davies’s argument is the assumption that the British officer corps was a thinking 
organisation and one whose members were able to learn from the past. However, as has been 
demonstrated, these claims appear exaggerated given the British experience in the Low 
Countries and elsewhere. For instance, although Wellington famously remarked that he had 
“Learnt what not to do” in the Low Countries in 1794, there is little to suggest that other 
British officers possessed the ability or desire to do likewise. For the most part the British 
military profession, to quote John P. Kiszely, “had a highly variable attitude toward military 
history” and until recently has never truly been committed to the development of a culture of 
military thought.2 Moreover, neither is there much evidence to suggest that the British 
recognised the benefit of ideas sharing and no official channels existed for officers to discuss 
ideas with their contemporaries.  
The only occasions in which officers had a chance to share ideas was in private 
meetings, but there is little or no evidence to illuminate what these discussions were about, let 
alone to suggest that the conversations themselves ever went beyond the confines of the 
dinner table. Thus contrary to Davies’s argument, the true British approach to military 
knowledge during this period was characterised by what Anthony Clayton has termed “An 
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anti-intellectual self-confidence” which was often fatal to British military performance and 
helped perpetuate the idea that “the innate abilities of the gentleman amateur would always 
triumph over the professional or the native tribesman.”3  
One of the by-products of the lack of an intellectual approach to war in the British 
Army was that there was no official mechanism in place for collecting and collating military 
reports and identifying potential lessons. Despite the fact that the British created a number of 
Commissions of Military Enquiry over the course of the period 1806 to 1818, none of these 
were designed to analyse in detail recent military developments or decipher lessons to be 
learnt from past military operations. Instead, the Commissions were created to report on 
purely administrative aspects.4  Military Inquiries were not the norm and it was rare that 
anything could be learnt from these opportunities, owing to the fact that the participants were 
often chiefly motivated by the desire to save their careers than to learn from past mistakes. 
The inquiry which followed the British surrender at Yorktown in 1781, for example, quickly 
degenerated into a clash of egos between Lieutenant-Generals Sir Henry Clinton and Charles 
Earl Cornwallis as the two men eschewed the chance to learn from the past and entered into a 
personal vendetta against one another.5 The Cintra Inquiry in 1808 and the Scheldt Inquiry in 
1810 were also dominated by personality clashes, instead of attempts to learn.  
The absence of a culture of learning not only meant that British officers were unready 
for the rigours of European war but were also equally unready for amphibious operations. 
Despite having mounted numerous amphibious operations against the French over the course 
of the 1700s, the administrators at the Horse Guards had never encouraged army officers to 
undertake special training for amphibious warfare. In contrast, the Royal Navy had gradually 
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Yorktown History, Vol. 98 Issue 331 (Jul., 2013), pp. 370–389. 
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developed a specialist amphibious force of its own over the course of the period, in the form 
of the Royal Marines. Although the Marines gained their Royal status in 1802, their origins 
can be traced back to an Order in Council in 1664, which called for the creation of the Duke 
of York and Albany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot.6 There were limited regulations for how 
the Royal Marines were to operate, however, so the Marines had developed their own 
approach to warfare and were trained according to both naval and military drills.7 A number 
of specialist works of amphibious theory were also available for officers of the marines and, 
although these texts were not incorporated into official regulations, they served to encourage 
Marine officers to develop an identity and to embrace their role as specialists in amphibious 
operations.8  
Further evidence that the British Army did not ordinarily learn from past experience 
of amphibious operations is demonstrated by the fact that Abercomby needed to train his men 
for amphibious landings prior to the successful expedition to Egypt in 1801.9 His death in the 
ensuing Egyptian campaign robbed the British Army of one of its brightest talents. The 
deaths of Moore at Corunna in 1809 and Le Marchant at Salamanca in 1812 deprived the 
army of two more rare military thinkers. Neither was there a policy of official debriefings 
and, for example, Wellington was never interviewed after he returned from India despite 
having played a major role in the wars against Dhoondiah Vagh and the Marathas.10  
                                                          
6 http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/The-Fleet/The-Royal-Marines/About-the-Royal-Marines/History 
7 Britt Zerbe, “That most useful body of men”: The Operational Doctrine and Identity of the British Marine 
Corps, 1755-1802 (PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, September 2010), pp. 153-167.  
8 Examples of the works available included: Thomas Molyneaux, Conjunct Operations: or expeditions that have 
been carried on jointly by the fleet and army (London, 1759); J. Robson, The British Mars, Containing several 
schemes and inventions, to be practised by land or sea against the enemies of Great Britain (London, 1763); Lt. 
John MacIntire, A Military Treatise on the Discipline of Marine Forces when at Sea (1763); Zerbe, “That most 
useful body of men”, pp. 154-155, 163-165.  
9 Mackesy, British Victory in Egypt, pp. 38-44. For more on learning and amphibious operations in the age of 
sail see Richard Harding, Amphibious Warfare in the Eighteenth Century: British Expedition to the West Indies, 
1740-42 (London: The Royal Historical Society, 1991).  
10 Davies, Wellington’s Wars, p. 97.  
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This contrasted markedly with the learning ethos fostered by the Prussians after their 
defeats at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 and in East Prussia in 1807. Shortly after the defeat at 
Friedland in June 1807, King Frederick William ordered the military high command to 
undertake a formal investigation into the poor performance of the Prussian army. The inquiry 
was organised into two military commissions. The most important of these was the ‘Military 
Reorganisation Commission’ which was placed under Scharnhorst’s control.11 The work of 
this commission was nothing short of remarkable. As Peter Paret has noted:  
The investigations scale and intensity were unprecedented at the time and may not 
have been equalled since. The commission began work toward the end of 1807 and 
continued until the summer of 1812. It investigated every surrender and every 
capitulation of a town or a fortress, together with the operations leading up to these 
events; demanded detailed reports from every senior commander, commanding 
officer of independent units, and eventually from every regimental and battalion 
commander; and ordered each regiment that had been in action to set up tribunals, 
their findings to be reviewed by the commission, which in turn forwarded 
recommendations to the king.12 
Ultimately the Prussians recognised in defeat the value of learning from their mistakes 
in order to improve future military performance whereas the British did not. The senior 
figures at the Horse Guards, and their political masters, were often all too eager to find 
scapegoats instead of seeking to understand what had occurred and why victory had not been 
secured. Prussia was not the only European power to seek lessons after defeat. Indeed, had 
other reviews not been undertaken by the Austrians and Russians after their defeats the 
French might never have been defeated at Leipzig. As it was the Austrians, Prussians and 
Russians eventually learnt that the way to defeat Napoleon was to emulate the French 
military system - especially the use of Army Corps – to provide strategic and operational 
flexibility. It was fortunate, therefore, that the British had one commander at their disposal in 
                                                          
11 Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War, p.84; Geoffrey L. Herrera and Thomas G. Mahnken ‘Military 
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and Leslie C. Eliason, The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
Cal. 2003), pp205-242 at p. 213. For further on the Prussian response to defeat in 1806 see Gunther E. 
Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 
191-192; Denis E. Showalter, ‘The Prussian Landwehr and Its Critics, 1813-1819’ Central European History, 
Vol. 4 No. 1 (Mar., 1971), pp. 3-33 at p.4.   




Wellington who thought and fought more like a European than his contemporaries in the 
British Army.  
 Unlike most of his contemporaries Wellington was an educated soldier who not only 
developed an ability to think constructively about military affairs but also actively sought to 
analyse and learn from past experiences. These attributes provided him with the means to 
succeed where others had not.  Furthermore, it is possible to argue that all of Wellington’s 
command skills, such as his light and quick battlefield tactics, eye for the terrain, ability to 
work with Allies, logistical expertise and recognition of the value of intelligence, were 
products of a gradual apprenticeship in the art of war which can be traced back to his baptism 
of fire in the Low Countries in 1794-5. It was in the Netherlands that a young Sir Arthur 
famously “learnt what not to do”, evidence that there is always something to learn if one has 
the desire and ability to do so; traits which few British officers possessed. Wellington was 
also an avid reader who always tried to develop prior knowledge of the area of operations for 
which he was bound. As S.P.G Ward has noted: 
When he was sent to India his library was stocked with books on India…when he 
was sent to the Peninsula he carried not only a Spanish prayer-book from which to 
learn the language, but Sir Charles Stewarts’ old Portuguese letter-books of 1797 
and General Richard Stewarts’ of 1803, amongst other sources from which he made 
his first interpretation of the form a war in Portugal would assume…Few generals 
have devoted their spare hours so advantageously to utilitarian scholarship.13 
 
In the absence of a culture of learning and an official mechanism for the identification 
of lessons, Wellington’s pursuit of professional knowledge marked him out from the crowd. 
Wellington’s desire always to be well informed about the enemy, which the duke famously 
described as a quest to understand what was on the other side of the hill, was the product of 
personal intelligence gathering and astute planning. Thus, on numerous occasions throughout 
his career, Wellington was able to learn from past mistakes when his contemporaries did not. 
                                                          
13 Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters, pp. 163-164.  
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For example, it was not merely by chance that Wellington placed great stock in the 
accumulation of good intelligence in the Iberian peninsula but because he had learnt from his 
own failure to gather accurate intelligence during the early stages of the error-strewn Deccan 
campaign against the Marathas in 1803.14  Additionally, Wellington’s eye for detail and skill 
at writing meticulous dispatches won him admirers in high places and between 1807 to 1808 
Wellington acted as an expert military advisor to Castlereagh.15  
Wellington’s ability to learn gave him a great advantage over his contemporaries who 
were usually content to ride into the thick of the action or a new campaign without first 
thinking through how best they were to operate, maintain their forces on the march, or defeat 
the enemy. Wellington’s hours of study also enabled him to develop a keen appreciation of 
both the limitations of British military power and the weaknesses of his opponents. Although 
he had spent his early career in India, many of the challenges he faced during this time were 
not unlike those which he would confront in European conditions later in his career.16 
Wellington’s time at Angers also introduced him to the scientific character of European 
military thinking and impressed upon him the value of learning.  Evidence of Wellington’s 
ability to learn from past experiences and think constructively about the strengths and 
weaknesses of his own troops and those of the enemy can be found in the records of a 
conversation between Sir Arthur and John Wilson Croker MP prior to the 1808 campaign in 
Portugal. When asked by Croker as to his thoughts on the proposed campaign in Portugal 
Wellington stated: 
Why, to say the truth, I am thinking of the French that I am going to fight. I have 
not seen them since the campaign in Flanders when they were capital soldiers, and a 
dozen years of victory under Bonaparte must have made them better still. They 
                                                          
14 Davies, Wellington’s Wars, pp. 50-7, 73-75; Elizabeth Longford, Wellington, The Years of the Sword 
(London: World Books, 1971), pp. 91-121; Jac Weller, Wellington in India (London: Longman, 1972); 
Randolph G.S Cooper, ‘Wellington and the Marathas in 1803’ IHR, Vol. II No. 1 (Feb., 1989), pp. 31-38; David 
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15 Muir, Wellington, pp. 228-229.  
16 Muir, Wellington,, p. 165.  
254 
 
have, besides, it seems, a new system of strategy which has out-manoeuvred and 
overwhelmed all the armies of Europe. ‘Tis enough to make one thoughtful, but no 
matter: my die is cast, they may overwhelm me, but I don’t think they will out-
manoeuvre me. First because I am not afraid of them as everyone else seems to be; 
and secondly because if what I hear of their system is true, I think it a false one 
against steady troops.17  
 
In 1808, Wellington’s knowledge of French numerical superiority prompted him to 
propose a scheme for the recruitment and maintenance of a remodelled Portuguese Army and 
better logistical arrangements.18 Additionally, although Wellington greatly valued the British 
regimental system, he was also quick to recognize the merits of the French divisional 
organisation and adopted something similar in 1809; a Corps structure also gradually 
evolved.19  
As well having a keen appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the 
French military system, Wellington’s years of study and command apprenticeship had taught 
him to distrust his fellow general officers. Whether in the aftermath of the controversial 
Convention of Cintra in 1808, or the near disaster at the Battle of the River Coa in 1810, 
Wellington often displayed a general distrust of his fellow senior officers and he habitually 
sought to lead from the front instead of delegating tasks to others. Wellington also much 
lamented the inability of his subordinates to learn from their mistakes and rebuked one 
General as follows, “What I cannot bear is his leaving his guns and stores; and strange to say, 
                                                          
17 John Wilson Croker, The Croker Papers: The Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker, Secretary 
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not only does he not think he was wrong in so doing, but he writes of it as being rather 
meritous, and says he did it before”.20  
Therefore when asked later in life how he had achieved success when others had not 
Wellington’s responded simply by stating that “The real reason why I succeeded in my own 
campaigns is because I was always on the spot—I saw everything, and did everything for 
myself”.21Although historians have suggested that Wellington’s habit of doing everything by 
himself marks greatness as a leader of men, particularly his hands-on approach at the Battle 
of Salamanca in 1812, it can also be viewed as a sign of the general weakness of the British 
officer corps. For example, in the aftermath of the close run Battle of Albuera and the escape 
of the French garrison at Almeida in 1811, Wellington blamed himself for not having been 
present and lamented the incompetence of his generals and their inability to undertake 
effective operational planning:  
I certainly feel, every day, more and more the difficulty of the situation in which I 
am placed. I am obliged to be everywhere, and if absent from any operation, 
something goes wrong. It is to be hoped that the General and other officers of the 
army will at last acquire that experience which will teach them that success can be 
attained only by attention to the most minute details; and by tracing only part of 
every operation from its origin to its conclusion, point by point, and ascertaining 
that the whole is understood by those who are to execute it.22 
 
Unlike his contemporaries, whose dispatches constitute little more than lists of events, 
Wellington’s display the hallmarks of a careful thinker who actively sought to evaluate 
events and the actions of others. However, although able to marshal his thoughts just as well 
as he did his troops, Wellington rarely shared his military thinking and knowledge about war 
with his contemporaries or encouraged others to adopt his more thoughtful approach to 
military matters. Neither did he seek to establish a culture of learning amongst his fellow 
officers. Additionally, not unlike Napoleon, Wellington’s style of leadership hindered his 
                                                          
20 Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington, pp.169-170.  
21 Phillp Henry, 5th Earl of Stanhope, Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington 1831-1851 (New 
York: Longmans Green & Co, 1888), p. 182.  
22 Esdaile, The Duke of Wellington, Military Dispatches p. 145.  
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generals’ professional development and Wellington only fully trusted Hill.23 Wellington’s 
opposition to reform during his time as Commander in Chief also hindered the development 
of competent British generals and many future commanders were often left asking ‘what the 
great duke would have done’ when they encountered difficulties on campaign.24  
Ultimately the British were fortunate to have an officer of Wellington’s calibre at 
their disposal. His success was due to his ability to learn from past experiences and to adapt 
his skills to different circumstances. In spite of his undoubted brilliance Wellington badly 
handled the army after victory at Salamanca in 1812 which led to the retreat from Burgos. 
British success in the peninsula was largely founded on the support of the local population 
and, had the Portuguese abandoned the British, no amount of battlefield prowess on the part 
of Wellington would have been able to prevent the need for a general British evacuation. The 
British would also have had to face far more French troops had the Spanish not contributed so 
much to the war effort in the peninsula.25 The same can be said of the Prussians and the 
Allied troops which formed the bulk of Wellington’s army in 1815, not to mention the 
thousands of Sepoy’s who fought alongside the British in India. Wellington was also 
fortunate not to have to face Napoleon and the Grande Armeé when the Emperor was at the 
peak of his powers in 1805-10. Fundamentally, Wellington was unique amongst his 
contemporaries and the successes achieved by his troops were not replicated by other British 
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generals in other theatres, not least the Low Countries.26 Remove Wellington and his 
victories from the history of the British Army and all that is left is a sad record of defeats and 
disasters which the British continued to suffer, despite York’s reforms.  
As already noted in the analysis of the concept of military transformation, reform can 
only take an organisation so far and is not far reaching enough to bring about transformation. 
Although worthy in their own right, the incremental military reforms made by York were 
narrowly focused on administrative, organisational and tactical aspects. They did not amount 
to an integrated programme of reform which consciously sought to transform the way the 
British Army operated and they did not significantly improve British military performance. 
Crucially the reforms did little to challenge the fundamental complacency and anti-
intellectualism of the officer corps. Nor was there any attempt to create official mechanisms 
for reflection and learning. Almost all British generals, therefore, failed to analyse past 
experiences and blundered from one disaster to the next in the Low Countries and elsewhere. 
Only Wellington learned from his experiences and was able to achieve success. Despite 
attempts by some historians to argue to the contrary, there was no transformation in the 
British Army during this period.  
 
                                                          
26 Bruce Collins has suggested that British success in 1815 is evidence of lessons having been learnt when in 
reality it was chiefly due to Wellington’s generalship. For Collins’s argument see: Collins, War and Empire: 




Map 1:  
 
Map of Anglo-Hanoverian positions near Dunkirk and direction of French offensive prior to 
Battle of Hondschoote (24 Aug-6 Sept 1793). Map taken from Fortescue, British Campaigns 




Map 2:  
 
Map of the Battle of Tourcoing 17-18 May 1794. Taken from Belloc, Tourcoing, p. 4.  N.B: 





Map 3:  
 
Map showing scene of Anglo-Russian campaign in the Low Countries in 1799. Colour code: 




Map 4:  
 
Map located at TNA MPH 1/810 and extracted from TNA WO 1/180. Note to map 6: map 
faces south.  Colour code: Blue = French/Batavians; Red = British; Green = Russians. N.B: 
















Cropped map of River Scheldt showing British landing sites and areas of operations: TNA 
WO 1/180 ‘Journal of the Proceedings of the Army’: Red Arrows = British landing sites; Red 
Lines = British troop concentrations; Red Circle = Flushing; Blue Lines = French troop 
concentrations; Blue Circle = Antwerp and dockyards.  
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Map 6:  
 
 
Cropped map/ landscape showing the British siege lines north of Flushing. Taken from TNA 







Map showing British attack upon Bergen-Op-Zoom. Taken from TNA WO 78/ 2726. Note 
key on left of map: Right Attack (Carleton/ Gore/ Skerret); Left Attack (Cooke/ Proby); False 
Attack (Ottley); Centre Arrack (Morrice) – these troops later joined Cooke’s column;      = 
British surrender points. 
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